Johnson v. United States
| Decision Date | 16 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-19-2967 |
| Parties | CHARESE JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
The self-represented plaintiff, Charese Johnson, filed suit on August 30, 2019, in the District Court of Maryland for Harford County against defendant Transportation Security Administration ("TSA"). ECF 4 (the "Complaint"). She alleges that her laptop was broken by TSA employees during screening at the airport. Id. The TSA removed the case to federal court on October 10, 2019, pursuant to 28 U.S.C §§ 2679, 1442, and 1446. ECF 1, ¶ 5.1 Section 2679 of 28 U.S.C. is a provision of the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").
Defendant has moved to dismiss the suit. ECF 11. The motion is supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 11-1) (collectively, the "Motion") and two exhibits. ECF 11-2 to ECF 11-3. Defendant moves for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), arguing that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the TSA is not a proper defendant (ECF 11-1 at 5-6), and under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing that the Complaint fails to state a claim. Id. at 6-10. The attached exhibits to the Motion pertain to the administrative claim that plaintiff filed with the TSA. ECF 11-2; ECF 11-3. On May 8, 2020, the TSA moved to substitute the United States as the proper party. ECF 14. I granted the motion. ECF 15.2
On December 16, 2019, the Court sent a notice to plaintiff, advising her of her right to respond to the Motion and of the potential consequences of failing to do so. ECF 12. Because plaintiff did not respond, I issued an Order on April 28, 2020. ECF 13. Among other things, the Order extended until May 28, 2020, the time for plaintiff to respond to the Motion. Id. at 2. Again, plaintiff failed to respond. Therefore, on June 3, 2020, I directed plaintiff to respond to the Motion by June 17, 2020. ECF 16. And, I warned plaintiff that if she failed to respond, I shall assume she does not oppose dismissal of the case. To date, plaintiff has not responded. See Docket.
No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall grant the Motion.
On June 29, 2018, plaintiff boarded a flight from McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada to Baltimore, Maryland operated by Spirit Airlines. ECF 11-2 at 2-3. In her initial claim with the TSA, filed that day, plaintiff stated, id. at 2-3:
Toshiba Satellite laptop was packed in my suitcase. Packaged with installation prior to flight. When I landed, the laptop package was missing and laptop screen broken. Receipt, plane ticket, and photograph attached4. . . Property is toshiba [sic] Satellite laptop computer monitor screen cracked, location of inspection is McCarran International Airport in Las Vegas, Nevada on 6/29/28. . . Prior to boarding plane, my laptop was enclosed with packaging paper and taped for protection. After bag was checked, I landed and opened suitcase packaging was missing. Laptop was unpackaged and laid on clothes.
In a box on the form labeled "Personal Injury/Wrongful Death," Johnson wrote: "Personal injury is laptop is used for my business and has valuable data that can not be recovered." Id. at 2. She indicated that the value of the property damage was $635.96. Id. at 2.
On July 25, 2018, Kimberly Davis, the Assistant Director of Management Services and Claims in the TSA's Financial Management Division, sent plaintiff a letter indicating that her claim had been received and assigned a control number. Id. at 1. The letter indicated that her claim would be governed by the FTCA and that she could file suit in federal court if her claim was denied or not resolved within six months. Id.
On May 20, 2019, Davis sent Johnson another letter, denying her claim. ECF 11-3. Davis stated: "After careful evaluation of all the evidence, we have determined that there are no legally sustainable grounds upon which a finding of liability can be based on the part of the TSA." Id. Davis indicated that Johnson could file suit in "an appropriate U.S. District Court not later than six months after the date this letter was mailed." Id.
Plaintiff's Complaint, filed in a Maryland state court on August 30, 2019, states, in its entirety: ECF 4. On the complaint form, Johnson indicates that her claim is a tort claim, for $5,000. Id.
A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom., McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of law "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
Whether a complaint states a claim for relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). That rule provides that a complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." The purpose of the rule is to provide the defendants with "fair notice" of the claims and the "grounds" for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007).
To survive a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) ; see also Paradise Wire & Cable, 918 F.3d at 317; Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). To be sure, a plaintiff need not include "detailed factual allegations" in order to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules "do not countenance dismissal of a complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted." Johnson v. City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 10 (2014) (per curiam). But, mere "'naked assertions' of wrongdoing" are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 2013). If a complaint provides no more than "labels and conclusions" or "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. "[A]n unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation" does not state a plausible claim of relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Rather, to satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth "enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest" a cognizable cause of action, "even if . . . [the] actual proof of those facts is improbable and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, "a court 'must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,' and must 'draw all reasonable inferences [from those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.'" Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) (alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Semenova v. Md. Transit Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 (4th Cir. 2015). However, "a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the facts." Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see Glassman v. Arlington Cty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). "A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer" that the plaintiff is entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012).
In the context of a motion to dismiss, courts ordinarily do not "'resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.'" King v. Rubenstein, 825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (quoting Edwards, 178 F.3d at 243). But, "in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6)." Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule 12(b)(6) "is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the complaint," Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 1993), "[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense 'clearly appear[ ] on the face of the complaint.'" Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (emphasis in Goodman) (quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250).
"Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the ...
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