Johnson v. United States, 08–6925.

CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Citation176 L.Ed.2d 1,559 U.S. 133,130 S.Ct. 1265
Docket NumberNo. 08–6925.,08–6925.
PartiesCurtis Darnell JOHNSON, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES.
Decision Date02 March 2010

Lisa Call

, Donna Lee Elm, Federal Defender, James T. Skuthan, Rosemary T. Cakmis, Robert Godfrey, Office of the Federal Defender, Jacksonville, FL, for Petitioner.

Leondra R. Kruger

, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Elena Kagan, Solicitor General, Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General, Deborah Watson, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.Opinion

Justice SCALIA

delivered the opinion of the Court.

We decide whether the Florida felony offense of battery by [a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing] another person, Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(a)

, (2) (2003), “has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person of another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), and thus constitutes a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act, § 924(e)(1).

I

Curtis Johnson pleaded guilty to knowingly possessing ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

. The Government sought an enhanced penalty under § 924(e), which provides that a person who violates § 922(g) and who “has three previous convictions” for “a violent felony” “committed on occasions different from one another” shall be imprisoned for a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life. A “ violent felony” is defined as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” that:

(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” § 924(e)(2)(B)

.

Johnson's indictment specified five prior felony convictions. The Government contended that three of those convictions—for aggravated battery and for burglary of a dwelling in October 1986, and for battery in May 2003—rendered Johnson eligible for sentencing under § 924(e)(1)

. At the sentencing hearing, Johnson did not dispute that the two 1986 convictions were for “violent felon[ies],” but he objected to counting his 2003 battery conviction. That conviction was for simple battery under Florida law, which ordinarily is a first-degree misdemeanor, Fla. Stat. § 784.03(1)(b)

, but is a third-degree felony for a defendant who (like Johnson) has been convicted of battery (even simple battery) before, § 784.03(2).

Under § 784.03(1)(a)

, a battery occurs when a person either “1. [a]ctually and intentionally touches or strikes another person against the will of the other,” or “2. [i]ntentionally causes bodily harm to another person.” Because the elements of the offense are disjunctive, the prosecution can prove a battery in one of three ways. State v. Hearns, 961 So.2d 211, 218 (Fla.2007). It can prove that the defendant [i]ntentionally caus[ed] bodily harm,” that he “intentionally str[uck] the victim, or that he merely [a]ctually and intentionally touche[d] the victim.

Since nothing in the record of Johnson's 2003 battery conviction permitted the District Court to conclude that it rested upon anything more than the least of these acts, see Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005)

(plurality opinion), his conviction was a predicate conviction for a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act only if [a]ctually and intentionally touch[ing] another person constitutes the use of “physical force” within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). The District Court concluded that it does, and accordingly sentenced Johnson under § 924(e)(1) to a prison term of 15 years and 5 months.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 528 F.3d 1318 (2008)

. We granted certiorari, 555 U.S. 1169, 129 S.Ct. 1315, 173 L.Ed.2d 583 (2009).

II

Florida has a statute similar to the Armed Career Criminal Act that imposes mandatory-minimum sentences upon “violent career criminal[s],” Fla. Stat. § 775.084(4)(d) (2007)

, defined to mean persons who have three convictions for certain felonies, including any “forcible felony,” § 775.084(1)(d)(1)(a). [F]orcible felony” is defined to include a list of enumerated felonies—including murder, manslaughter, sexual battery, carjacking, aggravated assault, and aggravated battery—and also “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” § 776.08. In Hearns, the Florida Supreme Court held that the felony offense of battery on a law enforcement officer, § 784.07(2)(b)—which requires the same conduct (directed against a law enforcement officer) as misdemeanor battery under § 784.03(1)(a)—was not a forcible felony. See 961 So.2d, at 219. It said that since § 784.03(1)(a) requires proof of only the slightest unwanted physical touch, “the use ... of physical force” was not an element of the offense. Id., at 219.

Johnson argues that in deciding whether any unwanted physical touching constitutes “physical force” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)

, we are bound by the Florida Supreme Court's conclusion in Hearns that it does not constitute “physical force.” That is not so. The meaning of “physical force” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) is a question of federal law, not state law. And in answering that question we are not bound by a state court's interpretation of a similar—or even identical—state statute.

We are, however, bound by the Florida Supreme Court's interpretation of state law, including its determination of the elements of Fla. Stat. § 784.03(2)

. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 916, 117 S.Ct. 1800, 138 L.Ed.2d 108 (1997). The Florida Supreme Court has held that the element of “actually and intentionally touching” under Florida's battery law is satisfied by any intentional physical contact, “no matter how slight.” Hearns, 961 So.2d, at 218.

The most “nominal contact,” such as a “ta[p] ... on the shoulder without consent,” id., at 219, establishes a violation. We apply “th[is] substantive elemen[t] of the criminal offense,” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, n. 16, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), in determining whether a felony conviction for battery under Fla. Stat. § 784.03(2) meets the definition of “violent felony” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i).

III

Section 924(e)(2)(B)(i)

does not define “physical force,” and we therefore give the phrase its ordinary meaning. Bailey v. United States, 516 U.S. 137, 144–145, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995). The adjective “physical” is clear in meaning but not of much help to our inquiry. It plainly refers to force exerted by and through concrete bodies—distinguishing physical force from, for example, intellectual force or emotional force. It is the noun that poses the difficulty; “force” has a number of meanings. For present purposes we can exclude its specialized meaning in the field of physics: a cause of the acceleration of mass. Webster's New International Dictionary 986 (2d ed.1954) (hereinafter Webster's Second). In more general usage it means [s]trength or energy; active power; vigor; often an unusual degree of strength or energy,” [p]ower to affect strongly in physical relations,” or [p]ower, violence, compulsion, or constraint exerted upon a person.” Id., at 985. Black's Law Dictionary 717 (9th ed.2009) (hereinafter Black's) defines “force” as [p]ower, violence, or pressure directed against a person or thing.” And it defines “physical force” as [f]orce consisting in a physical act, esp. a violent act directed against a robbery victim.” Ibid. All of these definitions suggest a degree of power that would not be satisfied by the merest touching.

There is, however, a more specialized legal usage of the word “force”: its use in describing one of the elements of the common-law crime of battery, which consisted of the intentional application of unlawful force against the person of another. See 2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 7.15(a), p. 301 (1986 and Supp.2003); accord, Black's 173. The common law held this element of “force” to be satisfied by even the slightest offensive touching. See 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 120 (1768) (hereinafter Blackstone); Lynch v. Commonwealth, 131 Va. 762, 765, 109 S.E. 427, 428 (1921)

; see also 2 LaFave & Scott, supra, § 7.15(a). The question is whether the term “force” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i) has the specialized meaning that it bore in the common-law definition of battery. The Government asserts that it does. We disagree.

Although a common-law term of art should be given its established common-law meaning, United States v. Turley, 352 U.S. 407, 411, 77 S.Ct. 397, 1 L.Ed.2d 430 (1957)

, we do not assume that a statutory word is used as a term of art where that meaning does not fit. Ultimately, context determines meaning, Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961), and we “do not force term-of-art definitions into contexts where they plainly do not fit and produce nonsense,” Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 282, 126 S.Ct. 904, 163 L.Ed.2d 748 (2006)

(Scalia, J., dissenting). Here we are interpreting the phrase “physical force” as used in defining not the crime of battery, but rather the statutory category of “ violent felon [ies],” § 924(e)(2)(B). In Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004), we interpreted the statutory definition of “crime of violence” in 18 U.S.C. § 16

. That provision is very similar to § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), in that it includes any felony offense which “has as an element the use ... of physical force against the person or property of another,” § 16(a). We stated:

“In construing both parts of § 16

, we cannot forget that we ultimately are determining the meaning of the term ‘crime of violence.’ The ordinary meaning of this term, combined with § 16's emphasis on the use of...

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