Joiner v. City of Columbus

• Decision Date: 04 January 2016
• Docket Number: CAUSE NO.: 1:14CV090-SA-DAS
• Parties: STEPHEN JOINER PLAINTIFF v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI, CAPTAIN FREDERICK SHELTON, in his official capacity DEFENDANTS
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi

STEPHEN JOINER PLAINTIFF v. CITY OF COLUMBUS, MISSISSIPPI,CAPTAIN FREDERICK SHELTON, in his official capacity DEFENDANTS

CAUSE NO.: 1:14CV090-SA-DAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI ABERDEEN DIVISION

January 4, 2016

ORDER ON ATTORNEYS FEES

After accepting a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Attorney's Fees seeking $157,305.09 for his attorneys' work in this case. The motion is ripe and the Court finds as follows:

Factual and Procedural Background

Stephen Joiner filed a complaint in this court on May 15, 2014 challenging the facial and as applied constitutionality of the City of Columbus's Parade Ordinance and Handbill Ordinance. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction [2], which the Court set for hearing in December. Prior to holding the hearing, however, the City of Columbus amended their Parade Ordinance to comply with the First Amendment. The hearing was cancelled accordingly, and the Plaintiff withdrew the Motion for Preliminary Injunction [45].

Initial discovery was exchanged in the case, but before depositions were taken, Defendants extended, and Plaintiff accepted, a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment. The Offer obligated Defendants to pay "jointly but not severally" $10,263.01 plus "all reasonable and necessary attorney's fees and costs to which the Plaintiff is statutorily or otherwise entitled under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 68 to the extent incurred and substantiated under prevailing legal standards as of the time of conveyance and service of this offer and in amount to be determined by the Court upon evidentiary submissions and, if appropriate, a hearing."

Upon Notice of Acceptance of the Rule 68 Offer [72], the Court entered Final Judgment [73] in favor of Plaintiff on March 30, 2015. Plaintiff thereafter filed his Motion for Attorney's Fees [74].

Standard of Review of Attorneys' Fees

The well-established "American Rule" is that a prevailing party is not ordinarily entitled to recover attorney's fees from the losing party. See Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens Council, 478 U.S. 546, 561, 106 S. Ct. 3088, 3097, 92 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1986) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S. Ct. 1612, 1616, 44 L. Ed. 2d 141 (1975)). Congress responded to the Alyeska decision by creating a statutory entitlement to "reasonable" attorney's fees for "prevailing" parties in civil rights litigation. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S. Ct. 1933, 1937, 76 L. Ed. 2d 40 (1983). As amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 provides in relevant part:

In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

While the statutory language is discretionary, the Supreme Court has held that fee awards should be denied only where special circumstances render an award unjust. Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S. Ct. 964, 966, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263 (1968) (citation omitted). The statutory threshold for entitlement to section 1988 fees is that the plaintiff must be a "prevailing party." This requirement is met if he succeeds "on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit [he] sought in bringing the suit." Texas State Teachers v. Garland Indep. School District, 489 U.S. 782, 792, 109 S. Ct. 1486, 1491, 103 L. Ed. 2d 866 (1989) (citation omitted). It is also clear that a plaintiff need not proceed to a "full litigation ofthe issues" to be a "prevailing party." Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129, 100 S. Ct. 2570, 2575, 65 L. Ed. 2d 653 (1980). Vindication through a consent decree (Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 757, 100 S. Ct. 1987, 64 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980) (per curiam)) or a Rule 68 offer of judgment (Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352, 101 S. Ct. 1146, 67 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1981)) also entitles a successful plaintiff to attorney's fees. In the present case the Court finds no special circumstances, nor do the defendants advance any, that would render an award of attorney's fees unjust.

"[T]he fee applicant bears the burden of establishing entitlement to an award and documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. The applicant . . . should maintain billing time records in a manner that will enable a reviewing court to identify distinct claims." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933; see also Bode v. United States, 919 F.2d 1044, 1047 (5th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he party seeking reimbursement of attorneys' fees ... has the burden of establishing the number of attorney hours expended, and can meet that burden only by presenting evidence that is adequate for the court to determine what hours should be included in the reimbursement."). However, attorney's fees awards should not provide a windfall to plaintiffs. See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 430 n. 4, 103 S. Ct. 1933 (explaining statutory goal of avoiding windfalls to attorneys); see also City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 580, 106 S. Ct. 2686, 91 L. Ed. 2d 466 (1986) ("Congress intended that statutory fee awards be 'adequate to attract competent counsel, but . . . not produce windfalls to attorneys.'" (quoting S.Rep. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5913)).

Determinations of hours and rates are questions of fact. See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995); Bode, 919 F.2d at 1047 (reviewing hours for clear error). "It remains important, however, for the district court to provide a concise but clearexplanation of its reasons for the fee award." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S. Ct. 1933; see also Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325-26 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Our concern is not that a complete litany be given, but that findings be complete enough to assume a review which can determine whether the court has used proper factual criteria in exercising its discretion to fix just compensation."); Nisby v. Comm'rs of Court, 798 F.2d 134, 137 (5th Cir.1986) ("When the district court does not explain its reasons for the attorney's fee it awards, we are unable adequately to review the propriety of the fee award."); Baughman v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 583 F.2d 1208, 1219 (3rd Cir. 1978) (requiring explanation of district court's adjustment of lodestar).

Discussion and Analysis

The first step in determining a reasonable attorney's fee is to ascertain the "lodestar" figure; this is done by multiplying the "number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888, 104 S. Ct. 1541, 1544, 79 L. Ed. 2d 891 (1984); Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933. The district court must determine whether the hours claimed were "reasonably expended on the litigation." Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 896 F.2d 927, 933-34 (5th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 903 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.1990); see also Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434, 103 S. Ct. 1933 ("The district court also should exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not 'reasonably expended.'"). The lodestar determination is not mechanistic, and "the district court's determination of the lodestar amount should not be guided solely by the billing records or the rates requested in the fee petition." Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 98-20692, 202 F.3d 264, *3 (5th Cir. Nov. 8, 1999) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 433, 103 S. Ct. 1933; Abrams v. Baylor College of Medicine, 805 F.2d 528, 536 (5th Cir. 1986)). Rather, the district court is required to identify from the fee petition thosehours that were "reasonably" expended on the litigation. When making that determination, the district court is obligated to scrutinize the billing records carefully and to exclude excessive, duplicative, or otherwise unnecessary entries. See Rivera, 477 U.S. at 568, 106 S. Ct. 2686; Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933; Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536. The district court should also consider whether the work performed was "'legal work in the strict sense,' or was merely clerical work that happened to be performed by a lawyer." Abrams, 805 F.2d at 536 (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1974)).

a. Reasonable Hours¹

A district court may reduce the hours claimed by the prevailing party in order to account for time expended on unsuccessful claims. This follows from the definition of a "prevailing party" as one who has "succeeded on 'any significant issue in litigation which achieve[d] some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing suit.'" See Wyatt v. Cole, 928 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1991), rev'd on other grounds, 504 U.S. 158, 112 S. Ct. 1827, 118 L. Ed. 2d 504 (1992) (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, and Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782, 109 S. Ct. 1486. The district court arrives at a reasonable fee award "either by attempting to identify specific hours that should be eliminated or by simply reducing the award to account for the limited success of the plaintiff." See Hensley, 461 U.S. at 424, 103 S. Ct. 1933, and Texas State Teachers, 489 U.S. at 782, 109 S. Ct. 1486; see also Kellstrom, 50 F.3d at 331 (a reduced fee award is appropriate if the relief, however significant, is limited in comparison to the scope of the litigation as a whole); Worldcom, Inc. v. Automated Commc'ns, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 526, 531 (S.D. Miss. 1999).

Typically courts must determine whether a particular claim is sufficiently "related" to the successful claim to be compensable under section 1988. In the present case, Defendants contend that time spent on Plaintiff's First Amendment facial challenge was not appropriate under Section 1988. As noted above, the City of Columbus revised its ordinances to reflect appropriate First Amendment case law. The facial challenge to the ordinances was not a distinctly different...