Johnston v. Prairie View, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 April 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-02041-HLT |
| Parties | BRENDAN JOHNSTON, Plaintiff, v. PRAIRIE VIEW, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. United States District Courts. 10th Circuit. District of Kansas |
On January 29, 2018, Plaintiff Brendan Johnston was voluntarily admitted to Prairie View, Inc. for mental health treatment. Plaintiff was then involuntarily transferred to Larned State Hospital ("LSH") on February 1, 2018 and released on February 5, 2018. During that time, two related civil complaints for emergency involuntary commitment were initiated, in Harvey County, Kansas and Pawnee County, Kansas. Based on his treatment while at Prairie View and LSH, Plaintiff filed the instant case against eleven Defendants, bringing a total of twelve claims—four federal and eight state-law claims.1 Seven of these claims are against Defendant Jason Lane in his official and individual capacities as Chief Deputy County Attorney for Harvey County, Kansas. Nine of the claims are against Defendants Prairie View Inc., David Hon, M.D., Gary Fast, M.D., and Brent Ide (collectively, "Prairie View Defendants").
Defendant Lane filed a motion to dismiss the claims against him (Doc. 55), and Prairie View Defendants also filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them (Doc. 50). The Court takesup both motions together. For the following reasons, the Court dismisses all the federal claims and declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining state-law claims.
Defendant Prairie View is a not-for-profit corporation that provides mental health services in Newton, Kansas. Defendant Hon was an inpatient psychiatrist who treated Plaintiff at Prairie View between January 29 and February 1, 2018. Defendant Hon supervised Defendant Ide, LCMSW, who completed a mental health screening form on February 1, 2018, before Plaintiff was transferred to LSH. Defendant Fast serves as Medical Director at Prairie View and was Defendant Hon's supervisor. Defendant Lane was the Chief Deputy County Attorney for Harvey County, Kansas at the relevant time.
Although Plaintiff initially was voluntarily admitted to Prairie View on January 29, 2018, he alleges that he revoked his consent for further services on January 30, 2018. After Plaintiff revoked his consent for treatment at Prairie View, he claims that a series of disturbing events happened. The details of those events are not important for resolution of Plaintiff's claims below. Highly summarized, Prairie View Defendants assert that Plaintiff was involved in a purported violent incident (which Plaintiff denies). Plaintiff claims that he was given a sedative he did not need and was prepared for transfer to LSH and transferred to LSH over his own objection as well as the objection of his family members. He claims that Prairie View Defendants were non-responsive to his family members' pleas and requests while initiating paperwork for civil commitment proceedings.
As part of the screening process for transfer to LSH, a staff member faxed to Defendant Lane "documentation legally required for Plaintiff's transfer and to initiate civil proceedings for his involuntary care and treatment." Doc. 42 at 18. Defendant Lane then prepared a VerifiedPetition for Involuntary Commitment, which he filed in the District Court of Harvey County at 2:44 p.m. on February 2, 2018—after Plaintiff had already been transferred to LSH in Pawnee County. Plaintiff claims that the Verified Petition contains the following "prima facie" invalid information:
Plaintiff was involuntarily admitted to LSH from February 1 through February 5, 2018. Plaintiff had private insurance, which covered a portion of his bill for his stay. LSH billed Plaintiff for the remainder, totaling $1588.48. Plaintiff claims that he "is unaware whether costs were assessed for his court appointed attorney, his transportation to [LSH] and/or for the prosecution of his care and treatment case pursuant to K.S.A. 59-2981, but submits that to date, no such costs have been received by him or his estate." Doc. 42 at 23. Plaintiff makes no allegations of being billed for services at Prairie View. According to Plaintiff, this case is about Defendants' joint efforts to "extort collection of non-consensual professional services through private insurance or estate seizure, effectuated with the assistance of fraudulent civil commitment proceedings." Doc. 81 at 1.
Plaintiff makes the following allegations with respect to Defendant Lane, as clarified in his response brief:
Lane is sued in both personal and official capacity pursuant to his duties as an investigator and/or witness undertaken as part of his duties as Harvey County Chief Deputy County Attorney for his direct involvement in initiating civil commitment proceedings swearing to probable cause for emergency need of involuntary commitment of Plaintiff to [LSH] on February 5, 2018 when Plaintiff was not within his jurisdiction, for intentionally taking multiple acts in furtherance of obstructing Plaintiff's counsel of choice, for facilitating concealed secondary prosecution of the same in another county without advising Plaintiff's attorney and for terminating proceedings in ex parte communications with the court to the exclusion of Plaintiff's counsel. Lane is also accused of failing to correct mistakes in his records upon discovery.
As explained below, Defendant Lane moves for dismissal alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c). Prairie View Defendants only move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6). A court will dismiss a cause of action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) under two circumstances. First, dismissal is warranted where an issue of law precludes recovery. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). Second, dismissal is likewise appropriate where the factual allegations fail to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if its factual allegations allow a court to draw the reasonable inference that the opposing party is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true, this obligation does not extend to legal conclusions or to "threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action." Id. at 678-79.
As also explained below, the Court does not consider dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(c). But Defendant Lane does raise one argument that is more appropriately considered under the standards of Rule 12(b)(1) instead of Rule 12(b)(6): the argument that he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Ruiz v. McDonnell, 299 F.3d 1173, 1180 (10th Cir. 2002) (). The Court therefore considers this argument under the standards of Rule 12(b)(1) instead of 12(b)(6). See Muscogee (Creek) Nation v. Pruitt, 669 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 2012) () (citation omitted); Davis v. California, 2017 WL 4758928, at *1 (D. Kan. 2017) (); Moreno v. Kan. City Steak Co., 2017 WL 2985748, at *3 (D. Kan. 2017) ().
Motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) can generally take two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. "[A] facial attack on the complaint's allegations as to subject matter jurisdiction questions the sufficiency of the complaint." Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10th Cir. 1995). In that situation, the allegations in the complaint are accepted as true. Id. Defendant Lane has not submitted any evidence, so the Court considers his attack a facial attack. The burden is on Plaintiff—the party asserting this Court's jurisdiction—to establish subject matter jurisdiction. Marcus v. Kan. Dep't of Revenue, 170 F.3d 1305, 1309 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
The Court examines Plaintiff's claims with these criteria in mind.
Plaintiff first asks the Court to deny Defendant Lane's motion outright as untimely because Defendant Lane filed an answer to Plaintiff's original complaint before filing this motion to dismiss or motion for judgment on the pleadings (which is targeted at the amended complaint). As Plaintiff correctly points out, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is not proper after an answer is filed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (); Swearingen v. Honeywell, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1193 (D. Kan. 2002) (); see also Humes v. Cummings, 2019 WL 1596579, at *3 (D. Kan. 2019). Although the Court may convert a motion to dismiss to one for judgment on...
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