Johnson v. Washoe Cnty. Sch. Dist.

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal,Nevada
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada
• Writing for the Court: LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
• Docket Number: 3:22-cv-00520-LRH-CLB
• Decision Date: 18 January 2024
• Parties: RYLEE JOHNSON and SIOBHAN JOHNSON, Plaintiffs, v. WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; KATY UPTON, individually, and in her official capacity; JASON URMSTON, individually, and in his official capacity; TAMMY HART, individually, and in her official capacity; WENDY HAWKINS, individually, and in her official capacity; SEAN HALL, individually, and in his official capacity; and DOES I-X, Defendants.
• topic: Civil Rights,Personal Injury Law,Civil Procedure

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RYLEE JOHNSON and SIOBHAN JOHNSON, Plaintiffs, v. WASHOE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, a political subdivision of the State of Nevada; KATY UPTON, individually, and in her official capacity; JASON URMSTON, individually, and in his official capacity; TAMMY HART, individually, and in her official capacity; WENDY HAWKINS, individually, and in her official capacity; SEAN HALL, individually, and in his official capacity; and DOES I-X, Defendants.

No. 3:22-cv-00520-LRH-CLB

United States District Court, D. Nevada

January 18, 2024

ORDER

LARRY R. HICKS, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Defendants Washoe County School District (“WCSD”), Jason Urmston (“Urmston”), Tammy Hart (“Hart”), Wendy Hawkins (“Hawkins”) and Sean Hall (“Hall”) (collectively “District Defendants”) move the Court to dismiss (ECF No. 16) the causes of action against District Defendants set forth by Plaintiffs Rylee Johnson (“Rylee”) and Siobhan Johnson (“Mrs. Johnson”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) (ECF No. 4). Plaintiffs opposed (ECF No. 26) and District Defendants replied (ECF No. 31). For the reasons contained within this Order, the Court grants District Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 16).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs commenced this action based upon alleged bullying that took place while Rylee attended Spanish Springs High School (“SSHS”) in WCSD. Accepting the allegations in Plaintiffs' FAC as true, Rylee played high school volleyball for SSHS as well as club volleyball for the Northern Nevada Juniors Volleyball Club (“NNJ”) in 2020. ECF No. 4 at ¶ 21. Rylee began her senior year at SSHS in the fall of 2021. Id. at ¶ 16. In 2020, Rylee chose to leave NNJ to play for another private volleyball club. Id. at ¶ 23. While Upton coached both the NNJ and the SSHS volleyball teams, this action concerns Upton's conduct while coaching SSHS in 2021. See generally id. Around the start of the fall semester during Rylee's senior year in 2021, Mrs. Johnson met with an assistant principal for SSHS, Urmston, and expressed her displeasure with Upton's coaching style and decisions.^[1] Id. at ¶¶ 23-30. Mrs. Johnson felt that the aggrieved coaching style and decisions by Upton reflected her displeasure with Rylee for leaving NNJ in 2020. Id.

Plaintiffs allege that, over the weeks following the meeting, Upton told players they could not let their parents “talk shit,” became increasingly hostile towards Rylee, eliminated her playing time, and ostracized her from the team. Id. at ¶¶ 34, 37-38. As a result, Mrs. Johnson and Rylee met with SSHS administrators on September 7, 2021, regarding this experience with Upton. Id. at ¶ 42. During the meeting, Plaintiffs recounted the alleged retaliation Rylee suffered following Mrs. Johnson's initial meeting with Urmston. Id. at ¶¶ 44-45. In response, the principal at the time, Hart, informed Mrs. Johnson and Rylee that Upton would be interviewed and made aware that she was under increased scrutiny, and other WCSD administrators promised Plaintiffs that they would observe Upton's coaching going forward to ensure proper conduct. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 53.

On September 15, 2021, the first full school week following the September 7th meeting, Upton was removed from practice and placed on administrative leave pending an investigation.^[2] Id. at ¶¶ 61, 62. After Upton's removal, Rylee's teammates bullied and harassed Rylee about the removal. Id. at ¶¶ 64-67. Rylee reported this bullying to her teachers and counselor, and Mrs. Johnson requested that the principal initiate a safety plan to protect Rylee from continued peer harassment. Id. at ¶¶ 67, 71. Over the next several weeks, Mrs. Johnson continued to meet with SSHS administrators to report ongoing bullying. Id. at ¶¶ 72-84.

A safety plan was administered by SSHS officials on October 21, 2021,^[3] Id. at ¶¶ 85, 92. As alleged in the FAC, when peer harassment continued to occur, Plaintiffs requested modifications to and enforcement of the safety plan due to alleged unsatisfactory measures taken by SSHS administrators. Id. at ¶¶ 92-94. On February 8, 2022, Plaintiffs allege that SSHS administrators removed key protections from the safety plan without notifying Plaintiffs and did not update the plan until February 21, 2022. Id. at ¶¶ 95-96. The alleged peer harassment and Plaintiffs' requests concerning the safety plan continued during the spring of 2022. Id. at ¶ 97.

In November of 2022, Plaintiffs commenced this action against District Defendants and Upton. ECF No. 1. In the FAC, Plaintiffs assert the following four causes of action: (1) First Amendment retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) against Upton; (2) municipal liability, i.e., a “Monell” claim, against WCSD; (3) negligence against WCSD;^[4] and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) against Upton, Urmston, Hart, and Hall. See ECF No. 4. On April 10, 2023, District Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Court must dismiss each cause of action against District Defendants pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ECF No. 16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A party may seek the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a complaint must satisfy the notice pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1103 (9th Cir. 2008). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Rule 8(a) does not require “detailed factual allegations;” however, a “pleading that offers only Tabeis and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action' ” is insufficient and fails to meet the broad pleading standard under Rule 8(a). Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).

To sufficiently allege a claim under Rule 8(a)(2), viewed within the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference, based on the court's judicial experience and common sense, that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. See id. at 678 79 (stating that “[t]he plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)). Further, in reviewing a motion to dismiss, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true. Id. However, “bare assertions” in a complaint amounting “to nothing more than a ‘formulaic recitation of the elements'” of a claim are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Id. at 680 81 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). The court discounts these allegations because “they do nothing more than state a legal conclusion-even if that conclusion is cast in the form of a factual allegation.” Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). “In sum, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory ‘factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief.” Id.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Article III Standing

District Defendants first challenge Mrs. Johnson's standing to sue. ECF No. 16 at 6-8. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). Article III of the United States Constitution confines federal judicial power to adjudicating only genuine “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. CONST, art. III, § 2. “Standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements”: (1) a concrete and particularized injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) a likelihood that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 560-61.

District Defendants' challenge relates to Mrs. Johnson's standing on each of the four claims brought by Plaintiffs. ECF No. 16 at 6-8. However, the Court need not address Mrs. Johnson's standing as it relates to each of the four claims. As explained in this Order, the Court sua sponte dismisses, with prejudice, Plaintiffs' first cause of action. The Court also grants District Defendants' motion, dismissing, with prejudice, the second and fourth causes of action. Finally, in subsection D of this Order, which is labeled “Negligence”, the Court explains that Plaintiffs negligence claim asserts five theories of negligence. The Court dismisses, with prejudice, the third cause of action as it relates to four of the five theories of negligence alleged by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court need only address District Defendants' challenge to Mrs. Johnson's standing in the context of the sole remaining theory of negligence alleged by Plaintiffs under the third cause of action.

The Court concludes that Mrs. Johnson lacks standing as to the sole remaining theory of negligence alleged by Plaintiffs under the third cause of action. Plaintiffs' fifth theory of...