Johnston v. City of Syracuse
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 5:20-CV-1497 |
| Parties | DR. MARK JOHNSTON, M.D. M.P.H., Plaintiff, v. CITY OF SYRACUSE, POLICE OFFICER VALLON SMITH, CHIEF OF POLICE KENTON T. BUCKNER, and DOES 1-200, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York |
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
LAW OFFICES OF BONNER & BONNER
Attorneys for Plaintiff
CHARLES A. BONNER, ESQ.
A CABRAL BONNER, ESQ.
RYDER LAW FIRM
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JESSE P. RYDER, ESQ.
CASE LAW LTD.
Attorneys for Plaintiff
JEFFREY LOUIS
MENDELMAN, ESQ.
HANCOCK ESTABROOK, LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
JOHN G. POWERS, ESQ.
MARY L. D'AGOSTINO, ESQ.
CITY OF SYRACUSE CORPORATION COUNSEL
Attorneys for Defendants
DANIELLE PIRES, ESQ.
SARAH MAE
KNICKERBOCKER, ESQ.
CITY OF SYRACUSE LAW DEPARTMENT
Attorneys for Defendants
TODD M. LONG, ESQ.
Plaintiff Dr. Mark Johnston, M.D. M.P.H. (“Johnston” or “plaintiff') alleges that defendant police officer Vallon Smith (“Smith”) used excessive force against him on May 5, 2019. To hear plaintiff tell it, Smith beat plaintiff in the course of a false arrest, then exhibited deliberate indifference to his medical needs in the aftermath.
Both Johnston contends, violated his constitutional rights. Plaintiff blames Smith individually for that violation, but he also looks to hold Smith's employer, the City of Syracuse (“Syracuse” or the “City”), its Chief of Police Kenton T. Buckner (“Buckner”), and two hundred Doe defendants (collectively “defendants”) liable as well. Defendants moved to dismiss that complaint in part on June 8, 2021 under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and for repleading or to strike portions of the complaint under Rules 8 and 12(f). That motion, having been fully briefed, will now be considered on the submissions and without oral argument.
II. BACKGROUND
On May 5, 2019, Johnston's daughter and son-in-law were running a race in the city of Syracuse.[1] Dkt. 23 (Compl.”), ¶ 11. Plaintiff had watched the couple begin the race first thing in the morning, and by 10:30 a.m. plaintiff was driving to the race's endpoint to watch his family finish. Id. Riding along with plaintiff was his service dog.[2] Id.
When Johnston got close to the finish line, a police officer directing traffic ordered him to turn around. Compl. ¶ 11. Plaintiff alleges that he complied, then pulled his car over to ask the officer how to get to his destination. Id.
According to Johnston, the traffic cop took issue with this, and called for “service.” Compl. ¶ 11. Defendant Smith apparently responded to that call and told plaintiff that he was under arrest. Id. Plaintiff claims that he then asked Smith why he was being taken into custody. Id. ¶ 12.
Johnston alleges that Smith's response was to punch him in the face and tackle him to the ground. Compl. ¶ 12. According to plaintiff, he fell on his left side, with his shoulder and left temple hitting the ground hard enough to knock him unconscious and lacerate his head. Id.
Smith and other officers then allegedly “wrenched” Johnston's arms behind his back. Compl. ¶¶ 12-13. At the same time, the other officers ground plaintiff's wrists into the pavement, destroying his watch. Id. ¶ 13. Plaintiff claims that he had previously had surgery on his right shoulder, so the officers' manipulations of his arms were “extraordinarily painful.” Id.
In total, Johnston claims that he suffered two fractured ribs, a concussion, shoulder pain, open head wounds, contusions, and abrasions. Compl. ¶ 14. Plaintiff alleges that his injuries were so severe that he was unable to walk to the patrol car. Id. ¶ 15. Instead, plaintiff asserts that the officers dragged him to the vehicle. Id. In the process, plaintiff “claim[ed] ADA rights.” Id. Apparently, the officers were unconcerned. Id. ¶ 16.
According to Johnston, he then complained that he was suffering from chest pain and had difficulty breathing. Compl. ¶ 17. In response, an EMT took plaintiff's blood pressure and pulse. Id. The EMT allegedly reported both as perfectly normal, despite plaintiff's recent trauma and history of hypertension. Id. A “senior officer” apparently then arrived on the scene and dismissed plaintiff's complaints of injury, telling him he was “fine.” Id. ¶ 19.
Johnston continued to complain of breathing difficulties during his ride to the jail. Compl. ¶ 18. The police nevertheless left plaintiff in the patrol car “for five to ten minutes without sufficient ventilation” once they reached the jail. Id. In the meantime, plaintiff alleges that his car was towed with his service dog still inside. Id. ¶ 21. Eventually, his dog was placed in a pound. Id.
When Johnston finally arrived at the jail, a nurse took a look at plaintiff and directed that he be sent to the emergency room. Compl. ¶ 20. Evidently, although the complaint says nothing to this effect, plaintiff was taken back to the jail after his treatment. Plaintiff would spend twenty hours in jail before being arraigned the next day. Id. ¶ 23.
Johnston then claims that Smith wrote a falsified arrest report to cover for his violation of plaintiff's rights. Compl. ¶ 24. Specifically, he alleges that Smith “willfully” testified falsely by claiming that plaintiff had pointed and yelled at the arresting officers. Id. Plaintiff similarly decries as false Smith's claim that plaintiff grabbed him in a “bear hug, ” causing Smith to fear plaintiff would bite him. Id. In addition, Smith supposedly falsely reported that plaintiff refused to be handcuffed despite direct orders. Id. Whatever the truth of Smith's report, the charges against plaintiff were eventually dropped. Id. ¶ 87.
On December 4, 2020, Johnston filed a complaint in this district. Dkt. 1. At first, plaintiff's complaint was joined with another plaintiff's, but their claims were severed on April 5, 2021. Dkt. 22. Plaintiff submitted an amended complaint limited to only his own claims against his own defendants on May 4, 2021. Dkt. 23.
Johnston's amended complaint states fifteen causes of action: (I) excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“§ 1983”) against Smith; (II) imputed liability for § 1983 claims against Syracuse and Buckner under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); (III) failure to prevent a conspiracy to violate constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (“§ 1986”)[3] against all defendants; (IV) false arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Smith; (V) false imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Smith; (VI) assault and battery in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under § 1983 against Smith; (VII) unlawful search in violation of the Fourth Amendment under § 1983 against Smith; (VIII) deliberate indifference to medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment against Smith; (IX) ratification under § 1983 against both the City and Buckner; (X) false imprisonment under New York state common law against Smith; (XI) assault under New York state common law against Smith; (XII) battery under New York state common law against Smith; (XIII) negligent hiring, training, retention and supervision under New York state common law against the City and Buckner; (XIV) a request for declaratory relief to the effect that plaintiff was factually innocent of the charges for which he was arrested and that Smith willfully made false charges in his incident report concerning the arrest; and (XV) a request for punitive damages.
On June 8, 2021, defendants moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss the complaint in part. Dkt. 34. They also moved to strike portions of the complaint or to order Johnston to replead under Rules 12(f) and 8, respectively.[4] Id. This decision now follows.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That factual matter may be drawn from “the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and documents incorporated by reference in the complaint.” DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010).
Importantly, “the complaint is to be construed liberally, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the plaintiff's favor.” Ginsburg v. City of Ithaca, 839 F.Supp.2d 537, 540 (N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002)). If the complaint and its additional materials-when viewed through that pro-plaintiff lens-are not enough to raise the plaintiff's right to relief on a claim above the speculative level, that claim must be dismissed. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
IV. DISCUSSION
Defendants' motion to dismiss can be grouped into six general headings: (1) Johnston's § 1986 claim is untimely and otherwise defective because plaintiff has failed to plead a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (“§ 1985”); (2) plaintiff has failed to allege any valid federal claims against Buckner; (3) plaintiff's federal assault and battery and false imprisonment claims are duplicative of his excessive force and false arrest claims, respectively; (4) plaintiff's state law claims are untimely; (5) plaintiff's requested declaratory relief is unavailable; and (6) portions of plaintiff's complaint are unnecessary and confusing, and should either be stricken under Rule 12(f) or else plaintiff should be required to replead under Rule 8.
In response, Johnston has asked for leave to amend his complaint to resuscitate his § 1986 claim and to...
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