Joiner v. City of Dallas

• Decision Date: 16 August 1974
• Docket Number: No. CA 3-4322-B.,CA 3-4322-B.
• Citation: 380 F. Supp. 754
• Parties: Fred and Dorothy JOINER et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

380 F. Supp. 754

Fred and Dorothy JOINER et al. v. CITY OF DALLAS et al.

No. CA 3-4322-B.

United States District Court, N. D. Texas, Dallas Division.

August 16, 1974.

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Jay M. Vogelson, Dallas, Tex., for plaintiffs; Charles J. Morris, John E. Kennedy, John F. Jordan, Aglaia D. Mauzy, Dallas, Tex., of counsel.

N. Alex Bickley and Joseph G. Werner, Dallas, Tex., for defendants City of Dallas, Wes Wise (Mayor), City Council of Dallas, George Schrader (City Manager), Park Board of Dallas, and Alex Bickley (City Attorney).

John W. Clark, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for defendant State Fair of Texas.

John W. Clark, Jr., Dallas, Tex., for defendant Robert B. Cullum.

John Hill, Atty. Gen., and Max P. Flusche, Asst. Atty. Gen., for intervenor State of Texas.

Before GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, and HUGHES and HILL, District Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

Threatened with loss of their homes and property, plaintiffs have come to this court for help in stopping the municipal bulldozer. They present a multifaceted challenge to the constitutionality of Vernon's Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 3264-3271, which outline the statutory procedure governing the appropriation of property through eminent domain, and art. 6081e, which grants to municipal corporations the authority to commence eminent domain proceedings for various purposes. They urge condemnation of these statutes for violating the strictures of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and for permitting the appropriation of private property without just compensation. Finding ourselves inextricably bound to well-settled interpretations of the doctrine of eminent domain and for other reasons set forth herein, we are obliged to hold these statutes constitutional and to deny the requested relief.¹

I.

In July 1968, the City Council of Dallas, Texas, approved a report submitted by the Park Board recommending the acquisition of realty in a geographic area locally known as "Fair Park." In August 1968, the City Council formally announced its intention to acquire the property that had become designated as the Fair Park Expansion Area ("FPEA"). By December 1968, the City had acquired title to about one-third of the FPEA properties. On July 28, 1969, the Park Board recommended to the City Council that eminent domain proceedings be initiated to acquire the remaining FPEA properties. Thereafter, the City Council declared by Resolution the necessity of acquiring by voluntary purchase or condemnation those properties.

During the period commencing July 1969, and concluding in early 1971, the remaining FPEA properties were either voluntarily sold to the City or cited by the City in eminent domain actions. As to that property sought to be acquired through eminent domain, a pattern of conduct emerged in conformity with the eminent domain statutes:

(1) The City Council would pass a Resolution authorizing the acquisition of the property by purchase or condemnation;

(2) When the City and the property owner failed to agree on a sales price, the City would file a Statement in Condemnation in a County Court at Law, Dallas County, Texas;

(3) The County Judge would appoint Special Commissioners in Condemnation to make a valuation of the property and to assess the damages arising from the condemnation;

(4) The Commissioners would conduct one or more hearings with advance written notice served on the property owner;

(5) The Commissioners would determine the amount of damages and would submit their Report to the County Judge;

(6) The City of Dallas would deposit in the registry of the County Court at Law an amount equal to the award rendered by the Commissioners; and,

(7) The property owner would file objections to the decision of the Commissioners within twenty days of the filing of their Report.

During the pendency of the State court eminent domain proceedings, Fred and Dorothy Joiner, together with twenty-eight other named plaintiffs, commenced this action in federal court.² Upon defendants' motion, the district judge dismissed the complaint, reasoning that property rights are not rights protected by the Civil Rights Act, that as a matter of comity the federal judiciary should not become involved in the interpretation and administration of a state's eminent domain statutes, and that even if comity did not require dismissal the anti-injunction statute precluded relief. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 329 F.Supp. 943 (N.D.Tex.1971). The Fifth Circuit affirmed in a per curiam opinion, 447 F.2d 1403 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court, however, vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972), and Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L. Ed.2d 669 (1971). Joiner v. City of Dallas, 412 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 2286, 36 L.Ed.2d 967 (1973).

On remand, the Fifth Circuit, pursuant to Mitchum, held that the Civil Rights Act "was an express exception to the anti-injunction statute thus giving the District Court jurisdiction." Joiner v. City of Dallas, 488 F.2d 519, 520 (5th Cir. 1974). In addition, citing Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 92 S.Ct. 1113, 31 L.Ed.2d 424 (1972), the court held that the Civil Rights Act must be construed as protecting property rights as well as personal rights. 488 F.2d at 520. Finally, the case was remanded to the district court with specific instructions to consider the potential applicability of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). 488 F.2d at 521. Thus, despite nearly four years of litigation, there still remains in issue the propriety of an exercise of jurisdiction by this court.

II.

A. YOUNGER V. HARRIS

An adjudication of the applicability of Younger requires a bifurcated analysis of the Joiner State court litigation in order to ascertain whether (i) all of the Younger predicates exist, and (ii) the public policy considerations arising from a state court criminal prosecution that mandate abstention are correlative to an eminent domain proceeding. Unless both inquiries are answered in the affirmative, Younger does not require abstention.

Under Texas law the pending state court litigation is wholly civil in character, arising out of Vernon's Tex. Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 3266(6) and grounded in the objections filed by property owners to the Reports of the Special Commissioners in Condemnation. See Sabine River Authority of Texas v. McNatt, 161 Tex. 551, 342 S.W.2d 741 (1961). This characterization by the Texas judiciary is binding upon the federal forum. Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 480 F.2d 998, 1001-1002 (5th Cir. 1973). Therefore, the threshold inquiry is whether the Younger doctrine requires as a predicate to its application that the pending state court litigation be criminal in character.

Although the Supreme Court has not expressly resolved this issue, Younger has been applied by the Court only when the state court proceedings are criminal or "in the nature of criminal proceedings." Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 576, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 1696, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973), explaining Geiger v. Jenkins, 401 U.S. 985, 91 S.Ct. 1236, 28 L.Ed. 2d 525 (1971). The Fifth Circuit has steadfastly enforced a similar requirement that the pending state court proceeding form a nexus with the state's enforcement of its criminal laws before Younger requires dismissal. Polk v. State Bar of Texas, 480 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1973); Duke v. State, 477 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1973); Palaio v. McAuliffe, 466 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1972).

Palaio v. McAuliffe, supra, presented one example of this nexus; plaintiffs, who were under a state court civil injunction forbidding their exhibition of obscene movies and against whom criminal complaints were pending, sought termination of the injunctions and cessation of prosecutions because the state statutes were unconstitutional.

We believe . . . that application of the principles of Younger should not depend upon such labels as "civil" or "criminal," but rather should be governed by analysis of the competing interests that each case presents.

* * * * * *

We thus pose a limited answer to the question . . . by holding that, where plaintiff is unable to prove the existence of "special circumstances," the principles of Younger bar federal intervention in a state civil proceeding that is an integral part of a state's enforcement of its criminal laws.

466 F.2d at 1232-1233.

Similarly, in Duke v. State, supra, 477 F.2d at 250-251, the nexus was found to exist by virtue of pending state court civil injunctions issued under statutes containing criminal penalties.³ By contrast, the pending Joiner litigation bears no functional correlation to the criminal laws of Texas, thereby falling substantially short of the nexus required before Younger will apply.

Assuming arguendo that Younger applies to any pending state court proceeding regardless of its integration with a state's criminal laws, there is yet another missing predicate. Younger applies only if the federal forum is requested to restrain the pending state court proceeding. Plaintiffs in the case at bar have made no such request. The named defendants, although participants in the pending state court litigation, are not judicial officers, prosecutors, or judges. See Allee v. Medrano, supra n. 3, 416 U.S. at 817 n. 11, 94 S.Ct. at 2201 n. 11, 40 L.Ed.2d at 581 n. 11. Moreover, no injunctive relief is requested of this court that will affect the current proceedings; all injunctive relief is prospective in application.⁴

In concluding that Younger does not affect the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise properly invoked, we rely not only on the absence of the Younger predicates but also on the absence of traditional, established legal principles that would give rise to the doctrines of comity,...