Johnston v. City of East Moline

• Decision Date: 07 July 1949
• Docket Number: Gen. No. 10330.
• Citation: 338 Ill.App. 220,87 N.E.2d 22
• Parties: JOHNSTON v. CITY OF EAST MOLINE.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

338 Ill.App. 220

87 N.E.2d 22

JOHNSTON

v.CITY OF EAST MOLINE.

Gen. No. 10330.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

July 7, 1949.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Rock Island County; A. J. Scheineman, Judge.

Action by Matilda Johnston, individually and as executrix of the estate of James P. Johnston, deceased, against the City of East Moline, a municipal corporation of the State of Illinois and another, for personal injuries suffered by plaintiff individually, and for damages for the wrongful death of plaintiff's decedent arising out of named defendant's alleged negligent maintenance of traffic signals. From the judgment, the named defendant appeals.

Judgment affirmed.Ben A. Stewart, East Moline, Roy H. Glockhoff, East Moline, for appellant.

Eagle & Eagle, Rock Island, for appellee.

DOVE, Justice.

Matilda Johnston individually and as executrix of the estate of her husband, Doctor James P. Johnston, deceased, filed her complaint at law in the Circuit Court of Rock Island County, against the defendants City of East Moline, a municipal corporation, and James L. Thompson. The defendant James L. Thompson was, upon motion, granted a severance and the case proceeded to trial against the defendant City of East Moline.

Plaintiff brought her suit to recover for personal injuries suffered by herself and also to recover damages for the wrongful death of her husband. The liability of the city was predicated upon the alleged negligence of the city in its failure to maintain in a proper state of repair traffic signals at the intersection of Seventh Street and Seventeenth Avenue in the City of East Moline. The complaint specifically charged that the city on and prior to February 23, 1945, through its agents and employees, had the possession, control and maintenance of the various streets, avenues and intersections in the City, including the various traffic signs, lights and signals connected with and appurtenant to said streets, avenues and intersections, including the intersection and traffic lights at the intersection of Seventh Street and Seventeenth Avenue in said city; that it was the duty of said city, its agents and employees to exercise reasonable care in its maintenance of the said streets, intersections and traffic signs; that in violation of this duty the city, its employees and agents, on and for approximately a week prior to February 23, 1945, failed to have any stop sign or stop light directing traffic entering the intersection at Seventh Street and Seventeenth Avenue from the east on Seventeenth Avenue to stop; that at the same time the city, its agents and employees, maintained, operated and controlled a traffic light facing traffic entering said intersection from the north on Seventh Street so that said traffic light at times was green and constituted an invitation to enter said intersection; that the city, its agents and employees, knew of the aforesaid dangerous condition; that plaintiff Matilda Johnston on or about the hour of 10:00 o'clock on the evening of February 23, 1945, was riding in a car driven by her husband in a southerly direction on Seventh Street in said city and approached said intersection from the north; that plaintiff and her husband were in the exercise of due care; that her husband in pursuance of the invitation to enter said intersection extended by said traffic light facing north, said traffic light showing green, drove his car into said intersection; that by reason of the failure of the said city, its agents and employees, to have any stop sign or stop light to control traffic entering said intersection from the east on Seventeenth Avenue, the vehicle in which plaintiff and her husband were riding was violently struck by another vehicle entering said intersection from the east on Seventeenth Avenue and as a direct result thereof, plaintiff suffered injuries and her husband received injuries which resulted in his death.

The answer of the defendant denied the allegations of negligence and affirmatively set up the defense that in the maintenance and operation of the traffic lights and signals in question, defendant was acting in a governmental capacity, performing governmental functions and hence incurred no liability.

As will be seen from the foregoing, the substance of the plaintiff's complaint is that the defendant city was negligent in allowing one traffic signal to remain in a state of disrepair for a period of about a week preceding the collision at the intersection which resulted in injuring the plaintiff and causing the death of her husband, while at the same time permitting the other three signal lights to continue to operate at said intersection, all of which created a trap whereby persons approaching the intersection from the north were invited into the intersection by a green light, while at the same time there was no warning of any kind facing persons driving into the intersection from the east.

The cause was tried before a jury resulting in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff as an individual for $25.00 and as executrix of her husband's estate the sum of $2000.00. The motion of the defendant for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, was denied and judgment was entered on the verdicts and this appeal by the defendant follows.

The evidence in this case established that Seventeenth Avenue in East Moline runs in an east and west direction, that Seventh Street runs in a north and south direction and that the city had installed automatic electric traffic devices of red, yellow and green lights mounted on posts on each of the four corners of the intersection. The lights on these signals were shaded so that each light faced in one direction only and was visible only in the direction of the approaching traffic for which it was installed and maintained for the purpose of controlling. The post or standard at the northwest corner of the intersection was knocked down and the signal broken on February 18th by a third person driving his truck into the same. The traffic signal thus knocked down controlled the traffic entering the intersection from the east on Seventeenth Avenue. The city promptly removed the post or standard together with the signal that was knocked down and ordered repairs for the same. The city permitted the other three traffic lights facing the traffic entering the intersection from the north, west and south to operate without taking any action to remedy the defect caused by the absence of the signal at the northwest corner. The city had notice of this condition and allowed the same to remain for five nights and six days. Seventeenth Avenue is a main street through the city of East Moline and carries a heavy volume of traffic and the traffic using Seventeenth Avenue from the east was thus without any control. The traffic on Seventh Street, while local in character between the business district and the residential district, was also heavy. This traffic was subject to the usual control afforded by the traffic signals and lights at the southwest corner and the northeast corner of said intersection. It also appears from the evidence that a number of collisions occurred at this intersection prior to the time of the accident involving the plaintiff and her husband.

James L. Thompson, the defendant who was granted a severance, entered said intersection from the east and as stated, the plaintiff's car entered said intersection from the north. The two cars collided in the intersection. Dr. Johnston was hurled out of his car and onto the pavement, which rendered him unconscious. While he was lying on the pavement, a car following the one which collided with his car, came into the intersection from the east and ran over his legs. He was removed to the hospital where he remained for about ten days. Afterwards he was at home for several weeks and then he attempted to resume his medical practice gradually. He was not able for long to continue his practice and on June 19, 1945, he died. An autopsy was performed, which disclosed a blood clot in his brain of about three inches in diameter. The physician who examined this blood clot testified that it was the result of trauma and was of the type which develops over a space of three or four months. Plaintiff's own personal injuries were slight.

The legal question presented to this court for determination is whether or not a municipality in the construction, maintenance and operation of electric traffic signals is engaged in a governmental function or in a corporate or proprietary function. If a municipality in the operation of traffic signals is engaged in a governmental function, then it is immune from tort liability, while on the other hand, if the installation, operation and maintenance of traffic signals is a corporate function, a municipality is liable for negligence in failing to keep its traffic signals in a proper state of repair. This precise question has never been passed upon directly by courts of review in this state but cases involving somewhat analogous questions have been frequently passed upon by our courts. The application of the rules of law governing a case of this character is difficult, and this difficulty has resulted in a great number of decisions in this state and in other states which cannot be reconciled.

Our Supreme Court notes this situation in the recent case of Gravander v. City of Chicago, 399 Ill. 381, 78 N.E.2d 304, 305, when it analyzed the problem as follows:

‘To attempt to point out the divergent views in the many cases cited in the briefs of the parties of this lawsuit would unnecessarily extend this opinion and would rather present further confusion and conflict. It is safe to say the line between municipal operations that are proprietary and therefore a proper subject of suits in tort, and those that are governmental and therefore immune from such suits, is not clearly defined. Powers and functions held to be governmental or public in one jurisdiction are sometimes held to...