Johnson v. University of Iowa
| Decision Date | 16 December 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-03-CV-10062.,3-03-CV-10062. |
| Parties | David A. JOHNSON, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. UNIVERSITY OF IOWA, State Board of Regents, David J. Skorton, M.D., in his official capacity, Douglas K. True, in his official capacity, and Susan C. Buckley, in her official capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
James C Larew, Larew Law Office, Iowa City, for David A Johnson On his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff.
Plaintiff David Johnson brings this action asserting that defendant University of Iowa's parental leave policy violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that the University's parental leave policy illegally discriminates against biological fathers because it fails to provide them parental leave paid out of accumulated sick leave, but provides biological mothers and adoptive parents that benefit.
The Court has before it (1) Defendants' motion for summary judgment; (2) Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment; (3) Defendants' motion to strike references to Jennie Embree; (4) Plaintiff's motion to strike for failure to properly deny or qualify responses; (5) Plaintiff's motion to strike responses and expert opinion of Dr. Jennifer Niebyl, M.D.; (6) Plaintiff's motion to strike a portion of the expert opinion of Dr. Kent Jayne1; (7) Plaintiff's motion to amend order certifying class; and (8) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply. Each of the motions are resisted by the opposing party, fully submitted, and ready for ruling. For the reasons outlined below, the Court denies Defendants' motion to strike, denies each of the three Plaintiff's motions to strike, grants Plaintiff's motion for leave to file a surreply, grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment, denies Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, and denies Plaintiff's motion to amend the order certifying the class.
On June 1, 2000, plaintiff David Johnson began employment as a clerk IV in the Office of the Registrar of defendant University of Iowa ("the University"). The University maintains a parental leave policy for all non-union employees, including Plaintiff. The policy provides in relevant part:
a. Purpose. To permit parents who have care giving responsibilities to have time off to spend with a child newly added to the family and, to the extent permitted by state law, to be paid during such leave. To adapt an employee's work schedule and/or duties to help reduce conflict with parental obligations.
b. Entitlement to Leave.
(1) Twelve-Month Faculty, Professional, Scientific, and Non-Organized Merit System Staff.
(a) Biological mothers are entitled to leave for any period of pregnancy-related temporary disability, to be charged against sick leave. Based on current medical practice, a leave of six weeks or less would not require the employee to provide disability documentation. If an employee's accumulated sick leave is insufficient to cover the period of disability, the employee will, at the employee's request, be granted a leave of absence without pay. Any request for absence beyond the period of disability is considered as a leave of absence without pay or as vacation.
(b) A newly adoptive parent, including a domestic partner, is entitled to one week (5 days) of paid adoption leave to be charged against accrued sick leave. Departments are encouraged to arrange for additional leave as necessary. Departments should work with prospective adoptive parents seeking to adopt through an adoption agency with specific requirements for parental leave, to the extent the adoption leave is not sufficient to undertake an adoption. Time not charged to accrued sick leave may be charged to accrued vacation or taken as leave without pay.
Plaintiff and his wife, Jennie Embree, a half-time University employee, had a daughter on November 16, 2002. Prior to her birth, both parents sought parental leave. (Johnson Aff., Pl.'s App. at 6-7.) Plaintiff made repeated efforts to determine whether under the policy a biological father could charge the same five days of parental leave against accrued sick leave that adoptive parents could. (Johnson Aff., Pl.'s App. at 3-6.) University administrators, including defendant Susan Buckley, Director of Human Resources, Dave Martin, President of the Staff Council, and Jan Gorman, an employee of the Department of Human Resources, uniformly responded to Plaintiff's inquiries, each stating that biological fathers could not receive parental leave under the policy.2 This is not to say that the University denies all caregiving leave to biological fathers. All employees are allowed to apply vacation time toward leave, or take unpaid leave of up to twelve weeks. Employees whose partner or spouse works for the University are allowed twelve weeks leave between them. Biological fathers are only prevented from applying accumulated sick leave to caregiving leave. Plaintiff took an unpaid leave of absence after the birth of his daughter.
Embree works at the University's College of Nursing as a half-time employee — about twenty hours per week. Like Plaintiff, she is subject to the University's parental leave policy. Under the policy, Embree took four weeks of pregnancy disability leave paid out of accumulated sick leave. For the two weeks following this time off, she worked ten hours per week from home, about half of her normal work week. The parties dispute the characterization of the final two weeks of leave time. Defendants assert that during those two weeks Embree received partial disability leave. (Buckley Aff., Defs.' App. Vol. III at 3.) Plaintiff claims that Embree had recovered from her pregnancy disability after the four weeks of total leave, and therefore the half-time leave was unrelated to Embree's disability. (Johnson Aff., Pl.'s App. at 6-7.)
On June 17, 2003, Plaintiff filed the present class action in this Court, naming as defendants the University, the State Board of Regents, the President of the University, David J. Skorton, M.D., the University's Vice President for Finance and Operations, Douglas K. True, and the University's Director of Human Resources, Susan C. Buckley. Plaintiff amended his complaint on October 8, 2003. Plaintiff groups his federal claims and state claims Wider headings "A" and "B," respectively. Count I of the federal claims alleges Defendants' conduct constitutes sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2003). Count II of the federal claims alleges Defendants' conduct violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Under the state claims heading, Count I alleges that the policy violates the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), Iowa Code § 216.6(1) (2003). Count II alleges that the policy violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Iowa Constitution. Iowa Constitution, Article I, § 6.
Before the Court can analyze the merits of the cross motions for summary judgment, it must evaluate the numerous other motions filed by the parties, which are listed above. These motions challenge various components of the summary judgment motions. In addition to their motion for summary judgment, Defendants filed one motion on August 10, 2004, which seeks to strike all references to Plaintiff's wife, Jennie Embree. Plaintiff has five motions in addition to his motion for partial summary judgment. On August 17, 2004, Plaintiff filed two motions to strike evidence set forth by Defendants: one challenges expert testimony of Kent Jayne, and the other challenges expert testimony of Dr. Jennifer Niebyl. Also on August 17, Plaintiff filed a motion asking the Court to strike many of Defendants' individual responses to Plaintiff's asserted material facts. On September 7, 2004, Plaintiff filed a motion to amend the order certifying the class. Finally, Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to file a surreply on September 14, 2004.
Defendants challenge Plaintiff's references to his wife, Jennie Embree, in his motion for partial summary judgment. Defendants make this challenge on the basis that during discovery Plaintiff did not disclose Embree as a potential person with information. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed.
Federal Rule 26 requires disclosure of persons with information. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(1). It also requires that parties formulate and adhere to a discovery schedule. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(f). Under Rule 37, the Court may not consider evidence disclosed after the deadline unless the failure to disclose was substantially justified or harmless. "Decisions on whether there is substantial justification for late-filed discovery materials or whether the late filing was harmless is within the Court's discretion." Trost v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir.1998).
The Seventh Circuit has devised a framework for determining whether a failure to disclose is justified:
"A district court need not make explicit findings concerning the...
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