Johnson v. Sullivan

• Decision Date: 16 June 1989
• Docket Number: No. 83 C 4110.,83 C 4110.
• Citation: 714 F. Supp. 1476
• Parties: Edna JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

714 F. Supp. 1476

Edna JOHNSON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Louis W. SULLIVAN, M.D., Secretary of Health and Human Services, Defendant.

No. 83 C 4110.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, E.D.

June 16, 1989.

Joseph A. Antolin, John Bouman, Robert E. Lehrer and Julie A. Nice, Legal Assistance Foundation of Chicago, Chicago, Ill., for plaintiffs.

Anton R. Valukas, U.S. Atty. by Linda A. Wawzenski, Asst. U.S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., and Donna Fuchsluger, General Counsel's Office, Social Security Admin., Baltimore, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM ORDER

BUA, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, a group of unsuccessful applicants for federal disability benefits, filed this class action suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services ("Secretary") in 1983. For six years, plaintiffs and the Secretary have waged an acrimonious legal war over the propriety of certain regulations governing the evaluation of federal disability claims. Plaintiffs won the opening battles in this court in 1983 and 1984, obtaining both class certification and summary judgment. 593 F.Supp. 375 (N.D.Ill.1984) (summary judgment); 100 F.R.D. 70 (N.D.Ill.1983) (class certification). In the months that followed, the Secretary persistently attacked the composition of the Johnson class and the merits of plaintiffs' claims. Despite these attacks, this court refused to retreat from its original rulings. 607 F.Supp. XXXXXXXXXXX (N.D.Ill.1984) (denying motion to alter or amend); 604 F.Supp. 1070 (N.D.Ill.1985) (denying motion for stay of injunctive relief). The parties then resumed their legal combat on an appellate battleground. In the initial appellate skirmish, plaintiffs prevailed; the Seventh Circuit affirmed this court's rulings in all respects. 769 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir.1985). The Secretary, however, achieved a limited victory over the Johnson class in the Supreme Court. In light of its recent decision in Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987), the Court vacated the Seventh Circuit's judgment in Johnson, remanding the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration. 482 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 3202, 96 L.Ed.2d 690 (1987). The Seventh Circuit in turn remanded the Johnson case to this court.¹ After assessing the impact of the Yuckert ruling, this court modified its previous award of injunctive relief to the Johnson class. Convinced that this modified award represented "a final determination of the appropriate remedy in this case," the court entered final judgment for plaintiffs in an order dated October 6, 1988. 697 F.Supp. 346, 354 (N.D.Ill.1988).

The court hoped in vain that its latest order would bring an end to the hostilities between the Johnson class and the Secretary. Unfortunately, the order of October 6, 1988 produced only a temporary cease-fire. Shortly thereafter, when the parties began to discuss the details of implementing the court-ordered relief, negotiations quickly reached an impasse. Unable to agree on the proper scope of relief, the parties asked the court to mediate their conflict over certain provisions of the amended judgment order proposed by plaintiffs. The Secretary then escalated the tension between the parties by firing a late volley at plaintiffs: a challenge to the composition of the class based on a recent Supreme Court decision. Angered by this assault on the class, plaintiffs counterattacked by filing a motion for Rule 11 sanctions. These recent developments require the court to step once more into the breach that separates the parties. In its continuing efforts to bring some measure of peace and conciliation to this bitter and contentious litigation, this court will now consider the parties' competing motions for entry of an amended judgment order, the Secretary's motion for reconsideration of class certification, and plaintiffs' motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

I. Amended Judgment Order

In the weeks following this court's order of October 6, 1988, the parties began to negotiate the specific details of implementing the court-ordered relief. Two months later, plaintiffs and the Secretary jointly moved to vacate the October 6 order insofar as it purported to be a final judgment. The court granted this motion based on the parties' assurances that they were attempting to agree on an amended judgment order that would better define the Secretary's obligations in implementing relief.

Despite the divisiveness that has pervaded this litigation, plaintiffs and the Secretary have managed to agree on a procedural framework for providing relief to the Johnson class.² Nonetheless, the parties remain deeply divided over certain substantive provisions of plaintiffs' proposed judgment order. The Secretary urges the court to amend the provisions in question; but plaintiffs strenuously object to the Secretary's proposed amendments. In order to fashion an amended judgment order, the court must choose between the conflicting provisions proposed by the parties. To achieve this purpose, the court will now examine the sections of plaintiffs' proposed order that have stalemated the parties' settlement negotiations.

A. Subparagraphs 1(k) and 1(l): The Definitions of "Redetermination" and "Retroactive Benefits"

In entering judgment for the Johnson class, this court concluded that the Secretary had improperly refused to consider the combined effect of nonsevere impairments when evaluating plaintiffs' disability claims. 697 F.Supp. at 352-53. The court ordered the Secretary to conduct "new disability hearings for class members — hearings that provide for consideration of the combined effect of all impairments." Id. at 354. While they agree on certain procedures for arranging and administering such hearings, plaintiffs and the Secretary vehemently disagree about the scope of the new hearings. The Secretary maintains that he need only redetermine each class member's eligibility for benefits as of the date the class member's claim was originally denied. According to the Secretary, if a class member does not qualify for benefits as of the date his claim was initially rejected, that class member cannot receive benefits for a subsequent disability unless he files a separate application. Plaintiffs contend, however, that the Secretary cannot properly restrict his review of the Johnson claims to the time period preceding the original denial of those claims. Plaintiffs argue that the Secretary must also determine whether each class member became disabled at any time since the initial denial of benefits. Under plaintiffs' proposed scheme, a class member who was not eligible for benefits when his claim was first rejected could nonetheless recover retroactive benefits from the onset date of a subsequent disability — even if he did not file a second application for benefits.

Due to their fundamental differences over the proper scope of the new hearings, the parties have proposed divergent definitions of "redetermination" and "retroactive benefits" (subparagraphs 1(k) and 1(l) of plaintiffs' proposed judgment order). This definitional dispute represents the major bone of contention at this point in the litigation. Regrettably, despite the significance of this issue, most of the parties' arguments offer this court little guidance in deciding the appropriate scope of the Secretary's redeterminations. For instance, in a disingenuous declaration of righteous indignation, plaintiffs insist that the court's prior orders already require the Secretary to award benefits to class members whose disability postdates the original denial of their claims. This argument is totally specious. Quite frankly, until the parties raised the issue at this juncture, this court had not even considered whether the Secretary's reconsideration of a class member's impairments should encompass the entire period from the date of the class member's original application to the date of his rehearing. By suggesting that the court already resolved this issue, plaintiffs are merely engaging in legal ventriloquism, trying to put words into the court's mouth. With all due respect, the court has no intention of playing Charlie McCarthy to plaintiffs' Edgar Bergen.

Likewise, this court will not play the ventriloquist when interpreting the orders of other courts, finding a "judicial analysis" of the scope of redetermination where none previously existed. In seeking to settle their dispute over the scope of redetermination, both parties to this litigation have invited the court to consult other cases involving successful class action challenges to Social Security regulations. For the most part, however, the "case law" cited by the parties consists of terse judgment orders that offer no particular rationale for the scope of redetermination defined by the presiding courts. In fact, these orders provide no evidence that the courts gave any thought to the conflicting visions of redetermination and retroactivity espoused by the parties in the instant case. Devoid of any detailed analysis, these judgment orders do not assist this court in drawing the boundaries of the redetermination period.

Of all the cases cited by the parties, only one case analyzes the redetermination issue as the parties have framed it. In his recent order in Marcus v. Sullivan, No. 85 C 453, 1989 WL 39709 (N.D.Ill. Apr. 17, 1989), Judge Moran confronted the same issue concerning the scope of redetermination that this court currently faces. Like the Johnson class members, plaintiffs in Marcus successfully challenged a Social Security regulation on which the Secretary had relied when denying plaintiffs' disability claims. See Marcus v. Bowen, 696 F.Supp. 364 (N.D.Ill.1988). Judge Moran then ordered the Secretary to redetermine the claims of Marcus class members. As in the instant case, plaintiffs in Marcus argued that the Secretary should reconsider each disability claim for the entire period from the date of a class member's original application to the date of the redetermination....