Johnson v. State
Decision Date | 20 June 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 778S139,778S139 |
Citation | 271 Ind. 145,390 N.E.2d 1005 |
Parties | David E. JOHNSON, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John D. Clouse and Michael C. Keating, Evansville, for appellant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant (Appellant) was charged with and convicted of bank robbery, Ind.Code § 35-13-5-1 (Burns 1975), and sentenced to twenty (20) years imprisonment. On appeal he asserts the following as error:
(1) The trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss grounded on the State's alleged failure to use proper extradition procedures in returning the defendant to Indiana.
(2) The State's failure to disclose to the jury certain considerations given to a chief witness in exchange for her testimony.
(3) The denial of the defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized in a search conducted without a warrant.
(4) The State's cross-examination of the defendant as to whether he had any evidence of his innocence.
(5) The trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to confer with a co-defendant prior to his decision as to whether to call him as a witness.
Prior to our discussion of the issues, let us first note that the defendant chose to proceed Pro se and in doing so he took on the responsibility of insuring that any errors which may have occurred at trial were preserved for review. In several instances he requests that special consideration be given because he is not educated in matters of trial procedure and, therefore, should not be held to the same standard set for practicing attorneys. On the contrary, however, he was provided with court appointed counsel and voluntarily chose to proceed without such assistance. He cannot now be heard to complain that the lack of such assistance worked to his detriment. Smith v. State (1977) Ind., 368 N.E.2d 1154.
Prior to the start of trial, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss alleging in part that the trial court lacked jurisdiction in the case due to his illegal arrest in Missouri and subsequent transportation to Indiana without formal extradition procedures or a waiver. The trial court denied his motion, which ruling he now assigns as error.
It has long been held that a trial court's jurisdiction is not affected by the impropriety of the method used to bring the defendant within its jurisdiction. Frisbie v. Collins (1952) 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 96 L.Ed. 541; Ker v. Illinois (1886) 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421; Massey v. State (1978) Ind., 371 N.E.2d 703. In Frisbie the United States Supreme Court stated 342 U.S. at p. 522, 72 S.Ct. at pp. 511-512:
Vicki Myers, a participant in the robbery with which the defendant was charged, was called as a chief witness for the State. During her testimony, she detailed the planning and execution of the robbery, naming the defendant as one of several involved. She was also questioned concerning the outcome of the charges which had been filed against her. She stated that she had been charged as a juvenile with bank robbery and that on conviction she was sentenced, as a delinquent, to the Indiana Girl's School. No mention was made of any agreement for special consideration to be given to her in exchange for her testimony.
The defendant contends that the State was under a duty to disclose any such arrangement made with Myers and as evidence that one did exist, he refers in his motion to correct errors to the certified transcript of testimony given by Myers at the trial of co-defendant Tillman Morris. That portion to which reference is made, consists of the following:
Myers' attorney testified at the same trial concerning the alleged deal and stated:
Despite the fact that Myers testified that no "deal" had been made concerning her testimony, it appears from the preceding statements that some type of an agreement was struck between the State and Myers, whereby she would give State's evidence in exchange for being tried as a juvenile. The defendant argues that the State had an affirmative duty to disclose the details of that agreement to the jury, citing as authority, Giglio v. United States (1972) 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 and Newman v. State (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 334 N.E.2d 684. Each case upon which the defendant relies, however, differs in one major respect from the case at bar. In each instance neither the defendant nor his attorney had any positive proof that an agreement existed until after the trial had been completed. Rather, the issue was raised as newly discovered evidence. Here, however, the defendant does not contend that he has newly discovered evidence. He had the transcript of the testimony which Myers gave at the Tillman trial before him during his own trial, and he made reference to it on several occasions, indicating that he had read it. At no point did he raise any objection to the State's incomplete questioning of the witness as to the outcome of the charge filed against her, nor did he attempt to present evidence of the agreement himself, through cross-examination of the witness. We cannot allow a defendant to sit idly by and refrain from objecting to alleged error and then to raise it for the first time in his motion to correct errors. Biggerstaff v. State (1977) Ind., 361 N.E.2d 895. Defendant, during the trial, knew of the considerations given to the State's witness and had the opportunity to reveal it to the jury and elected not to avail himself of that opportunity. The issue, therefore, has not been properly raised.
The State offered into evidence Exhibits Nos. 16, 17, 17A and 18, which consisted of money wrappers, a sawed-off shotgun, three twelve gauge shotgun shells and nylon hose, all recovered in the search of an apartment at 800 Line Street, Evansville. The defendant moved to suppress these exhibits upon the grounds that they were seized pursuant to an illegal search, conducted without a warrant. Supporting his motion, the defendant relied upon the grounds set out in the motion to suppress filed on behalf of co-defendant Tillman Morris and the evidence presented in the subsequent hearing held on the motion.
Prior to reaching the merits of the defendant's argument that the search was illegal, let us note that a defendant has no constitutional right to challenge the search of another person's property. Greer v. State (1970)253 Ind. 609, 255 N.E.2d 919. Inasmuch as there was testimony that the apartment was being rented to and occupied by Tillman Morris at the time of the search, the defendant has no standing to object to the search itself or to the admission of the fruits of the search. Thus, regardless of any illegality in the method in which the search was conducted, we find...
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