Joiner-Carosi v. Adekoya

• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Coomer, Judge.
• Citation: Joiner-Carosi v. Adekoya, 357 Ga.App. 388, 850 S.E.2d 823 (Ga. App. 2020)
• Decision Date: 26 October 2020
• Docket Number: A20A1418
• Parties: JOINER-CAROSI v. ADEKOYA.

357 Ga.App. 388

850 S.E.2d 823

JOINER-CAROSI

v.ADEKOYA.

A20A1418

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

October 26, 2020

Goodman McGuffey, James T. Hankins III, Samantha M. Mullis, for appellant.

Schneider Hammers, Jason T. Schneider, Campbell Wiliamson, for appellee.

Coomer, Judge.

Temitope John Adekoya filed an action against Staci Anne Joiner-Carosi to recover damages for personal injuries he allegedly sustained in an automobile collision caused by Joiner-Carosi. After a jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Adekoya, Joiner-Carosi filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. Joiner-Carosi appeals, contending that the trial court erred by (1) striking a juror for cause; (2) quashing trial subpoenas; (3) excluding evidence of attorney referrals to Adekoya's medical providers; and (4) excluding evidence regarding Adekoya seeking treatment on liens and Adekoya's contracts with his medical providers. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

On August 5, 2019, Joiner-Carosi served a trial subpoena on nonparties Peachtree Orthopedics and Cherokee Funding, LLC ("Cherokee Funding").¹ Cherokee Funding filed objections and a motion to quash on August 7, 2019. Joiner-Carosi filed a motion to enforce the trial subpoena against Peachtree Orthopedics on August 14, 2019. On August 19, 2019, the first morning of trial, the trial court heard argument on Cherokee Funding's motion to quash. After hearing argument from Cherokee Funding, Joiner-Carosi, and Adekoya, the trial court quashed both the subpoena issued to Cherokee Funding and the subpoena issued to Peachtree Orthopedics.

After ruling on the subpoenas, the trial court heard argument on two motions in limine filed by Adekoya. In one of the motions, Adekoya requested that the trial court prevent the defense from eliciting testimony about any matter concerning how Adekoya's bills had been or would be paid, including liens, letters of protection, or medical funding. In the other motion, Adekoya asked the trial court to bar defense counsel from eliciting testimony or presenting evidence regarding any attorney referral of Adekoya to his medical providers. The trial court granted both of Adekoya's motions.

During voir dire, Adekoya's counsel asked the jury panel, "Anybody ever feel suspicious or doubtful whenever they hear about somebody filing a lawsuit because they got hurt in a car wreck?" Seven jurors, including Juror Number 7, raised their hands. When Adekoya's counsel asked Juror Number 7 about his suspicions or doubts about a person filing a lawsuit for personal injuries, he explained that he has "doubts any time anybody sues anybody" because he has "a generally pessimistic view of people's abuse of the ..." When asked about the basis for his pessimism, Juror Number 7 responded, "I think societally we abuse the system, and people just want to sue everybody for everything." Juror Number 7 further clarified that the opinion he described is one that he holds "consistently." When Adekoya's counsel asked Juror Number 7 if his opinion caused him to "lean to one direction or another towards the plaintiff or defendant," Juror Number 7 responded, "No, sir." Adekoya moved to strike Juror Number 7 for cause, arguing that he was biased. Joiner-Carosi opposed the motion, arguing that Juror Number 7 said he could be impartial. The trial court granted Adekoya's motion to strike "in an abundance of caution" based on Juror Number 7's statements "regarding societally abusing the system, et cetera."

The jury trial resulted in a verdict in favor of Adekoya. Joiner-Carosi filed a motion for new trial, which the trial court denied. This appeal followed.

1. Joiner-Carosi first contends that the trial court erred by striking Juror Number 7 for cause. We disagree.

"[T]rial courts have broad discretion to evaluate and rule upon a potential juror's impartiality, based upon the ordinary general rules of human experience, and a trial court may only be reversed upon a finding of manifest abuse of that discretion." Kim v. Walls , 275 Ga. 177, 178, 563 S.E.2d 847 (2002) (citations and punctuation omitted). "Trial courts have ‘extremely broad discretion’ to decide whether to exclude a juror for cause once an adequate inquiry has been conducted. A conclusion on an issue of bias is based on findings of demeanor and credibility which are peculiarly in the trial court's province, and those findings are to be given deference." Elliott v. Home Depot U.S.A. , 275 Ga. App. 865, 867-868 (2), 622 S.E.2d 77 (2005) (citations and punctuation omitted). "Where the juror appears partial to one side or the other or through voir dire demonstrates a lack of impartiality, such constitutes good cause for the judge in his discretion to remove the juror to preserve the integrity of an impartial and fair jury trial and serve thereby the ends of justice." Mobley v. Wright , 253 Ga. App. 335, 337 (3), 559 S.E.2d 78 (2002). "A trial judge should err on the side of caution by dismissing, rather than trying to rehabilitate, biased jurors because, in reality, the judge is the only person in a courtroom whose primary concern, indeed primary duty, is to ensure the selection of a fair and impartial jury." Walls v. Kim , 250 Ga. App. 259, 260, 549 S.E.2d 797 (2001). "The trial judge, in seeking to balance the parties’ competing interests, must be guided not only by the need for an impartial jury, but also by the principle that no party to any case has a right to have any particular person on their jury." Id.

During voir dire, Juror Number 7 made statements from which the trial court could conclude that he was biased. Under these circumstances, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in striking Juror Number 7 for cause. Furthermore, "any error in dismissing the prospective juror for cause was harmless since there is nothing in the record to indicate that defendant did not have the benefit of an impartial jury. A party to a lawsuit has no vested interest in having any particular juror to serve; he is entitled only to a legal and impartial jury." Morris v. Bonner , 183 Ga. App. 499, 500 (1), 359 S.E.2d 244 (1987) (citations and punctuation omitted). Consequently, Joiner-Carosi has not shown reversible error on this basis.

2. Joiner-Carosi contends that the trial court improperly quashed the trial subpoenas issued to Peachtree Orthopedics and Cherokee Funding. We find no reversible error.

We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to quash a subpoena for abuse of discretion. In re Whittle , 339 Ga. App. 83, 85, 793 S.E.2d 123 (2016). OCGA § 24-13-22 provides that a subpoena for attendance at a trial shall be issued at the request of any party. "A subpoena may also command the person to whom it is directed to produce the evidence designated therein." OCGA § 24-13-23 (a). " OCGA § 24-13-23 (b) (1) gives the trial court discretion upon timely motion to quash or modify such a subpoena if it is unreasonable and oppressive. This standard is tested by the peculiar facts arising from the subpoena itself and other proper sources." Hickey v. RREF BB SBL Acquisitions , 336 Ga. App. 411, 414 (2), 785 S.E.2d 72 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). "It is well established that when a motion to quash is filed, the party serving the subpoena has the initial burden of showing the documents sought are relevant." In re Whittle , 339 Ga. App. at 90 (2), 793 S.E.2d 123 (citation and punctuation omitted). "Items that are neither pertinent nor relevant need not be produced." Walker v. Bruhn , 281 Ga. App. 149, 151, 635 S.E.2d 322 (2006).

On the first morning of trial, the trial court heard argument on Cherokee Funding's motion to quash. Cherokee Funding argued that the subpoena was unreasonable and oppressive because it sought only inadmissible evidence that was ultimately irrelevant to the claims and defenses in this case. Cherokee Funding contended that the evidence is inadmissible because it is collateral source evidence, and that requiring Cherokee Funding to present inadmissible evidence concerning collateral source benefits is inherently unreasonable and oppressive. In addition, Cherokee Funding argued that it is not obligated to produce irrelevant and nonpertinent information, even under subpoena.

"The collateral source rule, stated simply, is that the receipt of benefits or mitigation of loss from sources other than the defendant will not operate to diminish the plaintiff's recovery of damages." Polito v. Holland , 258 Ga. 54, 55 (3), 365 S.E.2d 273 (1988) (citation and punctuation omitted). Because of this rule, "evidence of collateral benefits is not generally material." Id. at 56 (3), 365 S.E.2d 273.

In response to Cherokee Funding's motion to quash, Joiner-Carosi contended that any documents that Cherokee Funding has on its relationship with Peachtree Orthopedics are both relevant and admissible because that relationship goes to the issues of bias and whether the medical charges are reasonable and necessary.

Adekoya argued that the subpoenas should not be enforced because (1) Joiner-Carosi never sought to obtain the records through discovery; (2) the only legal purpose for using the records would be for impeachment by bias, and since none of Adekoya's medical providers would be testifying, there was no testimony to impeach; (3) Adekoya is a college student who attends school in Texas and had flown in for the trial, so any delay of the trial would create prejudice for him; (4) in addition to being inadmissible as collateral source evidence, the records sought are inadmissible as evidence of Adekoya's financial condition; and (5) the records sought have nothing to do with the issues in the case, which, in accordance with the pretrial order, are causation and damages.

The trial court ruled that the subpoenas were in violation of its consolidated pretrial order; that although Joiner-Carosi claimed that the records she sought were important to show potential bias on the part of Adekoya's treating physicians, she failed to...