Johnston v. Mitchell
Decision Date | 03 October 2016 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-12332-WGY |
Citation | 213 F.Supp.3d 282 |
Parties | Bryan R. JOHNSTON, Petitioner, v. Lisa A. MITCHELL, Superintendent, Old Colony Correctional Center, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
David J. Nathanson, Wood & Nathanson, LLP, Boston, MA, for Petitioner.
Jennifer K. Zalnasky, Office of the Attorney General, Springfield, MA, for Respondent.
YOUNG, D.J.
A jury convicted petitioner Bryan Johnston ("Johnston") in 2006 of first-degree murder, use of a large capacity firearm in commission of a felony, possession of a large capacity firearm without a license, and armed burglary. At trial, Johnston admitted that he killed the victim, but argued that he lacked criminal responsibility for his actions under Massachusetts law.1 The Supreme Judicial Court ("SJC") affirmed his convictions and the denial of his motion for a new trial. Commonwealth v. Johnston , 467 Mass. 674, 7 N.E.3d 424 (2014).
Johnston now files a petition for habeas corpus relief before this Court on the basis of ineffective assistance of his trial counsel (his "counsel"). Specifically, he claims that counsel was ineffective in his (1) failure to move to have Johnston's statements made in jail and at Bridgewater State Hospital suppressed, Mem. Supp. Pet'r's Habeas Corpus ("Pet'r's Mem.") 14-36, ECF No. 26; (2) failure to move to exclude Johnston's statements in which he invoked his right to counsel and his refusals to answer questions, id. at 36-46; (3) failure to object to the prosecutor's statement that Johnston had "constructed" a defense, id. at 46-50; and (4) eliciting testimony regarding Johnston's being "moon-faced" without impeaching the testifying witness, id. at 50-53.
Johnston raises some troubling issues: for example, the jury ought not have heard about Johnston's repeated requests to speak with his attorney while at Bridgewater State Hospital. Reviewing his petition under the strictures of the current habeas statutory framework, however, the Court cannot grant him relief.
The Court must "accept the state court findings of fact unless [Johnston] convinces [the Court], by clear and convincing evidence, that they are in error." Lynch v. Ficco , 438 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir.2006) (internal citations omitted).2 As the issues raised on habeas all relate to Johnston's statements after the crime, or to counsel's decisions at trial,3 the discussion of the underlying facts will be concise.
Johnston had a phone conversation with the victim in the evening of December 6, 2004, after which Johnston drove to the victim's house and shot him six times with a rifle. Johnston , 467 Mass. at 677, 7 N.E.3d 424. Driving back to his own apartment after the shooting, Johnston wrecked his car and, after failing a field sobriety test, "was allowed [by two police officers] to telephone a friend[,]" who drove him back to his apartment at about 1:00 AM on December 7, 2004. Id. at 678–79, 7 N.E.3d 424.
[W]hile he was waiting for his friend to arrive and drive him [home], [Johnston] left a voice message for a female friend. He apologized for missing her call and said he was ‘wondering what you're up to tonight.’ He spoke in his typical ‘calm, easygoing, fun-loving... nonchalant’ tone. As [Johnston's] friend was driving him home from the restaurant [Johnston] said, [Johnston] produced a handgun and said there were six rounds in it. He also said that his license to carry a gun had been revoked.
Id. at 679, 7 N.E.3d 424 (alterations in original).
Approximately four hours after the murder, at 4:45 a.m. on December 7, 2004, [Johnston] telephoned his parents. He was making no sense, talking about the mafia and gangs, and threatening to commit suicide. At 6 a.m., his sister, a psychiatric nurse, returned a telephone call she had received from him. He made no sense. When his parents arrived at his apartment at 8 a.m., he was saying bizarre things and his eyes were unfocused.
In the years leading up to the instant crime, Johnston had exhibited signs of extreme paranoia, believing, for example, "that Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents had rappelled off the roof of his apartment complex and observed him from the window of his twenty-seventh floor apartment." Id. at 680, 7 N.E.3d 424. These paranoid delusions caused him to flee Hawaii, where he had been attending college, in 2002, and enroll at Westfield State College, in Massachusetts. See id. at 680–81, 7 N.E.3d 424. He continued to experience them while in Massachusetts.4
Johnston believed "that the victim had told him that his crime family had paid to have the defendant anally raped in Hawaii, and that they ‘bugged’ his apartment in Hawaii and his parents' home." Id. at 681, 7 N.E.3d 424. Johnston also Id.
Regarding his mental health, Johnston Id. at 682, 7 N.E.3d 424. There was expert testimony at trial regarding Johnston's mental illnesses and their effect on his criminal responsibility. Johnston presented testimony from two experts: Dr. Carol Feldman ("Dr. Feldman"), "a forensic psychologist," and Dr. Martin Kelly ("Dr. Kelly"), "a forensic psychiatrist." Id. at 682–83, 7 N.E.3d 424. "Dr. Feldman opined that, at the time of the killing, [Johnston] suffered from the mental illness paranoid schizophrenia and, although he generally appreciated the wrongfulness of killing, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of killing the victim, and he was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law." Id. at 683, 7 N.E.3d 424. "Dr. Kelly testified that [Johnston] lacked criminal responsibility due to a paranoid delusional disorder." Id. This disorder can exist alongside normal functioning, and, Dr. Kelly testified, Johnston's delusions were caused by it, and not by drug or alcohol use. Id. at 683–84, 7 N.E.3d 424. The Commonwealth's expert witness, Dr. Michael Welner ("Dr. Welner"), on the other hand, "testified that [Johnston] did not suffer from a major mental illness[,]" and instead that "his drug use" caused the actions. Id. at 684, 7 N.E.3d 424.
A jury returned guilty verdicts as to all of the counts charged, which included "(1) murder in the first degree on theories of deliberate premeditation, extreme atrocity or cruelty, and felony-murder; (2) armed burglary; (3) possession of a large capacity firearm in the commission or attempted commission of a felony; and (4) possession of a large capacity firearm without a license." Id. at 676, 7 N.E.3d 424.
Johnston was convicted by a jury after a trial in the Massachusetts Superior Court sitting in and for the County of Hampshire. See Johnston , 467 Mass. at 674, 7 N.E.3d 424. His motion for a new trial was denied without an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 676, 7 N.E.3d 424. The SJC consolidated his direct appeal and appeal from the denial of the new-trial motion and affirmed. Id. at 676–77, 7 N.E.3d 424. He filed a petition for habeas corpus in this Court. Compl., ECF No. 1. The matter has been fully briefed, see Pet'r's Mem.; Resp. Lisa A. Mitchell's Mem. Opp. Pet. Writ Habeas Corpus ("Govt.'s Mem."), ECF No. 31; Reply Mem. Supp. Pet. Habeas Corpus ("Pet'r's Reply"), ECF No. 36,5 and the Court held a hearing on June 29, 2016, Elec. Clerk's Notes, ECF No. 40.
Johnston argues that his counsel was ineffective for four reasons: (1) failure to move to suppress statements Johnston made after he had been given a Miranda warning, see Pet'r's Mem. 14-36; (2) failure to move to exclude Johnston's statements in which he invoked his right to counsel and his refusals to answer various questions, id. at 36-46; (3) failure to object to the trial prosecutor's statement that Johnston had "constructed" a defense, id. at 46-50; and (4) eliciting testimony regarding Johnston's being "moon-faced" without impeaching the testifying witness, id. at 50-53. The Court first discusses the applicable legal framework, and then addresses these...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Johnston v. Mitchell
...Court for the District of Massachusetts in search of a writ of habeas corpus, which was denied. See Johnston v. Mitchell (Johnston II ), 213 F.Supp.3d 282, 285 (D. Mass. 2016). This timely appeal followed.II. Discussion On appeal, Johnston seeks habeas relief based on two ineffective-assist......
- Cherkaoui v. City of Quincy