Joiner v. SVM Mgmt., LLC
| Decision Date | 21 February 2020 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 124671 |
| Parties | Chandra JOINER et al., Appellants, v. SVM MANAGEMENT, LLC, Appellee. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Berton N. Ring, of Berton N. Ring, P.C., of Chicago, for appellants.
John P.M. Peskind and Michael Griffin, of Sanford Kahn, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiffs Chandra Joiner and William Blackmond rented an apartment from defendant SVM Management, LLC. They paid a security deposit to defendant to secure against potential unpaid rent or other damages. After they moved out, defendant returned their security deposit but failed to pay interest on that deposit, as required by the Security Deposit Interest Act (Deposit Act) ( 765 ILCS 715/0.01 et seq. (West 2016)). Plaintiffs brought two class-action claims and an individual claim but did not file a class-certification motion with their complaint. Defendant responded by tendering plaintiffs' requested damages and attorney fees on one count and later moving to dismiss the other two. Plaintiffs refused that tender, and defendant later argued that its tender made that cause of action moot pursuant to our decisions in Barber v. American Airlines, Inc. , 241 Ill. 2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042 (2011), and Ballard RN Center, Inc. v. Kohll's Pharmacy & Homecare, Inc. , 2015 IL 118644, 400 Ill.Dec. 620, 48 N.E.3d 1060. Plaintiffs ask us to revisit those decisions in light of evolving federal precedent and the United States Supreme Court's decision in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez , 577 U.S. 153, 136 S. Ct. 663, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016).
¶ 3 Plaintiffs rented an apartment in a large residential apartment complex from defendant with a lease term beginning on October 1, 2014. They entered into a one-year written lease and gave defendant a security deposit of $1290. The parties later extended that lease for a second year before plaintiffs moved out on September 30, 2016. On or about October 11, 2016, defendant returned plaintiffs' full security deposit. Defendant did not, however, pay security interest on that deposit at any time.
¶ 4 Soon after, plaintiffs brought a three-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County. In count I, they alleged, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (Class A), that defendant violated the Deposit Act by failing to pay interest on its tenants' security deposits. In count II, they alleged, on behalf of themselves and others similarly situated (Class B), that defendant violated the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act ( 815 ILCS 510/1 et seq. (West 2016)) by way of various allegedly unlawful lease and rider provisions.1 Finally, in count III, they alleged, individually, that defendant violated the Rental Property Utility Service Act ( 765 ILCS 735/0.01 et seq. (West 2016)) by failing to provide the required notices or disclosures relating to plaintiffs' payment of a common-area utility, namely that one or more parking lot lights were connected to plaintiffs' electrical meter. Attached to the complaint were the lease and five riders.
¶ 5 Defendant moved for an extension of time to answer or otherwise plead, which the circuit court granted. Before that extension expired and before defendant answered or pled, plaintiffs propounded written discovery and noticed a deposition. Defendant moved to stay discovery and, at the same time but in a separate motion, to dismiss counts I and II of the complaint. Defendant moved to dismiss count I pursuant to this court's decision in Barber , 241 Ill. 2d 450, 350 Ill.Dec. 535, 948 N.E.2d 1042, arguing that it "made a full and unconditional tender of all sums due to Plaintiffs under Count I." It moved to dismiss count II under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2016) ), arguing that plaintiffs failed to state a cause of action under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The motion to dismiss did not attack nor address count III. Plaintiffs responded, arguing, as they do here, that Barber and Ballard were no longer valid law and, even if they were valid, that defendant's tender was insufficient. They did not address the arguments regarding count II and instead noted that they would amend their complaint. Plaintiffs also opposed defendant's motion to stay discovery.
¶ 6 The court granted plaintiffs leave to amend count II of their complaint and stayed discovery pending the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss count I. Plaintiffs amended count II of their complaint to allege violations of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act ( 815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 2016)). They did not attach the lease, the riders, or any other exhibit to the amended complaint.
¶ 7 At the hearing on the motions to dismiss and to stay discovery, defense counsel argued for a stay on the counts that he alleged had not been adequately pled. He admitted that, "with respect to Count III, it states a cause of action, we can do discovery on Count III." The court quashed a subpoena to a third party as overbroad and stayed discovery "except for any discovery that may be related to class certification." It then took the motion to dismiss under advisement pending an oral ruling eight days later and stayed all discovery until that date. In its oral ruling, the court dismissed count I, finding that it was bound by this court's precedents in Barber and Ballard and that defendant made an adequate tender. Regarding the attorney fees and the stay order, the court stated that it would "keep everything in place until [it] rule[d] on the [plaintiffs' motion for Rule 308(a) certification ( Ill. S. Ct. R. 308(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 2015)) ]."
¶ 8 The Rule 308 motion was continued to the next status hearing, as was the discovery stay, over plaintiffs' objection. The court's order also noted that it would address the discovery stay and the disposition of the tender monies and potential attorney fees related to count I at the status hearing. It further noted that nothing in that or any previous order was "intended by the court or Plaintiffs as a waiver of Plaintiffs' appeal rights or rights to the tender monies."
¶ 9 Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint generally and count II specifically. It alleged that, in that amended complaint, plaintiffs referred to three documents—a security deposit receipt, a lease, and a lease extension—but failed to attach those documents. It argued that the court should strike plaintiffs' amended complaint for failing to attach its exhibits. It also alleged that plaintiffs failed to plead a cause of action in count II. The court denied the motion for Rule 308 certification and, noting that plaintiffs elected to stand on their pleadings, set a hearing date for the second motion to dismiss.
¶ 10 The day before the hearing on the second motion to dismiss, plaintiffs filed a motion for presentment of supplemental authority or for reconsideration. They argued, as they do to this court, that the federal Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court had reversed the decision and rationale on which this court's decisions in Barber and Ballard were based. They argued that "nearly every state in the country" embraced this change in the law.
¶ 11 At the hearing, the court dismissed the first amended complaint as deficient for lacking the written instruments on which the claims were founded pursuant to section 2-606 of the Code. 735 ILCS 5/2-606 (West 2016). It also dismissed count II for failing to state a claim for violation of the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act. The motion for reconsideration was set for hearing and later denied. Plaintiffs elected to stand on their pleadings, and the court dismissed the entire cause with prejudice, making it final and appealable.
¶ 12 Before the appellate court, plaintiffs argued, like they do here, that our decision in Barber was no longer good law in light of Campbell-Ewald and, if Barber was still good law, that the circuit court erred in holding that Barber permitted dismissal of all counts when defendant only tendered on one count. They also argued that the circuit court erred by preventing plaintiffs from conducting discovery on the basis of defendant's tender and that it erred in dismissing the remaining causes of action.
¶ 13 The appellate court found that defendant made a valid tender before noting that only we can overturn this court's precedent. 2019 IL App (1st) 172336-U, ¶ 28, 2019 WL 659556. Therefore, it held, Barber was still good law in Illinois, and "the circuit court properly dismissed Count I as moot." Id. ¶ 30. It next held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in staying discovery. Id. ¶ 35. It examined the sufficiency of the pleadings regarding count II, noted that plaintiffs did not argue for reversal of the circuit court's section 2-615 dismissal for failure to state a claim, and affirmed dismissal. Finally, it found that count III was not based on a written instrument, such that the claim was insufficient without the instrument attached, and reinstated count III. Id. ¶ 49. We granted plaintiffs leave to appeal. Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. July 1, 2018).
¶ 15 Although plaintiffs use some of the verbatim arguments they used in support of the prevention of discovery issue below, before this court they frame their argument as two issues instead of four: that Barber is no longer good law and that the circuit court erred in dismissing all counts based on defendant's tender as to only the first count. We agree that, to decide this case, we must reexamine Barber and Ballard in light of the approach now used by the Seventh Circuit and the United States Supreme Court.
¶ 16 We disagree, however, that the circuit court dismissed all counts based on the tender. Rather, only count I was dismissed on the tender. In a separate order,...
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