Johnson v. United States

• Citation: 68 S.Ct. 391,333 U.S. 46,92 L.Ed. 468
• Decision Date: 09 February 1948
• Docket Number: No. 138,138
• Parties: JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
• Court: United States Supreme Court

333 U.S. 46

68 S.Ct. 391

92 L.Ed. 468

JOHNSON

v UNITED STATES.

No. 138.

Argued Dec. 10, 1947.

Decided Feb. 9, 1948.

Motion to Recall Mandate Denied April 5, 1948.

See 333 U.S. 865, 68 S.Ct. 788.

Messrs. Silas B. Axtell, of New York City, and David A. Fall, of San Pedro, Cal., for petitioner.

Mr. Samuel D. Slade, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case is here on a petition for a writ of certiorari which we granted because of the seeming misapplication by the court below of Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R. Co., 329 U.S. 452, 67 S.Ct. 401.

Petitioner was a seaman on S.S. Mission Soledad, a steam tanker owned and operated by the United States. He was on the main deck rounding in two blocks, an operation which followed the cradling of the boom. One block was attached to the outer end of the boom by a wire rope. The other block was being held by a shipmate, one Dudder, who stood above petitioner on the meccano deck, a structure of beams which had been erected on the main deck. Petitioner was taking in the slack by pulling on the free end of the rope which ran through the two blocks. As he pulled on the rope the two blocks were brought together. When that was done Dudder had to walk forward with the block he held at a rate of speed controlled by petitioner. The operation went forward smoothly. Petitioner would pull on the rope, Dudder would walk forward, and then petitioner would stop to coil the accu- mulated free line. Petitioner and Dudder had worked harmoniously, neither one jerking on the line nor interfering with the other's function. There was no fouling of the lines; the rope was taut and ran free.

We have only a partial account of how the injury to petitioner occurred. Dudder was not called. The only testimony we have is from petitioner and his version of the episode is uncontradicted. The block which it was Dudder's duty to hold (and which weighed 25 or 30 pounds) was permitted to fall; it hit petitioner on the head and caused the injury for which this libel in personam (see 41 Stat. 525, 46 U.S.C.A. § 742) was filed under the Jones Act, 38 Stat. 1185, as amended, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688. Dudder, as we have said, was standing above petitioner. It is not certain why the block fell. Petitioner was hit without warning. When hit, he was bending over coiling the line on the deck.

The rule of res ipsa loquitur applied in Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra, means that 'the facts of the occurrence warrant the inference of negligence, not that they compel such an inference.' Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233, 240, 33 S.Ct. 416, 418, 57 LE d. 815. We need not determine what the result would be if it were shown that petitioner was pulling on the rope when the accident happened. For the uncontradicted evidence is that he was not pulling on the rope but was bending over coiling it on the deck. A man who is careful does not ordinarily drop a block on a man working below him. Some external force might conceivably compel him to do so. But where, as here, the injured person is not implicated (Jesionowski v. Boston & Marine R. Co., supra), the falling of the block is alone sufficient basis for an inference that the man who held the block was negligent. In short, Dudder alone remains implicated, since on the record either he or petitioner was the cause of the accident and it appears that petitioner was not responsible.

The Jones Act makes applicable to these suits the standard of liability of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as amended, 53 Stat. 1404, 45 U.S.C. § 51, 45 U.S.C.A. § 51. Thus the shipowner becomes liable for injuries to a seaman resulting in whole or in part from the negligence of another employee. See De Zon v. American President Lines, 318 U.S. 660, 665, 63 S.Ct. 814, 817, 87 L.Ed. 1065. And there is no reason in logic or experience why res ipsa loquitur is not applicable to acts of a fellow servant. See Lejeune v. General Petroleum Corporation, 128 Cal.App. 404, 18 P.2d 429; Johnson v. Metropolitan Street R. Co., 104 Mo.App. 588, 592, 593, 78 S.W. 275. True, the doctrine finds most frequent application in cases of injuries arising from instruments or properties under the employer's exclusive control. San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 32 S.Ct. 399, 56 L.Ed. 680; Jesionowski v. Boston & Maine R. Co., supra; Lukon v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 131 F.2d 327; Sweeting v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 3 Cir., 142 F.2d 611. Inherent, however, in the negligence inferred in that type of case is an act or failure to act by an individual. While the acts of negligence underlying such accidents may reach higher into the management hierarchy than the one involved here, the Federal Employers' Liability Act compels us to go no higher than a fellow servant. See Terminal R. Ass'n v. Staengel, 8 Cir., 122 F.2d 271, 136 A.L.R. 789.

No act need be explicable only in terms of negligence in order for the rule of res ipsa loquitur to be invoked. The rule deals only with permissible inferences from unexplained events. In this case the District Court found negligence from Dudder's act or dropping the block since all that petitioner was doing at the time was coiling the rope. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 160 F.2d 789, feeling that petitioner might have pulled the block out of Dudder's hands. It reasoned that although petitioner testified he was bending over coiling the rope when the block hit him, the concussion may have caused a lapse of memory which antedated the actual injury. The inquiry, however, is not as to possible causes of the accident but whether a showing that petitioner was without fault and was injured by the dropping of the block is the basis of a fair inference that the man who dropped the block was negligent. We think it is, for human experience tells us that careful men do not customarily do such an act.

Petitioner presses here his claim for maintenance and cure which was rejected by both courts below. He was hospitalized by respondent for a number of weeks following the accident. He was then found unfit for sea duty and doctors of the Public Health Service recommended that he enter various government hospitals. He refused and went instead to live on the ranch of his parents. We need not decide whether an agreement between petitioner and the government doctors for out-patient treatment and rest at his home might be inferred. Cf. Rey v. Colonial Nav. Co., 2 Cir., 116 F.2d 580; Moyle v. National Petroleum Transport Corporation, 2 Cir., 150 F.2d 840. For there is ample evidence to support the findings of the two lower courts that petitin er had incurred no expense or liability for his care and support at the home of his parents. See Field v. Waterman S.S. Corporation, 5 Cir., 104 F.2d 849. On that issue we affirm the Circuit Court of Appeals. On the issue of negligence we reverse it.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

So ordered.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER dissenting in part.

What is this case? It is a suit by the petitioner, a seaman, for an injury sustained while working on a vessel owned and operated by the United States. Under existing law the United States is liable only if it failed in its duty of exercising reasonable care in safeguarding its employees—the United States is liable, that is, only if it was negligent. And it is up to the plaintiff to prove such negligence.

What is the plaintiff's claim here? It is that while the petitioner and a fellow seaman named Dudder were working together in an operation known as 'rounding in' blocks to bring two blocks of a block and tackle together, somehow or other a block fell and struck the petitioner, who was operating on a deck below Dudder, on the head. The claim is that the block which hit petitioner was negligently released by Dudder and that the United States is responsible for Dudder's negligence. (The 'fellow servant rule' is not a defense under the Jones Act which authorizes this suit. 38 Stat. 1185, as amended, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, 46 U.S.C.A. § 688.) There were no witnesses to this happening besides Dudder and Johnson. The only sources of knowledge for ascertaining what actually happened—whether fault lay with Dudder or Johnson or with nobody, as the law determines fault—were the accounts which Dudder and Johnson might furnish and such inferences as human experience could reasonably draw from the occurrence itself.

What evidence does the record disclose? Of the two available witnesses only one testified. That was the petitioner. It is accurate to state, therefore, that his version of what immediately preceded the injury was uncontradicted. But it is no less true that he was unable to furnish any evidence bearing on the cause of the happening.¹ His testimony has not established that it was the carelessness of Dudder that caused the block to fall out of Dudder's hand rather than a careless jerk of the rope by himself which caused such release. Dudder was available as a witness but he was not called. The United States in fact had Dudder's deposition taken before the trial, and it was placed at Johnson's disposal. Neither party, for reasons of its own, called Dudder as a witness or introduced his deposition.

What conclusions are to be drawn from the facts as they were developed at the trial? It is not the business of this Court to conduct the trial of a case or, even where a case is technically open here on the facts, to sit in independent judgment on the facts. If a case like this is to be allowed to come here at all, we sit in judgment on the proceedings in their entirety. This is a proceeding in Admiralty tried by a judge and not a jury. The trial judge, who heard the testimony and who was in the best possible position to weigh what he heard and saw, died before he gave his view of the testimony. By agreement, the cause was then submitted for judgment by another district judge on the basis of the...