Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 16 July 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. SC 97330,SC 97330 |
| Parties | Ronald JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Johnson was represented by Amy E. Lowe of the public defender’s office in St. Louis, (314) 340-7662.
The state was represented by Daniel N. McPherson of the attorney general’s office in Jefferson City, (573) 751-3321.
Ronald Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of first-degree murder, one count of first-degree robbery, and two counts of armed criminal action. The circuit court sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Johnson moved for postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035,1 arguing his counsel was ineffective and, therefore, his plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily. The motion court overruled his motion after an evidentiary hearing. Because Johnson has not established his counsel was ineffective or his plea was entered unknowingly and involuntarily, the motion court’s judgment is affirmed.
Ronald Johnson and Cleophus King were charged with the murder of a local attorney in the city of St. Louis.2 The State possessed an audio recording that documented the crime as it occurred. Before trial, the State offered Johnson a plea agreement in which the State would abandon seeking the death penalty in exchange for his guilty plea. Given the heinous nature of the alleged crimes and the significant evidence of Johnson’s guilt possessed by the State, his counsel advised him he could receive the death penalty if he took his case to trial.
Johnson ultimately accepted the State’s offer. At his plea hearing, the circuit court asked Johnson if he understood the charges against him, if he had time to discuss his case with his attorney, and whether he wished to plead guilty. Johnson affirmed he understood the charges, adequately discussed the case with his attorney, and wished to plead guilty. Johnson also affirmed he fully understood the nature of the proceedings against him and he had no mental disabilities
that would impair his ability to aid in his defense. The circuit court informed Johnson of the rights he would waive by pleading guilty. Johnson indicated he understood he forfeited those rights by pleading guilty and desired to do so. The State recited the following factual basis to support the guilty plea:
Johnson indicated these facts, as recited by the State, were correct. He also denied there were any threats made to induce his guilty plea.
The circuit court then asked Johnson about his satisfaction with his plea counsel’s performance, to which Johnson indicated he was satisfied with his counsel and his counsel had done what Johnson asked him to do. The circuit court accepted Johnson’s guilty plea, finding it to be knowing and voluntary, and imposed a sentence of life without the possibility of parole pursuant to the plea agreement.
Johnson filed a timely motion for postconviction relief. In his amended motion, Johnson sought postconviction relief on three specific grounds.3 Johnson argued he was coerced into pleading guilty by the threat of receiving the death penalty when he was ineligible for such punishment due to intellectual disability; he was not competent at the time of his plea and will never be competent; and his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s competency evaluation and request an independent evaluation.4 The motion court conducted an evidentiary hearing, at which Johnson introduced evidence about his low IQ and threats made by his plea counsel that caused him to believe he would receive the death penalty if he took his case to trial even though his low IQ made him ineligible to receive the death penalty. Johnson argued his low IQ made him incompetent to enter his plea, and he would never be competent to enter a guilty plea due to his intellectual disability. At the hearing, Johnson also faulted his counsel for not challenging the State’s competency evaluation and not seeking and obtaining an independent evaluation.
Johnson’s plea counsel testified he believed Johnson was intellectually slow, but he did not believe Johnson was intellectually disabled based on his interactions with Johnson. Johnson’s counsel also denied encouraging Johnson to accept the State’s offer or threating that Johnson would receive the death penalty if convicted by a jury. Johnson’s counsel instead testified he advised Johnson only of the potential consequences of taking his case to trial, namely, that he could receive the death penalty if he did not accept the State’s plea offer. Johnson’s counsel testified Johnson decided to accept the plea offer and plead guilty after lengthy discussions with his family. The motion court found Johnson’s plea counsel credible, specifically rejecting Johnson’s allegation that counsel threatened he would receive the death penalty if the case proceeded to trial, and overruled Johnson’s motion for postconviction relief. Johnson appealed, and this Court ordered transfer pursuant to Rule 83.04.
"This Court’s review of a motion court’s ruling on a Rule 24.035 motion for postconviction relief is ‘limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the [motion] court are clearly erroneous.’ " Latham v. State , 554 S.W.3d 397, 401 (Mo. banc 2018) (quoting Rule 24.035(k)) (alterations in original). "A motion court’s findings and conclusions are clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire record, the court is left with the definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Johnson seeks postconviction relief pursuant to Rule 24.035,5 alleging his plea counsel was ineffective for advising him to accept the plea agreement. "If conviction results from a guilty plea, any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is immaterial except to the extent that it impinges the voluntariness and knowledge with which the plea was made." Cooper v. State , 356 S.W.3d 148, 153 (Mo. banc 2011). To prove his counsel was ineffective, Johnson must show "(1) counsel’s performance did not conform to the degree of skill, care and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney and (2) he was thereby prejudiced." Webb v. State , 334 S.W.3d 126, 128 (Mo. banc 2011). "To show prejudice in a guilty plea case, a defendant must prove that, but for the errors of counsel, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have demanded trial." Cooper , 356 S.W.3d at 153.
On appeal, Johnson asserts three grounds for relief. First, Johnson argues he was coerced into accepting the State’s plea offer when his plea counsel threatened he could receive the death penalty if he took his case to trial. Second, Johnson argues he was incompetent to plead guilty because of his intellectual disability, and that he will never be competent to plead guilty due to his low IQ. Third, Johnson alleges his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the State’s competency evaluation.
"[A] guilty plea must be a voluntary expression of the defendant’s choice, and a knowing and intelligent act done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Cooper , 356 S.W.3d at 153. "A plea of guilty is not made voluntarily if the defendant is misled or is induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false or ill founded." Drew v. State , 436 S.W.2d 727, 729 (Mo. 1969) (internal quotations omitted). The record in this case refutes Johnson’s assertion that his counsel threatened him or provided any "false or ill-founded" advice. Id.
In his first point, Johnson argues he was coerced into accepting the State’s offer by counsel’s alleged threat that he could receive the death penalty if he took his case to trial. Johnson argues this constituted coercion in that his fear of receiving the death penalty induced him to plead guilty.
"[T]he test of whether a plea is voluntarily and intelligently made is not whether a particular ritual is followed or whether each and every detail is explained to a defendant but whether the plea in fact is intelligently and voluntarily made." McMahon v. State , 569 S.W.2d 753, 758 (Mo. banc 1978). In claiming his plea was coerced by his plea counsel’s alleged threat, Johnson must show he was "induced to plead guilty by fraud or mistake, by misapprehension, fear, persuasion, or the holding out of hopes which prove to be false or ill founded." Drew , 436 S.W.2d at 729. The record in this case refutes Johnson’s assertion that his counsel made any threats that caused him to plead guilty due to "misapprehension" or "fear." Id.
Although Johnson alleged his counsel threatened he would receive the death penalty at trial, the motion court did not find Johnson’s allegation credible. Johnson testified he pleaded guilty to avoid the death penalty,...
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