Johnson v. United States

• Decision Date: 12 September 2022
• Docket Number: 22-cv-00747-DMR
• Parties: JAMES ELLIS JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

JAMES ELLIS JOHNSON, Plaintiff,
v.
UNITED STATES, Defendant.

No. 22-cv-00747-DMR

United States District Court, N.D. California

September 12, 2022

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS RE: DKT. NO. 7

DONNA M. RYU, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Defendant United States of America moves to dismiss James Ellis Johnson's complaint alleging civil rights and tort claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). [Docket No. 7.] Johnson, who is self-represented, filed an opposition brief. [Docket Nos. 12, 14 (“Opp'n”).]^[1] Defendant replied. [Docket No. 13 (“Reply”).] The court held a hearing on August 25, 2022. For the following reasons, the motion is granted. Johnson is granted leave to file a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) within 30 days-i.e., by October 12, 2022.

I. BACKGROUND

Johnson makes the following allegations in the complaint and the accompanying exhibits,

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all of which are taken as true for the purposes of the motion.^[2] [Docket No. 1 (“Compl.”).] Liberally construed, Johnson alleges that on January 14, 2020, he was arrested by the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) police in Palo Alto “for no reason.”^[3] Compl. at 3. He claims, “I believe the hold situation was a set up. There was a short talk between my self and another veteran, then he left!” Id. Johnson explains that he was trying to make an appointment but then three armed members of the VA police showed up. Id. at 4. One stopped thirty feet away from him and demanded Johnson to approach him and explain “what happen[ed].” Id. Johnson replied that he wanted to know why there were three armed officers present. Id. Johnson requested an attorney and for that reason, he asserts, he was arrested. Id.

Johnson claims that he was “manhandled,” “forced down walk ways, and hall ways” and not allowed to “walk on my own.” Compl. at 4. Johnson then was forced into a room and handcuffed behind his back. Id. He was not allowed to leave and was denied his Miranda rights. Id. Johnson did not answer any questions until “the pain in my shoulder became unbearable” related to an injury that the VA “refused to treat me for.” Id. Johnson contends that the officer kept telling him that “I [know] the law, and you don[']t.” Compl. at 5. The officer then “tortured” him. Id. The officers later took him to court, but “when it was pointed out I prevented a situation, not caused one, they dropped the charge.” Id. Johnson does not explain what offense he was initially charged with.

Johnson asserts that he learned the VA had a “notice” in its system “telling staff to call police if I cause a problem” but that no such notice was ever “presented” to him. Id. Instead, the VA staff called the police just for “stating a point of view,” which abridged his “right to freedom of speech.” Id. The notice to which Johnson refers appears to be a “behavioral flag” imposed by

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the VA due to Johnson's previous “disruptive behavior.” Id.; see Compl. Ex. 1.

Johnson alleges a claim for violation of “civil rights, freedom of speech” related to the behavioral flag. Compl. at 6. He also asserts a second claim labeled “tort law, negligence liability.” The second claim lists false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, “tortured,” false prosecution, and “prima facie case i,ii,iii,iv.” Id. at 7. Johnson seeks $9,900 in damages plus injunctive relief consisting of a removal of the behavioral flag from the VA computer system, plus costs.

Johnson attaches exhibits to his complaint. The first is a printout of the behavioral flag. The behavioral flag requires “Staff to contact local law enforcement or VA Police should patient be unable to be redirected from engaging in disruptive behavior or pose a threat to safety.” Compl. Ex. 1. VA staff members also must complete certain reports to “inform other providers and Disruptive Behavior Committee of any further events.” Id. According to the flag, “[t]he Veteran has a history of verbally disruptive behavior. (4/30/8, 3/23/17, 1/2/17, SFVA 5/20/17).”^[4]Id.

Exhibit 2 is the VA's response to a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request that Johnson submitted on January 15, 2020 for a copy of the “Disruptive behavior report 4/20/2018, 2/22/2017, 1/02/2017, and Ref # 640-181942.” The VA identified only one responsive document, related to “Ref # 640-191942 dated 4/30/2018,” but redacted certain portions of it pursuant to a FOIA exemption that permits withholding documents that would “constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of a living person's personal privacy.” Compl. Ex. 2. The redacted report from the “Disruptive Behavior Reporting System” includes Johnson's health records from 2018. Id.^[5] The VA did not locate any responsive records for the requested reports dated 2/22/2017 and 1/02/2017. Id.

Exhibit 3 encompasses a number of documents that are connected to the January 14, 2020

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incident. These documents include (1) an administrative tort claim that Johnson filed with the VA on January 16, 2020; (2) another printout of the behavioral flag; (3) progress notes from a VA employee regarding a call she had with Johnson on November 19, 2019, in which he threatened to “take [her] to court to explain why he has this flag”; and (4) documents about a petty offense hearing held on September 2, 2020 regarding a charge of disorderly conduct against Johnson. The last category of documents include a Notice to Appear from the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and letters by Johnson in advance of that hearing. The complaint and attachments do not describe the nature of the hearing or the outcome. Finally, Exhibit 3 includes an email to Johnson with contact information where he could send a “request for reconsideration” without any explanation of what he sought reconsideration.^[6]

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is a challenge to the court's subject matter jurisdiction. A court will dismiss a party's claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction “only when the claim is so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of th[e Supreme] Court, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (citation and quotation marks omitted). When reviewing a 12(b)(1) motion, the court sculpts its approach according to whether the motion is “facial or factual.” White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000). A facial challenge asserts that “the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). A factual challenge asserts that subject-matter jurisdiction does not exist, independent of what is stated in the complaint. White, 227 F.3d at 1242. In contrast with a facial challenge, a factual challenge permits the court to look beyond the complaint, without “presum[ing] the truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations.” Id. (citation omitted). Even the

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presence of disputed material facts “will not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of jurisdictional claims.” Roberts v. Corrothers, 812 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted).

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the claims alleged in the complaint. See Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the court must “accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94, and may dismiss a claim “only where there is no cognizable legal theory” or there is an absence of “sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim to relief,” Shroyer v. New Cingular Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim has facial plausibility when a plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation omitted). In other words, the facts alleged must demonstrate “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 555 (2007).

Pro se pleadings must be liberally construed and “held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 94. The Ninth Circuit has held that “where the petitioner is pro se,” courts have an obligation, “particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt.” Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc). “This rule relieves pro se litigants from the strict application of procedural rules and demands that courts not hold missing or inaccurate legal terminology or muddled draftsmanship against them.” Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013). “This duty applies equally to pro se motions.” United States v. Qazi, 975 F.3d 989, 993 (9th Cir. 2020). However, “a liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Byrd v. Maricopa Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, 629 F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Pena v....