Johnston v. Brown
Decision Date | 27 September 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 3-284A50,3-284A50 |
Citation | 468 N.E.2d 597 |
Parties | Harold D. JOHNSTON, Jr., Harold D. Johnston and Brenda Johnston, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Melvin R. BROWN, Dwight Kline and Elizabeth Kline, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
James E. Easterday, Sowinski, Easterday & Ummel, Plymouth, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Charles K. Michael, George W. Stephenson, Logansport, Lester L. Wilson, Winamac, for defendants-appellees.
On May 4, 1980 Melvin Brown and Dwight Kline were in the process of dismantling a silo and transporting it to Kline's farm. Brown was driving a pickup truck loaded with metal silo parts, some of which hung out over the sides of the truck bed. Brown and a passenger were travelling north on State Road 17 near Kewanna when they both noticed a boy on a bicycle riding south, i.e. toward them on their side of the highway. Brown drove the truck closer to the centerline of the road. As the truck and the boy passed each other, a protruding metal rod struck the boy and severely damaged his right arm. The boy, Harold Johnston, Jr., was 14 years old and mildly mentally retarded. On April 21, 1982 the boy and his parents brought suit against Brown, Kline and Kline's wife, alleging negligence. After trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants.
After perfecting this appeal, the Johnstons raise three issues, as restated:
1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to amend the pretrial order and allow testimony of an additional witness.
b) submitting the issue to the jury, and
c) finding for the defendant on the issue which should have been negated, as a matter of law, by the doctrine of last clear chance.
3) Whether the trial court erred in refusing to give plaintiffs' proposed instruction No. 6 on imputed negligence.
The Johnstons assert that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to amend the pretrial order by allowing testimony of an additional witness. The pretrial order required that any additional witnesses for trial were to be reported to the other party not later than three days before trial. Due to an intervening legal holiday which delayed mail delivery, the defendants did not receive notice of the Johnstons' intent to call an additional witness until the morning of trial. The trial court did not allow the testimony of the additional witness due to the Johnstons' failure to give notice sooner when there was no justifiable reason for failing to do so.
Amendment of a pretrial order to allow additional witnesses to testify is a matter within the trial court's discretion and will be reviewed only for abuse of that discretion. Dominguez v. Gallmeyer (1980), Ind.App., 402 N.E.2d 1295. The boy's mother testified that he had an IQ of 68 to 70, which was 20-30 points lower than normal IQ and that he was two to four years behind a normal fourteen year old in school. This is substantially the same information to which the plaintiff's offer to prove reveals the excluded witness would have testified. 1 No abuse of discretion has been shown by the exclusion. Cf. Indiana State Highway Commission v. Vanderbur (1982), Ind.App., 432 N.E.2d 418 ( ).
The Johnstons maintain that the trial court erred in denying their Rule 50(A)(1) motion for judgment on the evidence on the issue of contributory negligence. First, they claim any finding of contributory negligence was based on a violation of IC 9-4-1-101, 2 which the defendants failed to prove because no one testified the boy was riding on the roadway. Second, they maintain that even if a violation of the statute was shown, no causal connection between the violation and the injury exists.
As stated in Dibortolo v. Metropolitan Sch. District of Washington Twp. (1982), Ind.App., 440 N.E.2d 506 at 508:
The testimony at trial reflects a conflict in the evidence concerning the exact position of the bicycle on the highway. Moreover, it is uncontradicted that the boy was travelling in the wrong direction regardless of his exact position on the highway. 3 This alone forms a basis for a violation of the statute. Finally, there can be no greater direct link between a violation of the statute and the injury because if there had been no violation, i.e. if the boy had been riding his bicycle south on his right lane of the highway, he would not have been struck by the truck travelling north in its right lane of the highway. Moreover, from the evidence that the truck was travelling approximately 20 m.p.h., that the plaintiff was riding toward it, and that he could have easily moved four or five feet further away from the travelled portion of the highway, the jury could have determined that apart from the statute he failed to exercise reasonable care. The trial court's denial of the Johnstons' TR 50(A)(1) motion is affirmed.
The Johnstons argue that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury because they claim a fourteen year old retarded child with a mental age of ten years in a position of sudden peril is not guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. We do not agree.
No instruction regarding a sudden emergency was offered at trial by the Johnstons. Neither did they include an argument based on sudden emergency in their motion to correct errors. Consequently this portion of their argument is waived under Appellate Rule 8.3(A)(7).
The mother testified that the boy's intelligence was equivalent to a ten to twelve year old child. The standard of care for children involved in negligence or contributory negligence involving violation of a safety statute is that degree of care ordinarily used by children of like age, knowledge, judgment and experience under similar circumstances. Bixenman v. Hall (1968), 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837. We cannot say that a fourteen year old mentally retarded child with the mental abilities of a ten to twelve year old is incapable of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Cf. LaNoux v. Hagar (1974), 159 Ind.App. 646, 308 N.E.2d 873 ( ). Consequently, the trial court properly submitted this issue to the jury.
Finally, the Johnstons argue that, as a matter of law, a finding of...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Radio Distributing Co., Inc. v. National Bank and Trust Co. of South Bend, 3-1284A351
...Inc. v. Windmiller (1978), 176 Ind.App. 535, 376 N.E.2d 529. This applies to orders concerning additional witnesses. Johnston v. Brown (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 597. In considering whether to permit an amendment the trial court considers the danger of surprise or prejudice to the opponen......
-
Baller by Baller v. Corle
...children of the same age, knowledge, judgment and experience. Bixenman v. Hall (1968) 251 Ind. 527, 242 N.E.2d 837; Johnston v. Brown (1984) 3d Dist.Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 597; Dibortolo v. Metropolitan School District of Washington Township (1982) 2d Dist.Ind.App., 440 N.E.2d Bixenman v. Hal......
-
Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc. v. Robertson
...will examine the evidence most favorable to the appellee and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. Johnston v. Brown (1984) 3d Dist. Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 597, 601. It is undisputed that the truck sold to Robertsons was represented as a "new" truck which had been driven 850 miles ......
-
Hanas v. Rasmussen, 3-185A19
...it is against the evidence, if there is a total lack of evidence, or if it is contrary to uncontradicted evidence. Johnston v. Brown (1984), Ind.App., 468 N.E.2d 597, 601. We will not reweigh the evidence or judge credibility of witnesses, but only determine if the verdict is sustained by s......