Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 83-1029
Decision Date | 06 August 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 83-1029,83-1029 |
Parties | Harold M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
J. Paul McGrath, Asst. Atty. Gen., Washington, D.C., Richard Allen Stacy, U.S. Atty., Cheyenne, Wyo., Leonard Schaitman and John S. Koppel, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D.C., for defendant-appellant.
Cary R. Alburn III, Laramie, Wyo., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SETH, Chief Judge, and BREITENSTEIN and SEYMOUR, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); Tenth Cir.R. 10(e). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
The Department of Justice appeals from a district court order requiring disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552 (1982) (FOIA), of all FBI files pertaining to Harold Johnson. The FBI compiled the information in the course of a criminal investigation of Johnson. Some information was released to Johnson at his request, but the Bureau claimed that most of Johnson's file was covered by exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) of the FOIA. Id. Sec. 552(b)(7)(C), (D). After an in camera review of the withheld information, the district court summarily ordered the entire file disclosed. We have conducted our own in camera review, and we conclude that all of the information that was withheld is covered by either exemption 7(C) or 7(D). Accordingly, we reverse.
The FBI investigated Harold Johnson in 1979 for bank fraud and embezzlement, but did not bring any charges against him. In 1981, Johnson requested the contents of his file from the FBI. The Bureau released four of the thirty-eight file pages in their entirety and eleven with excisions, and withheld the remaining twenty-three. The FBI cited FOIA exemptions 7(C) and 7(D) as grounds for the nondisclosures. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(C), (D). 1 Johnson exhausted his administrative remedies with no relief, and thereafter brought this action in federal district court to compel production of the excised portions of the file.
The Government moved for summary judgment, supporting its motion with a declaration comparable in scope and purpose to a Vaughn Index, see Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826-28 (D.C.Cir.1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977, 94 S.Ct. 1564, 39 L.Ed.2d 873 (1974), which was prepared by FBI Special Agent Dale Berndt. The declaration included a copy of the thirty-eight page file with the excised parts deleted by black marker-pen. In the margin beside each deletion, the Bureau provided a short-hand explanation of the subject matter of the deletion, and indicated the particular exemption used. Due to the breadth of the nondisclosures, the trial judge was unable to decide the matter based on the declaration alone. He therefore agreed to view the complete file in camera.
Rec., vol. I, at 110. The Government then initiated this appeal.
We begin with a brief overview of the general analytical framework to be employed in FOIA cases. The basic policy of the FOIA is in favor of disclosure to permit public access to information unnecessarily shielded from public view. Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61, 96 S.Ct. 1592, 1598-99, 48 L.Ed.2d 11 (1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 832, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973); Alirez v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 423, 425 (10th Cir.1982). Nonetheless, the subsection (b) exemptions are an integral part of the FOIA and represent " 'the congressional determination of the types of information that the Executive Branch must have the option to keep confidential.' " Rose, 425 U.S. at 361, 96 S.Ct. at 1599 (quoting Mink, 410 U.S. at 80, 93 S.Ct. at 832).
A district court must make a de novo review of an administrative claim of exemption, with the agency bearing the burden of justifying the decision to withhold. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(a)(4)(B). To satisfy its initial burden under the Act, the agency must provide a "detailed analysis" of the requested documents and the reasons for invoking a particular exemption. See Antonelli v. FBI, 721 F.2d 615, 617 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2399, 81 L.Ed.2d 355 (1984); Vaughn, 484 F.2d at 823-28.
In this case, the FBI met its initial burden by Special Agent Berndt's declaration and by the district court's in camera inspection of the documents. The declaration "fairly describes the content of the material withheld and adequately states [the] grounds for nondisclosure." Cox v. United States Department of Justice, 576 F.2d 1302, 1312 (8th Cir.1978). Moreover, the district court in its discretion undertook an in camera review of the actual documents. The unexcised document, when read in conjunction with the detailed declaration specifying how the agency characterized each bit of undisclosed information and the exemptions upon which it relied, more than adequately satisfies the agency's initial burden of explaining its claim of exemption. Consequently, we must decide whether the claimed exemptions are proper under the FOIA.
The present case undisputedly involves a "record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(D). Consequently, the FOIA exempts disclosure of "the identity of a confidential source and ... confidential information furnished only by the confidential source ...." Id.
Lesar v. United States Department of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 492 (D.C.Cir.1980) (footnotes omitted). See also Keeney v. FBI, 630 F.2d 114, 119 n. 2 (2d Cir.1980); Conoco, Inc. v. United States Department of Justice, 521 F.Supp. 1301, 1308 (D.Del.1981), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 687 F.2d 724 (3d Cir.1982). This interpretation of exemption 7(D) is borne out by the legislative history of the FOIA. See Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), Source Book: Legislative History, Texts and Other Documents 380-81, 450-51, 456-59, 468 (Joint Comm. Print 1975) (hereinafter cited as "Source Book"). Accordingly, we need not inquire whether the information given actually would identify a confidential source. The only relevant inquiry in this kind of case is whether the undisclosed information is "confidential information furnished only by [a] confidential source." 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552(b)(7)(D). If it is, then the information is exempt.
The circuit courts are divided on what must be shown before information may be categorized as "confidential." The Second, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits adhere to the rule that, in the absence of an express assurance of confidentiality, the burden rests on the agency to show "that the information was furnished under circumstances from which an assurance of confidentiality could be reasonably inferred." Nix v. United States, 572 F.2d 998, 1003-04 (4th Cir.1978). Moreover, whether the information was furnished under an express or implied assurance of confidentiality is a question of fact in these circuits. See Parton v. United States Department of Justice, 727 F.2d 774, 776-77, (8th Cir.1984); Keeney, 630 F.2d at 119-20 (2d Cir.); Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131, 1137 (4th Cir.1977). The District of Columbia and Third Circuits hold that a criminal law enforcement agency need not detail the facts surrounding each interview and prove that the information was given under an express or implied assurance of confidentiality. The agency need only "state that the information was furnished by a confidential source" and it is exempt. See Conoco, 687 F.2d at 730 (3d Cir.); Lesar, 636 F.2d at 492 & n. 114 (D.C.Cir.). Finally, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits employ yet a third approach. "Unless there is evidence to the contrary in the record, ... promises of confidentiality are inherently implicit in FBI interviews conducted pursuant to a criminal investigation." Miller v. Bell, 661 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1981), cert denied, 456 U.S. 960, 102 S.Ct. 2035, 72 L.Ed.2d 484 (1982); accord Ingle v. Department of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 269 (6th Cir.1983). But see Maroscia v. Levi, 569 F.2d 1000, 1002 (7th Cir.1977) ( ).
The scope of the 7(D) exemption in this type of case is a question of first impression in our circuit. Reviewing the merits of all three approaches, we believe the view of the...
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