Johnson v. State
Citation | 642 S.W.3d 780 |
Decision Date | 29 March 2022 |
Docket Number | SD 36948 |
Parties | Nick E. JOHNSON, Movant-Appellant, v. STATE of Missouri, Respondent-Respondent. |
Court | Court of Appeal of Missouri (US) |
JEDD C. SCHNEIDER, Columbia, Mo, for Appellant.
GREGORY L. BARNES, Jefferson City, Mo, for Respondent.
Nick E. Johnson ("Movant") pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary in 2012, but, for various reasons, he was not sentenced for that crime until 2018. Movant now appeals the denial of his Rule 24.035 motion seeking post-conviction relief.1
In four points, Movant claims the motion court clearly erred in denying his motion because: (1) the delay in his sentencing resulted in fundamental unfairness to Movant as his bargained-for concurrent, ten-year sentence became a "de facto consecutive sentence"; (2) the motion court used an "incorrect" legal standard to evaluate that aspect of Movant's claim; and plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC") by: (3) "allowing" the delay in sentencing; and (4) failing to advise Movant that he could withdraw his guilty plea. Finding no merit in any of these claims, we affirm.
In 2012, pursuant to a written agreement, Movant pleaded guilty as a prior and persistent offender and was to receive a ten-year sentence that would run concurrently with any other sentences he might have. The State also agreed to dismiss a first-degree robbery charge as a part of the agreement.
Movant was in long-term drug treatment on another case at the time of his guilty plea. After he pleaded guilty in this case, Movant incurred other serious felony charges in another county, and he was incarcerated during most of the time period between his 2012 guilty plea and his sentencing hearing in 2018. The underlying premise of all of Movant's points is that the time lapse between his plea and sentencing resulted in his serving a de facto consecutive sentence rather than the concurrent sentence he was promised in his binding plea agreement. Movant offers no authority in support of that premise.
Our review of a motion court's denial of a Rule 24.035 motion is limited to a determination of whether the findings and conclusions of the motion court are clearly erroneous. Rule 24.035(k); Suber v. State , 516 S.W.3d 386, 388 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (internal citation omitted) .... We defer to the motion court's credibility determinations. Smith v. State , 413 S.W.3d 709, 715 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (internal citation omitted). "After a guilty plea, our review is limited to a determination of whether the movant's plea was knowing and voluntary." Arnold [v. State ], 509 S.W.3d [108,] 113 [(Mo. App. E.D. 2016) ] (internal citation omitted).
Goldberg v. State , 635 S.W.3d 599, 603 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).
In deciding whether Movant's guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the motion court made the following findings:
The plea record reflects that the plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently under Missouri case law. [Movant] was apprised of the terms of the plea agreement in this case verbally during the plea colloquy.... [Movant] acknowledged the terms of the plea agreement ... and acknowledged his signature at the bottom of the plea agreement .... He was apprised of his trial and appellate rights .... After he was so informed, he entered his guilty plea as to sole count of Burglary in the plea agreement.... Such plea was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, and any statement by [M]ovant now to the contrary is directly contradicted by the plea record.
Movant's points are:
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