Johnson v. United States
| Decision Date | 08 June 2016 |
| Docket Number | Crim. Case No. 4:07-cr-00374-NKL-1,Case No. 4:16-cv-00141-NKL |
| Parties | CHARLES L. JOHNSON, Movant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
In view of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), Charles L. Johnson moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence. For the reasons discussed below, the motion to vacate is denied. The Court also denies a certificate of appealability.
In 2008, judgment was entered against Johnson based on his plea of guilty to one count of carjacking under 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and one count of use of a firearm during a crime of violence, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), that is, the carjacking. This Court sentenced him to 77 months of imprisonment on the carjacking count, the bottom of the applicable sentencing guidelines calculation, and a consecutive 84 months on the firearm count, the top of the applicable calculation. Johnson did not appeal his conviction.
A "crime of violence," for purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A), is:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3). The judgment entered against Johnson does not distinguish between the elements clause, subsection (A), or the residual clause, subsection (B), of § 924(c)(3).
Johnson argues the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague in view the Supreme Court's Johnson v. United States analysis, and that § 924(c)(3)'s elements clause does not cover the underlying crime of carjacking, so his conviction for use of a firearm during a crime of violence must be vacated.
In Johnson, the Supreme Court examined a challenge to the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act. The Act requires a minimum sentence of 15 years if a person violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (), has three prior convictions for a "violent felony," § 922(e)(1). A "violent felony" for purposes of the Act is:
§ 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Subsection (i) is the elements clause; burglary, arson, extortion, and explosives are subsection (ii)'s enumerated offenses; and the final portion of subsection (ii), underlined above, is the residual clause. Johnson invalidated the Act's residual clause, 135 S.Ct. at 2556, and Johnson applies retroactively, Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257, 1265 (2016). The decision in Johnson did "not call into question" the elements clause or enumerated offenses subsections of the Act. 135 S.Ct. at 2563.
For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes it need not decide here whether the residual clause of § 924(c)(3) is unconstitutionally vague in view of the Johnson analysis, because Charles Johnson is nevertheless subject to conviction pursuant to § 924(c)(3)'s elements clause.
As noted, Johnson pled guilty to use of a firearm during a crime of violence, the carjacking. The elements clause of the definition of a crime of violence provides that such crime:
(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another[.]
§ 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added). In turn, there are "three basic elements" to the crime of carjacking:
U.S. v. Casteel, 663 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting U.S. v. Wright, 246 F.3d 1123, 1126 (8th Cir. 2001)) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2119) (emphasis added). Johnson focuses on the word "intimidation" in § 2119, arguing it does not necessarily encompass "physical force" as required under § 924(c)(3)(A), and that carjacking therefore does not categorically qualify as a crime of violence.
But the Eighth Circuit has previously held that the federal crime of carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence under § 924(c), as well as a United States Sentencing Guideline that uses a definition essentially identical to the one contained in § 924(c)(3)(A). Specifically, in United States v. Jones, the court held, without discussion, that a carjacking conviction under § 2119qualified as a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(1). 34 F.3d 596, 601-02 (8th Cir. 1994) ().
This Court notes that Jones involved the original version of the carjacking statute, which at the time included the element of possession of a firearm while committing the carjacking.1 At the time Jones was decided, a number of courts had previously held armed carjacking under § 2119 always constituted a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c)(1), inasmuch as armed carjacking always presented a substantial risk of force being used against a victim reluctant to surrender his or her vehicle. See Jones, 34 F.3d at 601-02 ().
Congress amended § 2119 in 1994 and 1996. The 1994 amendment, part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act, deleted reference to possession of a firearm, and replaced it with the mens rea element of "intent to cause death or serious bodily harm." Pub. L No. 103-322, 108 Stat 1796, § 60003(a)(14) (1994). The 1996 amendment, part of the Carjacking Correction Act, added death as a possible punishment for certain offenses, and specified that "serious bodily injury" includes certain sexual assaults. Pub. L. 104-217, 110 Stat. 3020, § 2 (1996). For the reasons discussed below, the Court concludes Jones is notdistinguishable from the case before it, notwithstanding the differences between the version of the carjacking statute at issue in Jones and at issue here.
In U.S. v. Mathijssen, 406 F.3d 496, 500 (8th Cir. 2005), the Eighth Circuit examined whether the California crime of carjacking qualified as a crime of violence for purposes of enhancement of the defendant's sentence as a career offender under § 4B1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines define a crime of violence as any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, and that:
406 F.3d at 500. The court concluded that the California offense "similarly meets the definition of a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines because it qualifies independently under both" parts of § 4B1.2(a). Id. Section 4B1.2(a)(1) of the Sentencing Guidelines is essentially identical to § 924(c)(3)(A) at issue here.
Mathijssen was decided in 2005, after the amendments of § 2119, and the court in Mathijssen expressly focused on § 2119's requirement that the taking of the vehicle be "by force and violence or intimidation"—a requirement under both the prior and later versions of § 2119. The court cited Jones and did not distinguish the case in any way, nor address differences betweenthe original and later versions of the statute when it reaffirmed its holding in Jones. In short, Mathijssen establishes that the post-Jones amendments to § 2119 do not affect the categorization of carjacking as a crime of violence. This conclusion is supported by the nature of the amendments—addition of the mens rea element of "intent to cause death or serious bodily harm," addition of the death penalty for certain offenses, and specification that "serious bodily injury" includes certain sexual assaults—which are consistent with violent crimes.
This view of Mathijssen is further reinforced by the Eighth Circuit's subsequent decision in United States v. Hicks, 374 F. App'x 673 (8th Cir. 2010), which concerned the same Sentencing Guidelines at issue in Mathijssen. In Hicks, the Eighth Circuit held, without elaboration, that the defendant's federal conviction of aiding and abetting a carjacking was a crime of violence for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Hicks, 374 F. App'x at 674 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and United States v. Brown, 550 F.3d 724, 728 (8th Cir. 2008)2).
Thus here, inasmuch as U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1) and § 924(c)(3)(A) are essentially identical, Mathijssen and Hicks further support the conclusion that the federal crime of carjacking qualifies as a crime of violence. See United States v. Cowan, 696 F.3d 706, 708-09 (8th Cir. 2012) (...
To continue reading
Request your trial