Johnson v. T. J. Watson
| Decision Date | 29 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-cv-00317-JPH-MJD |
| Parties | TYRONE QUENTIN JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. T. J. WATSON, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT, DENYING WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2241, AND DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT
Petitioner Tyrone Johnson, an inmate currently incarcerated at the Federal Correctional Institution in Fairton, New Jersey seeks a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.[1]He asserts numerous challenges to his conviction and sentence, including that he is entitled to relief under Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016)[2], because he does not have the necessary predicate convictions for an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). For the reasons explained below, his petition is denied.
In October 2020, Mr. Johnson filed a motion for leave to supplement asking the Court to consider an opinion from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan that addresses the issues raised in his § 2241 petition. Dkt. 28. This motion, dkt. [28], is granted to the extent the Court will consider relevant precedent as discussed below.
In December 2011, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment against Mr. Johnson, charging him with distributing a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). United States v. Johnson, 1:11-cr-20767-TLL-PTM (E.D. Mich.) ("Crim. Dkt."); dkt. 1. In May 2012, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment that charged Mr. Johnson with one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 100 grams or more of a mixture or substance containing heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 ("Count 1"), one count of possession with intent to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) ("Count 2"), one count of distribution of heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) ("Count 3"), one count of using a communication facility to commit conspiracy to distribute heroin in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) ("Count 4"), and one count of using a residence to distribute and use controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1) ("Count 5"). Crim. Dkt. 17.
After return of the superseding indictment, the United States filed an information pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. Crim. Dkt. 18. It stated that Mr. Johnson had the following prior convictions:
a conviction on March 11, 1998 for attempted possession of cocaine, less than 25 grams, in case number 97-9499 in the Recorder's Court (Wayne County Circuit Court); a November 13, 1998 conviction for delivery/manufacture of less than 50 grams in case number 98-1758-FH in Macomb County Circuit Court; a conviction on February 24, 2000 for delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine in case number 99-11195 in Wayne County Circuit Court; and a conviction on December 1, 2008 for possession of methamphetamine in case number 08-011525-01-FH in Wayne County Circuit Court.
Mr. Johnson proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted him of all counts charged in the superseding indictment. Crim. Dkt. 42; see also dkt. 8-1. With respect to Count 1, the jury found that the conspiracy involved less than 100 grams of a mixture or substance containing heroin. Dkt. 8-1 at 2.
After Mr. Johnson's conviction at trial, a United States Probation Officer prepared a presentence investigation report ("PSR") concerning Mr. Johnson. See dkt. 20. The PSR grouped all of the offenses and determined that Mr. Johnson's adjusted offense level was 24. Dkt. 20 at ¶¶ 15-22. It applied the career offender guideline, United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guidelines") § 4B1.1, and calculated Mr. Johnson's total offense level as 34. Dkt. 20 at ¶¶ 23-25.
The PSR found that Mr. Johnson had several prior felony convictions, including convictions for: (1) possession of less than 25 grams of cocaine, (2) possession with intent to deliver under 50 grams of cocaine, (3) delivery of less than 50 grams of a controlled substance, (4) aggravated domestic assault, and (5) possession of methamphetamine. Dkt. 20 at ¶¶ 26-32. Whether considering only Mr. Johnson's prior convictions or his status as a career offender pursuant to Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1, his criminal history category was VI. Id. at ¶¶ 34-35.
Based on the § 851 information, Mr. Johnson's statutory maximum sentence for Counts 1 through 3 was 30 years' imprisonment. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C); see also dkt. 20 at ¶ 56. He was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of 8 years' imprisonment on Count 4 and 20 years' imprisonment on Count 5. See dkt. 20 at ¶ 56. His guideline range under the Sentencing Guidelines was 262 to 327 months' imprisonment. Id. at ¶ 57.
In May 2013, Mr. Johnson received an aggregate sentence of 270 months' imprisonment to be followed by an aggregate six-year term of supervised release. Crim. Dkt. 58. He appealed his convictions and sentence, Crim. Dkt. 59, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, United States v. Johnson, 765 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2014). Mr. Johnson filed a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, Crim. Dkts. 72, 73, but the district court denied this motion in October 2016, Crim. Dkts. 87, 88.
In November 2017, Mr. Johnson sought leave to file a second or successive motion under § 2255, arguing that two of his prior convictions could not be used to enhance his sentence in light of Mathis v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2243 (2016). United States v. Johnson, No. 17-2427 (6th Cir.). The Sixth Circuit denied his request in April 2018, finding that his only argument did "not rely on [a] new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court ...." Id.; dkt. 1 at 2.
Mr. Johnson filed his § 2241 petition in July 2019. Dkt. 1. In his original petition and supplement, he challenges the sentencing enhancements applied under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) and Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1. He also challenges the effectiveness of his trial and appellate counsel, the procedures related to the § 851 information filed by the United States, and the sentencing proceedings. Dkts. 1, 8.
A motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the presumptive means by which a federal prisoner can challenge his conviction or sentence. See Shepherd v. Krueger, 911 F.3d 861, 862 (7th Cir. 2018); Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1124 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc). Under very limited circumstances, however, a prisoner may employ § 2241 to challenge his federal conviction or sentence. Webster, 784 F.3d at 1124. Specifically, under § 2255(e), a federal prisoner may seek relief under § 2241 only if it "appears that the remedy by motion [under § 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the] detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); Roundtree v. Krueger, 910 F.3d 312, 313 (7th Cir. 2018).
The Seventh Circuit has held that § 2255 is "'inadequate or ineffective' when it cannot be used to address novel developments in either statutory or constitutional law, whether those developments concern the conviction or the sentence." Roundtree, 719 F.3d at 313 (citing In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 1998); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013); Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123 (7th Cir. 2015) (en banc)). Whether § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective "focus[es] on procedures rather than outcomes." Taylor v. Gilkey, 314 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2002).
The Seventh Circuit construed § 2255(e), referred to as the "savings clause," in In re Davenport, holding:
A procedure for postconviction relief can be fairly termed inadequate when it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent offense.
In re Davenport, 147 F.3d at 611. "[S]omething more than a lack of success with a section 2255 motion must exist before the savings clause is satisfied." Webster, 784 F.3d at 1136.
Specifically, to fit within the savings clause, "a petitioner must establish that '(1) the claim relies on a statutory interpretation case, not a constitutional case, and thus could not have been invoked by a successive § 2255 motion; (2) the petitioner could not have invoked the decision in his first § 2255 motion and the decision applies retroactively; and (3) the error is grave enough to be deemed a miscarriage of justice.'"[3] Chazen v. Marske, 938 F.3d 851, 856 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Beason v. Marske, 926 F.3d 932, 935 (7th Cir. 2019)); see also Roundtree, 910 F.3d at 313 (acknowledging a circuit split regarding this test and holding that relitigation under § 2241 of a contention that was resolved in a proceeding under § 2255 is prohibited unless the law changed after the initial collateral review). If a petitioner cannot meet all three conditions, he is not entitled to proceed under § 2241. See, e.g., Davis v. Cross, 863 F.3d 962, 964-65 (7th Cir. 2017) ().
The respondent recognizes that it is unclear whether the Court should apply the substantive law of the Sixth Circuit or the Seventh Circuit to address the merits of Mr. Johnson's claims. See dkt. 19 at 11. The parties do not dispute, however, that the Seventh Circuit's three-part test is applicable to determine whether Mr. Johnson may proceed under the savings clause. Accordingly, this Court first addresses whether Mr....
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