Joint Heirs Fellowship Church v. Ashley, Civil Action No. H–14–0125.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. H–14–0125. |
| Citation | 45 F.Supp.3d 597 |
| Parties | JOINT HEIRS FELLOWSHIP CHURCH, Houston's First Church of God, and Faith Outreach International Center, Plaintiffs, v. Natalia ASHLEY, in her official capacity as Interim Executive Director of the Texas Ethics Commission, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Brent Clark Perry, Kelly J. Coghlan, Attorneys At Law, Jerad Wayne Najvar, Najvar Law Firm, Houston, TX, for Plaintiffs.
Erika M. Kane, Office of the Texas Attorney General, Austin, TX, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church, Houston's First Church of God, and Faith Outreach International Center (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this action against the Executive Director and members of the Texas Ethics Commission, in their official capacities (collectively, “Defendants”) challenging certain provisions of the Texas Election Code. Pending before the court are Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Expedited Preliminary Injunctive Relief (“Motion for Preliminary Injunction”) (Docket Entry No. 2), Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 52), and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support (“Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment”) (Docket Entry No. 53). For the reasons explained below, Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part, Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction will be denied, and this case will be dismissed.
Plaintiffs are incorporated churches that wish to become involved in efforts to recall certain elected officials.1 Plaintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church and Houston's First Church of God are located in Houston, Texas, and plaintiff Faith Outreach International Center is located in San Antonio, Texas.2
When Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Preliminary Injunction, there was “a recall effort under way in San Antonio, Texas, to recall Mayor Julián Castro and council members Diego Bernal, Rebecca Viagran, Rey Saldaña, Shirley Gonzales, Ray Lopez, Cris Medina and Ron Nirenberg.”3 According to Plaintiffs, the “recall effort [was] premised on a proposed ordinance that these council persons and Mayor proposed and supported that is contrary to religious freedom and freedom of speech.”4 Plaintiffs desired “to immediately initiate their involvement in support of the San Antonio efforts.”5 Plaintiffs also contend that “some Houston city officials have supported policies that Plaintiffs feel are contrary to moral values and religious freedom,” and that “[p]laintiffs Joint Heirs Fellowship Church and Houston's First Church of God would like to engage in immediate involvement in support of a recall election regarding one or more such officials.”6
Plaintiffs allege that under certain provisions of the Texas Election Code they “cannot be involved in supporting the recall efforts through raising money, donating money, coordinating people's activities, promoting the recall effort on church websites, allowing petitions to be signed and distributed on church grounds, speech supporting the effort, or in any way public[ly] supporting recall efforts.”7 Defendants are charged with enforcing the provisions of the Texas Election Code.8
Plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage in the following conduct:
Plaintiffs filed their Original Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 17, 2014.10 On January 23, 2014, the court held a scheduling conference “to discuss an expedited schedule for the filing of motions and briefs” related to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.11 A preliminary injunction hearing was scheduled for February 5, 2014.12 Defendants filed a response to Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction on January 29, 2014.13 Plaintiffs filed a reply on February 3, 2014.14
On February 4, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law related to the preliminary injunction hearing.15 The court held the preliminary injunction hearing on February 5, 2014, and ordered the parties to submit a proposed schedule for the submission of supplemental briefing.16 The court urged the parties to confer and attempt to stipulate to conduct that they agree does not violate the Texas Election Code.17 On February 7, 2014, the parties filed a Joint Status Report and Proposed Scheduling Order.18 Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint the same day.19 On February 10, 2014, the court entered a scheduling order on supplemental briefing.20
On February 19, 2014, Defendants filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and their supplemental briefing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction.21 On February 21, 2014, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss.22 On March 3, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their supplemental briefing on their Motion for Preliminary Injunction.23 The parties subsequently indicated that they could not agree on a proposed order detailing specific conduct that does not violate the Texas Election Code.24
On March 18, 2014, Plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint.25 On March 21, 2014, Plaintiffs filed a response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss.26 On April 2, 2014, Defendants filed an answer to Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint.27
On June 13, 2014, the parties submitted the pending motions for summary judgment.28 On July 3, 2014, the parties filed their responses.29 On July 18, 2014, the parties filed their replies.30
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure mandates summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A party moving for summary judgment “bears the burden of identifying those portions of the record it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. Reyna, 401 F.3d 347, 349 (5th Cir.2005). When the nonmoving party would bear the ultimate burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its summary judgment burden by “ ‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Rule 56 does not require such a movant to negate the elements of the nonmovant's case. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir.2005). Where the moving party would bear the burden of proof at trial, it must present evidence that would require “a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.” Int'l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally's, Inc., 939 F.2d 1257, 1264–65 (5th Cir.1991).
Once the movant has carried this burden the nonmovant must show that material facts exist over which there is a genuine issue for trial. Reyna, 401 F.3d at 349 (citing Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2553–54 ). The parties may support the existence or nonexistence of a genuine fact issue by either (1) citing to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, admissions, and interrogatory answers, or (2) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A)-(B). In reviewing this evidence “the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal ‘Judicial Power,’ that is, federal-court jurisdiction, to ‘Cases' and ‘Controversies.’ ” U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 100 S.Ct. 1202,...
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