Johnson v. Watson
| Decision Date | 09 July 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 3795,3795 |
| Citation | 272 P.2d 580,70 Nev. 443 |
| Parties | JOHNSON et al. v. WATSON et al. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Hawkins, Rhodes & Hawkins, Reno, for appellants.
L. E. Blaisdell, Hawthorne, for respondents.
This case concerns the sufficiency under the statute of frauds of a written memorandum of agreement. Appellants, as plaintiffs, brought suit for damages against defendants, now respondents, alleging breach of an oral agreement to purchase improved real property and furnishings therein. A written memorandum of the agreement was attached to the complaint. Defendants challenged the sufficiency of the memorandum by moving to dismiss the complaint. This motion was granted, and plaintiffs appealed.
Two primary objections to the sufficiency of the memorandum are made: That the description of the property is inadequate; and that the consideration and loan provisions are not stated with certainty. The memorandum is as follows:
'Hawthorne, Nevada
November 15th, 1952
Received of Harold and Thresa Watson ..... Five Hundred Dollars and a 1952 DeSota car (Value $3,000.00) for which Watson will furnish a bill of sale and the pink slip which has just recently been sent to Carson City for showing ownership in his name ..... This is the down payment on 385 G. Street, house and furniture. Total sale is $15,000.00. Balance payment is to be $100 per month together with 6% on unpaid balance. It is agreed that Watsons will sign a loan in case N. C. Johnson said seller is able to produce one. Johnson is to carry back as a section the balance due over and above loan at 6% and said monthly payment shall not exceed $100 or more per month. Taxes and insurance to be pro-rated. Escrow charges to be equally divided between buyer and seller, excepting Seller shall paid for guaranty insurance title.
Harold Watson
Thresa Watson
Seller
Helen N. Johnson
Norman C. Johnson
Broker
E. S. Babcock'
The applicable statute is Section 1529, N.C.L.1929, which reads:
'Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void, unless the contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, expressing the consideration, be in writing, and be subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made.'
The applicable general principle of law, as set forth in Sec. 207 of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts and quoted in Stanley v. A. Levy & J. Zentner Co., 60 Nev. 432, 112 P.2d 1047, 1053, 158 A.L.R. 76, is:
"A memorandum, in order to make enforceable a contract within the statute, may be any document or writing, formal or informal, signed by the party to be charged or by his agent actually or apparently authorized thereunto, which states with reasonable certainty, (a) each party to the contract either by his own name, or by such a description as will serve to identify him, or by the name or description of his agent, and (b) the land, goods or other subjectmatter to which the contract relates, and (c) the terms and conditions of all the promises constituting the contract and by whom and to whom the promises are made."
The property is here described by street and number, the town and state appearing in the caption. Such a description is generally regarded as sufficient. 37 C.J.S., Frauds, Statute of, § 188, p. 673; Tobin v. Larkin, 183 Mass. 389, 67 N.E. 340; Montgomery v. Graves, 301 Ky. 260, 191 S.W.2d 399; 23 A.L.R.2d 39; contra, Martin v. Seigel, 35 Wash.2d 223, 212 P.2d 107, 23 A.L.R.2d 40. The sufficiency of such a description is in accord in principle with a prior decision of this court, Roberts v. Hummel, 69 Nev. 154, 243 P.2d 248.
Next is challenged the definiteness of the provisions for consideration, and for secondary loan financing. The agreement provides for a price of $15,000, with a down payment, cash and car, of $3,500, leaving a balance of $11,500, to be paid at $100 per month with 6% interest on the unpaid balance. The agreement then provides:
This provision is argued by defendants to be uncertain in not specifying the rate of interest on the alternative loan, whether the loans are to be secured by mortgage or deeds of trust, whether the security shall cover all or only a portion of the balance due, and the meaning of the words 'or more.'
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...all terms of the agreement so long as the essential terms and the substance of the agreement are present. See Johnson v. Watson, 70 Nev. 443, 447, 272 P.2d 580, 582 (1954). A "writing" may satisfy the statute even if it consists of separate writings. Ray Motor Lodge, 80 Nev. at 118, 390 P.2......
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