Johnston v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 21 December 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. CA-5-80-133.
• Parties: Waivie JOHNSTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rod SHAW, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

556 F. Supp. 406

Waivie JOHNSTON, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Rod SHAW, et al., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. CA-5-80-133.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Lubbock Division.

December 10, 1982.

On Motion to Amend December 21, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Stephen C. McIntyre, West Texas Legal Services, Lubbock, Tex., for plaintiffs.

Kay Fletcher, Asst. Crim. Dist. Atty., Lubbock, Tex., for defendants.

MEMORANDUM

WOODWARD, Chief Judge.

This case came on for trial before the court, without a jury, on the 7th day of December, 1982 with the attorneys and parties present. This memorandum shall constitute the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law and reference is here made to the stipulations as to the agreed facts made by the parties and contained in the Pre-Trial Order of this court, which are adopted by the court as additional findings of fact.

The court has jurisdiction to hear this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) and (4) and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988.¹

The four plaintiffs in this suit, Waivie Johnston, Ester Reyna, Thelma Clark, and Emma Rodriguez, are unsuccessful applicants for emergency financial assistance with the Lubbock County General Assistance Agency (LCGAA), Lubbock County, Texas. The defendants are the County Judge and members of the Lubbock County Commissioners Court, all in their official capacities, and the Director of the LCGAA, also in her official capacity. The complaint also names the Lubbock County Commissioners Court itself as a defendant.

In June of 1980, the plaintiffs were residents of the Coronado Apartments in Lubbock, Texas and certain of their utility services either had been terminated or were about to be terminated for nonpayment of current bills. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully applied to the LCGAA for emergency financial assistance to remedy or prevent the termination of their utility services. No written reasons for the denial of their applications were given plaintiffs. No written or oral notice of their right to appeal these determinations, the appellate procedures, or the LCGAA's eligibility standards were given plaintiffs.

The evidence establishes that at the time in question it was not the policy or practice of the LCGAA to provide written reasons for denial of assistance unless an unsuccessful applicant specifically requested such. It was also the practice of the LCGAA to orally inform unsuccessful applicants of their right to appeal adverse decisions only if such persons specifically requested such information or demonstrated disagreement with the decisions of their case workers. These plaintiffs did not receive either written or oral notice of their right to appeal rejection of their applications.

Lubbock County established the LCGAA pursuant to Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 2351(11) (Vernon 1971),² to furnish emergency relief to those who meet certain eligibility requirements. The County has regularly provided funds in its budget for the staffing of this agency and certain monies to afford emergency relief to qualified applicants.

Plaintiffs seek nominal damages, injunctive relief, and an award of attorney's fees for the deprivation of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

For the past several months, the LCGAA has established a policy and followed a practice of affording written notice to all unsuccessful applicants of the reasons for the rejection of their applications and their right to appeal that decision.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DEFENSE

The defendants have pled and asserted that the plaintiffs cannot recover any damages or attorney's fees and are not entitled to injunctive relief because the Eleventh Amendment bars this action in its entirety. Defendants misconstrue the scope of that amendment.

A

The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State. U.S. Const. amend. XI.

"While the Amendment by its terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, the Supreme Court has consistently held that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1355, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974); Employees v. Department of Public Health and Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 1615, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890).

The Eleventh Amendment does not prohibit the relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case. The State of Texas is not a party to this suit and no relief is sought against the State or any of its agencies.

The relief sought against the county and its officers in this case is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. That amendment does not prevent suit against counties or municipal corporations. "A county does not occupy the same position as a state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 1358 n. 12, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974). "It has long been established that actions against a county can be maintained in United States courts in order to vindicate federally guaranteed rights." Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 233, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1234, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964). "The bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to States and State officials in appropriate circumstances, ... but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations." Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 97 S.Ct. 568, 572, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530, 10 S.Ct. 363, 33 L.Ed. 766 (1890). See also Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital, 665 F.2d 724, 726-28 (5th Cir.1982).

In Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the Supreme Court held that municipalities and other local governmental units were "persons" within the meaning of that term in 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but limited its holding to "local government units which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes." Id. at 690 n. 54, 98 S.Ct. at 2035 n. 54. Therefore, the question before the court in this case is whether the defendant County (had it been sued directly) and its officials are the alter ego or mere administrative arm of the State of Texas. Laje v. R.E. Thomason General Hospital, 665 F.2d at 726-27 n. 2. "The answer depends, at least in part, upon the nature of the entity created by state law." Mount Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280, 97 S.Ct. at 572. "While local government entities may, in some circumstances, be considered an arm of the state, thereby deriving the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, ... independent local political subdivisions are not entitled to such immunity even though they may `exercise a slice of state power.'" Laje, 665 F.2d at 727.

A federal court must examine the particular entity in question and its powers and characteristics as created by state law to determine whether the suit is in reality a suit against the state itself. * * * Courts typically look at the degree of local autonomy and control, and most importantly whether the funds to defray any award would be derived from the state treasury. Id.

Applying these principles to Lubbock County, it is clear that Lubbock County's administration of this emergency relief program through the LCGAA is simply too attenuated from the State of Texas to support an extension of the Eleventh Amendment. Lubbock County's Commissioners Court established the eligibility standards for emergency relief, not the State of Texas. Funds for the program are budgeted by the County and paid from County, not State funds. Appeals from adverse decisions of the LCGAA go to the Commissioners Court. There are no administrative provisions providing for a further appeal to any state agency. While it is true that art. 2351(11) directs the County Commissioners Court to provide for the support of paupers, the degree of freedom from state supervision with which the County operates and funds this program, and the independence of Lubbock County in general, both lead to a conclusion that in administering this program Lubbock County is not merely an alter ego or administrative arm of the State of Texas.

B

While it is well-recognized that the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity to States and state agencies from federal court suit, Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 98 S.Ct. 3057, 56 L.Ed.2d 1114 (1978), Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), it provides no barrier to plaintiffs in this suit against county officials. "It has been settled law since Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), that suits against state and county officials to enjoin them from invading constitutional rights are not forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment." Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218, 228, 84 S.Ct. 1226, 1231, 12 L.Ed.2d 256 (1964) (emphasis added). If state officials cannot be proceeded against for declaratory relief, putative plaintiffs might in some circumstances have to await the institution of state-court proceedings against them in order to assert their constitutional claims. This is not the way the law has developed. Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 737, 100 S.Ct. 1967, 1977, 64 L.Ed.2d 641 (1980). "Suits against state officials in federal courts are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. (emphasis added).

However, a suit in federal court by private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 1143, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979); ...