Johnson v. Taylor

• Citation: 5 N.E. 732,106 Ind. 89
• Parties: Johnson and others v. Taylor and others.
• Decision Date: 24 March 1886
• Court: Supreme Court of Indiana

106 Ind. 89

5 N.E. 732

Johnson and others

v.Taylor and others.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

Filed March 24, 1886.

Appeal from Starke circuit court.

H. R. Robbins, Jas. M. Howard, and Thos. J. Merrifield, for appellants.

Church & Church, for appellees.

Howk, J.

On the sixteenth day of May, 1885, the appellants, James R. Johnson, Thomas J. Merrifield, Henry R. Robbins, and Sylvester A. McCrackin, commenced this action in the court below, against the appellees, John Taylor, Sr., John A. Taylor, Margaret Taylor, Lydia M. Taylor, and Gilbert M. Daniels, as defendants. The object of appellants' suit, as stated in their complaint, was to quiet their title to certain real estate, particularly described, in Starke county, against the pretended claims of appellees to some interest therein or title thereto, contrary and adverse to appellants' title. Appellees John Taylor and John A. Taylor jointly answered in two paragraphs, of which the first was a general denial of the complaint, and in the second paragraph they said that on the fourth day of February, 1885, they sold and conveyed by their warranty deed, and for a valuable consideration, all their right, title, and interest in and to the real estate described in appellants' complaint, to their co-appellee Gilbert M. Daniels, and they disclaimed having any interest therein. Appellees Margaret and Lydia M. Taylor jointly answered by a general denial of the complaint. Appellee Daniels answered by a general denial of the complaint, and also filed a cross-complaint setting up his title to the real estate in controversy, and praying that his title might be quieted in him against the unfounded claims of appellants. To Daniels' cross-complaint, appellants answered in two paragraphs, the first of which was a general denial, and the second paragraph was a special answer. The cause was tried by the court, and at appellants' request the court made a special finding of the facts, and thereon stated its conclusions of law in favor of appellee Daniels. Over appellants' exceptions to the conclusions of law, the court adjudged and decreed that appellee Daniels was the owner of the real estate in controversy, and that his title thereto ought to be quieted and forever set at rest, as against the appellants.

The first error of which complaint is here made on behalf of appellants is the overruling of their demurrer to the cross-complaint of appellee Daniels. In his cross-complaint the appellee Daniels alleged that, at the time of the commencement of this suit, he was the owner in fee-simple, and by his tenants in the possession, of the real estate described in appellants' complaint herein; that appellants claimed to have a title to such real estate by virtue of a sheriff's deed dated on February 23, 1885, and executed on a pretended sale of such land by the sheriff of Starke county, under an execution or order of sale issued to him by the clerk of the Pulaski circuit court against the defendant John A. Taylor, in a proceeding commenced in the Starke circuit court by attachment, and changed to Palaski county, and in no other way; that appellee Daniels purchased such land of the defendants John A. Taylor and John Taylor on January 26, 1885, who delivered to him their warranty deeds, duly executed and acknowledged, dated February 4, 1885, and recorded on the next day in the recorder's office of Starke county, and that he paid therefor the sum of $3,000; that the defendants John A. and John Taylor, at the time of Daniels' purchase, were the owners of such land; that appellee Daniels, at the time of his purchase of and payment for such real estate, had no notice whatever of any of the proceedings or claim of the appellants, and was a bona fide purchaser thereof for a full and sufficient consideration, which was fully paid; that appellants' proceedings, if any were had, were void as to him, Daniels, and were without any actual or constructive notice to him, and without force and effect; and that appellants' claim, and their pretended proceedings and sheriff's sale as aforesaid, tended to be and were a cloud upon the title of appellee Daniels, to such real estate. Wherefore, etc.

It is very clear, we think, that no error was committed by the court in overruling appellants' demurrer, for the alleged want of sufficient facts, to the cross-complaint of appellee Daniels. In the statutory action to quiet the title to real estate, what is required to be stated in the complaint or cross-complaint, wherein such relief is sought, is so plainly indicated in and by the provisions of section 1070, Rev. St. 1881, that it would seem to be difficult for any one, with the statute before him, to so prepare such a pleading that it would not withstand a demurrer thereto for the want of sufficient facts; and yet it has sometimes been done. The provisions of section...