Johnson v. Watkins, Civil Action No. 3:07–cv–621–DPJ–FKB.

• Decision Date: 21 March 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 3:07–cv–621–DPJ–FKB.
• Citation: 274 Ed. Law Rep. 913,803 F.Supp.2d 561
• Parties: Pearl L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff v. Earl WATKINS, in his capacity as Superintendent of Jackson Public School Districts, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

274 Ed. Law Rep. 913

803 F.Supp.2d 561

Pearl L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff

v.Earl WATKINS, in his capacity as Superintendent of Jackson Public School Districts, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:07–cv–621–DPJ–FKB.

United States District Court,S.D. Mississippi,Jackson Division.

March 21, 2011.

Pearl L. Johnson, Jackson, MS, pro se.

Rajita Iyer Moss, Owens Moss, PLLC, Jackson, MS, for Defendant.

ORDER

DANIEL P. JORDAN, III, District Judge.

This employment dispute is before the Court on Defendant Jackson Public Schools District's (JPS) Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law (JMOL) [125] and Motion for New Trial [126]. Having fully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable authority, the Court concludes that JPS is entitled to JMOL on damages. All other relief is denied.

I. Facts/Procedural History

This matter has a long and bitter history that will not be repeated in full. Briefly, JPS hired Plaintiff Pearl Johnson as a literacy coach at Rowan Middle School. During her brief tenure in this position, Johnson claims that she was sexually harassed by Principal Tony Winters, and that Winters and others retaliated against her for complaining of the alleged harassment. In May 2009, this Court partially granted JPS's Motion for Summary Judgment [44] and dismissed Johnson's sexual-harassment claim along with her individual-liability claims against Winters and JPS Superintendent Earl Watkins. Order [65] May 29, 2009, 2009 WL 1507572. That Order provided a more detailed recitation of facts and is herein incorporated. Johnson's Title VII retaliation claim survived Defendants' Motion and a subsequent Motion for Reconsideration [66] because the issue was not argued in light of Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). The retaliation claim was then set for trial.

Johnson's counsel withdrew after responding to the initial summary-judgment Motion, leaving Johnson to represent herself. From that date, the case has been arduous and extraordinarily time consuming requiring frequent assistance from the Court. As the matter progressed, it became apparent that Johnson would require some assistance, and in an effort to reduce anticipated challenges at trial, the Court appointed stand-by counsel. Although stand-by counsel performed admirably, Johnson represented herself, and the jury heard a number of improper statements before returning a $50,000 verdict in her favor. The trial lasted four days.

In July 2010, JPS renewed its pre-verdict Motion for JMOL and alternatively sought a new trial. After numerous extensions and other post-trial motions and issues, Johnson filed her Response [165] on February 28, 2011, although it could not be docketed until March 4, 2011, because Johnson accidentally shuffled her papers in the clerk's office and did not immediately return to correct them.¹ The Response contained more than thirty exhibits and other materials that were available but not offered at trial. The Court therefore denied Plaintiff's Motion [166] to include these materials and has not considered Johnson's references to them. The Response also includes new factual assertions that are not supported by the record evidence (or even by the stricken exhibits). These facts were ignored. After exhaustive review of the record and the parties' submissions, the Court is prepared to rule.

II. Analysis

A. JMOL

“Under Rule 50, a court should render judgment as a matter of law when ‘a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue.’ ” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a)) (other citations omitted). The trial court must “review all of the evidence in the record.... In doing so, however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id. at 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citations omitted). “Thus, although the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe.” Id. at 151, 120 S.Ct. 2097 (citation omitted). The Court “ ‘will not disturb the jury's verdict unless, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff], the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly to [the defendant] that reasonable jurors could not have arrived at a verdict except in [its] favor.’ ” Streber v. Hunter, 221 F.3d 701, 721 (5th Cir.2000) (quoting Douglas v. DynMcDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 144 F.3d 364, 369 (5th Cir.1998)).

Title VII makes it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice ... or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under” Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–3(a) (2006). “There are three elements to a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII: (1) that the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII, (2) that an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Raggs v. Miss. Power & Light Co., 278 F.3d 463, 471 (5th Cir.2002) (citation omitted). JPS concedes that Johnson participated in a protected activity but denies she suffered an adverse employment action. JPS also challenges whether Johnson proved a causal connection between the alleged adverse action and her damages, as well as the reasonableness of her damages.

1. Materially Adverse Employment Actions

Johnson testified regarding a number of incidents that occurred during her tenure at Rowan Middle School. Many of the allegations related to petty slights and disagreements with Winters, such as his unwelcome attempt to give Johnson a Christmas card. The parties now dispute the following as alleged acts of retaliation: (1) Winters's alleged assault in December 2006; (2) alleged denial of training in January 2007; (3) alleged denial of privilege to make unannounced visits to classrooms in February 2007; (4) alleged criticism at coaches meeting in February 2007; (4) criticism in February 2007 over changing a bulletin board; (5) alleged comments when she was ill on March 1, 2007; (6) alleged refusal to convert personal-leave days into sick-leave days at the end of March 2007; (7) May 2007 denial of opportunity to present “Congeniality Awards” to students at an award ceremony; (8) a transfer from Rowan Middle School to Brown Elementary School in May 2007; and (9) alleged denial of opportunity to make presentations to teachers at some undetermined date.

To begin, it is axiomatic that an alleged retaliatory act must occur after an employee's participation in a protected activity. Here, Plaintiff filed her Charge of Discrimination after all of the above referenced incidents. But “an informal complaint may constitute protected activity for purposes of retaliation claims.” Casna v. City of Loves Park, 574 F.3d 420, 427 (7th Cir.2009). And Johnson testified that she began complaining to her superiors in October or November 2006. Def.'s Mot. [125] Ex. A, Johnson Test. 103. With the exception of the failure to train allegation, discussed below, the evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict suggests that the disputed incidents occurred after the protected activity.

The main question is whether the alleged incidents constitute materially adverse employment actions.

To constitute prohibited retaliation, an employment action must be “materially adverse,” one that would “dissuade[ ] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” The purpose of this objective standard is “to separate significant from trivial harms” and “filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.”

Stewart v. Miss. Transp. Com'n, 586 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir.2009) (alteration in original) (quoting White, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405). The “significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances. Context matters.” White, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405. Although this determination is often a question of fact, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has “frequently” decided it as a matter of law. Magiera v. City of Dallas, 389 Fed.Appx. 433, 437 n. 3 (5th Cir.2010) (citation omitted).

Numerous Fifth Circuit decisions have found as a matter of law that incidents similar to these fall short of establishing a materially adverse employment action. For example, in Stewart, the following acts were not sufficient to create a triable issue: (1) “personal items were taken from [Plaintiff's] desk”; (2) “the locks on [Plaintiff's] office had been changed and she was not allowed to close her office door”; and (3) “[Plaintiff] was chastised by superiors and ostracized by co-workers.” 586 F.3d at 331–32 (holding that such claims “fall into the category of ‘petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners' ”) (citing White, 548 U.S. at 69, 126 S.Ct. 2405). The court further found that in the context of the evidence, even the placement of the plaintiff on administrative leave for three weeks, and reassigning her upon return to “a new supervisor and given a heavier workload,” did not present a materially adverse employment action because the plaintiff “suffered no adverse impact.” Id. at 332.

Similarly, in Peace v. Harvey, the court found as a matter of law that the following constituted mere petty slights or minor annoyances:

[Plaintiff] received a note detailing leave approval procedures from the Deputy Chief of Staff; she was not provided a designated seat at a ceremony for...