Johnson v. Wabash County
| Decision Date | 09 July 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-577-A-160,2-577-A-160 |
| Citation | 391 N.E.2d 1139,181 Ind.App. 281 |
| Parties | Margaret E. JOHNSON, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. WABASH COUNTY, Indiana, Clarence Bowman, Eugene Schenkel and Glen A. Berry as the Board of Commissioners of the County of Wabash, State of Indiana, and the Board of Commissioners of the County of Wabash, State of Indiana, Appellee(Defendants Below). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John R. Johnston, Wabash, for appellant.
Larry C. Thrush, Wabash, for appellee.
Plaintiff-appellant Margaret Johnson (Johnson) brought an action against Defendant-appellee Wabash County (County) to recover unpaid salary allegedly owed her for services rendered as prison matron from and including January 1, 1967, through December 31, 1974. The County filed a motion for summary judgment which was granted by the trial court.
We reverse.
In 1967, Johnson was appointed prison matron of the County by the Sheriff (her husband) in accordance with IC 11-5-4-6 1 and received an annual salary as established by the Wabash County Council.
On November 12, 1975, Johnson filed a complaint seeking judgment in the amount of $37,960.00 against the County for back salary plus attorney fees. This complaint was amended on December 30, 1975, to demand a total amount of $75,920.00 ($28,470.00 for back salary, $18,980.00 for attorney fees, and $28,470.00 for "liquidated damages"). She claimed she was entitled to be paid a salary equivalent to the salary paid to other deputy sheriffs and police officers in accordance with IC 11-5-4-3 which, prior to its amendment in 1972, provided in relevant part:
"The Prison Matron and her assistant or assistants shall be paid such compensation or salaries as other deputy Sheriffs and police officers Are paid for like work." (our emphasis)
This provision was amended effective February 14, 1972 to read as follows:
"The Prison Matron and her assistant or assistants shall be paid such compensation or salaries as other deputy Sheriffs and police officers are paid."
In her complaint, Johnson set forth the annual salaries paid to her as compared to the compensation paid to the deputy sheriffs (allegedly for like work) as follows:
"Year Annual Salary Annual Salary Paid to
---- ------------- ---------------------
Paid To Deputy Sheriffs For
------- -------------------
Plaintiff Like Work
--------- ---------
1967 $2,040.00 $5,620.00
1968 2,700.00 5,400.00
1969 2,700.00 6,120.00
1970 2,900.00 6,500.00
1971 3,190.00 6,800.00
1972 3,690.00 7,400.00
1973 3,800.00 7,700.00
1974 4,000.00 7,950.00"
The County filed a motion for jury trial together with its answer on February 2, 1976, wherein it admitted that Johnson's record of her salary was correct and acknowledged that the salaries of the Lowest paid deputy sheriff for the years 1972-1973 were accurate, but denied that the salary paid to such deputy sheriffs was for like work as that of the prison matron for the years prior to 1972. Numerous separate defenses were asserted in the answer: first, that the portion of Johnson's claim accruing more than five years prior to the filing of her complaint was barred by the statute of limitations pursuant to IC 34-1-2-2 2; second, that Johnson waived her claim for additional compensation by accepting the terms of employment and salary paid; third, that her claim was barred in equity by laches; fourth, that she did not perform "like work" as required in the pre-1972 provision of IC 11-5-4-3; fifth, that the position of prison matron was a part-time job and therefore not subject to a salary comparable to a full-time deputy sheriff position; and finally, that attorney fees and liquidated damages were not recoverable. The County's answer also asserted as a set-off that Johnson lived in a dwelling furnished by the County free of any rent or utility charges during the term of her employment and that this constituted additional compensation since none of the deputy sheriffs or police officers had been provided with living quarters or free utilities
On August 12, 1976, the County filed its motion for summary judgment together with affidavits and supporting memorandum. In its memorandum it asserted that the statutory requirement had been met with respect to Johnson's salary since, during the entire period of Johnson's employment, the deputy sheriffs of Wabash County were paid a salary pursuant to the guidelines established by IC 17-3-71-2, which provides in pertinent part:
"In all counties having a population of not less than twenty-five thousand and one (25,001) and not more than forty thousand (40,000) according to the last preceding United States census, the salary of each of said deputies and other assistants shall not be less than two hundred and twenty dollars ($220) per month . . . ."
Thus, County argued, even if Johnson were considered to be a full-time employee and entitled to a salary commensurate with that payable to full-time deputy sheriffs, the County would have been Obligated to pay her only the statutory minimum of $2,640.00 per year, or a total of $21,120.00 during her eight years of employment. In fact, Johnson was paid a total salary for eight years of $25,020.00.
The trial court denied Johnson's motion to strike the County's request for trial by jury and granted the County's motion for summary judgment. In response to Johnson's motion to correct errors, the trial court's judgment was corrected as follows to set forth reasons for granting the summary judgment:
"FINDINGS AND ORDER This matter came on for hearing on the 5th day of October, 1976, upon the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel for each of the parties, now finds:
1. That from January 1, 1967 through December 31, 1974, the Defendant would have been obligated to pay a full time prison matron a salary in accordance with the Legislative Directives enumerated in Indiana Code 17-3-71-2;
2. That during the entire eight (8) year period of Plaintiff's employment, Wabash County, Indiana had a population of not less than 25,001 and not more than 40,000 persons;
3. That the minimum salary that Defendant was legally obligated to pay to the Plaintiff, if Plaintiff was a full time employee, was the monthly sum of Two Hundred Twenty Dollars ($220.00);
4. That in all instances the monthly salary paid to the Plaintiff by the Defendant exceeded the statutory minimum prescribed by Indiana Code 17-3-71-2.
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED by the Court that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided in this cause, therefore, the Court now grants the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and enters judgment for Defendants."
Johnson presents the following issues for our review:
I. Whether the trial court's entry of summary judgment based on its application of IC 11-5-4-3 and IC 17-3-71-2 was contrary to law in the trial court's application of the appropriate statutes and in its finding that there exists no genuine issue of material fact.
II. Whether the trial court erred by not granting partial summary judgment for Johnson.
III. Whether the trial court erred in granting the County's request for trial by jury.
When reviewing the granting of a summary judgment this Court must determine if any genuine issue of fact exists and whether the law was correctly applied by the trial court. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 56; Doe v. Barnett (1969), 145 Ind.App. 542, 251 N.E.2d 688. We first address whether the trial court correctly applied the law.
Johnson contends that the trial court erred in its construction of IC 11-5-4-3. Specifically she argues that the trial court erred when it found that the minimum salary requirements set in IC 17-3-71-2 had a bearing upon IC 11-5-4-3. The County argues that the statutory minimum requirement is directly applicable in the establishment of a prison matron's salary.
The controlling statute in this case is IC 11-5-4-3, which, prior to the 1972 Amendment, required that prison matrons be paid a salary equal to the salary other deputy sheriffs and police officers were paid for like work. The 1972 amendment deleted the qualifying words "for like work," and now requires that prison matrons receive the same compensation as other deputies and police officers are paid, regardless of their respective duties.
When construing legislation, this Court must reasonably interpret the statutory language to discover the legislative intent and goal. Skirvin v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (1976), Ind.App., 355 N.E.2d 425. It is also a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need not and cannot be interpreted by a court, Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners v. Holthouse Realty Corp. (1976), Ind.App., 352 N.E.2d 535; and, in the absence of an expressed differing legislative intent, words in statutes are given their plain, ordinary meaning. Indiana Department of State Revenue v. Cable Brazil, Inc. (1978), Ind.App., 380 N.E.2d 555. Furthermore, there is a presumption that a statutory amendment was intended to change the existing law. Sekerez v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 521.
Applying these general rules of statutory construction, we conclude the plain meaning of IC 11-5-4-3 to be that a prison matron is entitled to be paid on the same salary scale as that established locally for, and paid to, deputy sheriffs and police officers. Additionally, it must be shown that the duties performed by an employee in the capacity of prison matron prior to the 1972 amendment were "like work" compared to that of deputies and police officers at that time.
IC 11-5-4-3, makes no reference to IC 17-3-71-2, nor do we find that the legislature...
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