Johnson v. United States
| Decision Date | 12 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 17-2411 (CRC) |
| Parties | JOSEPH JOHNSON, JR., Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Keep poking the bear and it will eventually claw back. After plaintiff Joseph Johnson filed this, his twelfth, lawsuit challenging his student loan debt, the government brought a counterclaim to collect the approximately $35,000 it says he owes. The question is whether the government's parry is a compulsory counterclaim that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) required it to bring in one of Johnson's prior suits. Answering in the affirmative, the Court will grant summary judgment on the counterclaim for Mr. Johnson. For now at least, he has managed to elude the bear.
The background of this case has been fully recounted on several occasions. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, No. 17-cv-2411 (CRC), 2019 WL 2424039, at *1-2 (D.D.C. June 10, 2019); Johnson v. Duncan, No. GJH-15-1820, 2017 WL 462049, at *1-2 (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2017), aff'd as modified, Johnson v. Devos, 775 F. App'x 86 (4th Cir. 2019); Johnson v. U.S. Dep't of Educ., 580 F. Supp. 2d 154, 155 (D.D.C. 2008), aff'd without op., No. 08-5468 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 10, 2009). A brief recap suffices here.
Johnson enrolled in college in the fall of 1993. Johnson, 2019 WL 2424039, at *1. Over the next few years, he obtained several federally guaranteed student loans that he eventually consolidated under a U.S. Department of Education ("Department") direct loan program. Id.; Compl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 1. Beginning in 2011, Johnson alleges that he made several attempts to repay his loans but the government wrongfully refused to accept or properly credit his checks. See id. at ¶¶ 13-30. Johnson's complaint focuses specifically on a $12,390 check that he claims to have submitted to the Department in February 2012. Johnson, 2019 WL 2424039, at *1; Compl. ¶¶ 28-30. According to Johnson, the Department accepted that check but failed to accurately reduce his overall debt. Johnson, 2019 WL 2424039, at *1; Compl. ¶¶ 28-30. Johnson further contends that although he has never defaulted on his loans, the Department falsely reported to credit agencies that he was delinquent on his payments. Johnson, 2019 WL 2424039, at *1; Compl. ¶¶ 31-33.
In October 2013, Johnson filed an administrative claim with the Department via a Standard Form 95 ("SF-95"), which is a precursor to filing claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). Status Report by U.S., Ex. A, ECF No. 47-1 (hereinafter, "SF-95"); see also Compl. ¶ 34; 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a). In the SF-95, Johnson asserted that the government had agreed to settle his debts in full by accepting his $12,390 check and, as a result, its continued collection efforts were unlawful. See SF-95. Johnson also filed several lawsuits involving the loans, the eleventh of which was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. See Johnson, 2017 WL 462049 (D. Md. Feb. 1, 2017) ("Johnson XI"). In that case, Johnson alleged that the Department misreported his outstanding debt and breached its agreement to accept the $12,390 check as recompense for his entire debt. Id. at *1-2. Thegovernment filed an answer to Johnson's complaint and later moved for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), which the court granted. Id. at *6.
Several months later, Johnson filed the present suit in this Court. See Compl. In his complaint, Johnson lodged a host of claims against the government stemming from (once again) the Department of Education's failure to accurately report his debts and its mishandling of his $12,390 check. See id. ¶¶ 13-33. The government moved to dismiss the complaint, and the Court granted the motion, finding that res judicata precluded Johnson's claims given that he had previously filed—and lost—at least one other federal case raising the same claims. Johnson, 2019 WL 2424039, at *5 (citing Johnson XI).
After filing its motion to dismiss, the government brought a counterclaim against Johnson for the outstanding $33,314.91 that he allegedly owed on his student loans as of that time. Counterclaim ¶ 16, ECF No. 21. Johnson answered with thirty-six affirmative defenses. See Answer, ECF No. 24. The Court then requested the parties' views on whether the government's counterclaim was barred by Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a), which prohibits the filing of certain counterclaims that a party neglected to file in a prior related action. See Jan. 24, 2020, Min. Order. The government responded in a status report that the counterclaim was not barred by Rule 13(a). See Status Report by U.S., ECF No. 47 ("Gov. Status Report"). The government reasoned that the counterclaim had not yet accrued in any of Johnson's prior lawsuits against the federal government save for Johnson XI. See id. at 4-6. As to Johnson XI, the government argued that the counterclaim was not compulsory in that case because: (i) the case was resolved by a judgment on the pleadings, see id. at 7-8; (ii) debt enforcement counterclaims are generally non-compulsory in litigation over the underlying debt, see id. at 8-9; and (iii) an exception for already-pending claims applied because Johnson's SF-95 was still pending before theDepartment of Education when he filed Johnson XI, see id. at 9-10. Finally, the government noted that even if the Court determines that its counterclaim is barred by Rule 13, the government may nonetheless recoup Johnson's debts through administrative channels. Id. at 10-12.
After the government filed its status report, Johnson moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the government's counterclaim was compulsory in Johnson XI. See Mot. for Summ. J. at 2-6, ECF No. 49. The government opposed the motion, reiterating the points made in its prior status report. See Gov. Opp. to Summ. J., ECF No. 51 ("Gov. Opp."). Johnson's motion is ripe for the Court's resolution.
A party seeking summary judgment must show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). "Once the movant has carried this initial burden, the party opposing summary judgment must then 'come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Harris v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. 20-cv-8 (CRC), 2020 WL 5798446, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 29, 2020) (Cooper, J.) (quoting Jeffries v. Barr, 965 F.3d 843, 859 (D.C. Cir 2020)). In making this determination, the court must view the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party" and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
"The purpose of [Rule 13] is to prevent multiplicity of actions and to achieve resolution in a single lawsuit of all disputes arising out of common matters." Columbia Plaza Corp. v. Security Nat'l. Bank., 525 F.2d 620, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (cleaned up). To that end, Rule 13deems a counterclaim "compulsory" (rather than "permissive") if it arises out of the same transaction or occurrence as the opposing party's claim and does not require adding a third-party over whom the court lacks jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a)(1). A party that fails to plead a compulsory counterclaim is barred from asserting that claim in a future lawsuit. See Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467, 469 & n.1 (1974). Permissive counterclaims, by contrast, can generally be filed in a later lawsuit. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
The government maintains that Rule 13 poses no bar to its counterclaim for three reasons. First, it argues that Rule 13(a)(1) does not apply when the prior litigation ended with a judgment on the pleadings absent any discovery. Second, it contends that the substance of the counterclaim—collection of Johnson's outstanding loans—is not sufficiently related to the various claims filed in Johnson XI to qualify as compulsory. And third, it argues that the counterclaim falls within an express exception for claims that were pending in another action at the time of the prior lawsuit. The Court will take each argument in turn.1
The parties first dispute whether discovery did or did not occur in Johnson XI. See Gov. Status Report at 7-8; Mot. for Summ. J. at 2, 4; Gov. Opp. at 3-6. This skirmish is beside the point. Application of Rule 13 does not depend on whether discovery took place, but rather, attaches when a party submitted a "pleading" in the prior action as defined by Rule 7(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a) () (emphasis added); see also Horn & Hardart Co. v.Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1258, 1264 (D.D.C. 1987). Rule 7(a), in turn, defines "pleading" to include (among other things) answers to complaints. Fed. R. Civ. P. 7(a)(2).
Here, it is undisputed that the Government filed an answer to Johnson's complaint in Johnson XI. See Gov. Opp. at 3 (). Plainly, then, the government filed a pleading for purposes of Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). As a consequence, the government was required to include any counterclaim in that pleading that qualified as "compulsory" under Rule 13(a) or risk losing the ability to file it in a later action. Indeed, the government aptly summarized this rule in its briefing: "Where the defendant in an action is obligated to plead, i.e., file an answer, failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim in such an answer precludes subsequent litigation on that claim." Gov. Status Report at 6 (emphasis added) (cleaned up).
Despite this clear outcome, the government argues that the filing of a pleading "is not dispositive" because "the compulsory counterclaim rule [only] applies when the party does, in fact, have a valid claim." Id. at 7-8. By this logic, the government reasons that it was relieved of any burden...
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