Joliet v. Pitoniak
| Decision Date | 31 May 2006 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 127175. |
| Citation | 715 N.W.2d 60,475 Mich. 30 |
| Parties | Virginia JOLIET, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gregory E. PITONIAK and Frank Bacha, Defendant-Appellants, and James Arango, Defendant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
E. Philip Adamaszek, Mt. Clemens, for the plaintiff.
Secrest Wardle (by Janet Callahan Barnes) and Johnson, Rosati, LaBarge, Aseltyne & Field, P.C. (by Edward D. Plato), Farmington Hills, for the defendants.
The issue before us is whether plaintiff's claims for violations of the Civil Rights Act (CRA),1 breach of contract, and misrepresentation accrue on the dates that the alleged discriminatory acts or misrepresentations occur or on the plaintiff's last day of work. Following our decision in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005), we hold that a claim of discrimination accrues when the adverse discriminatory acts occur. Thus, if a plaintiff's complaint does not make out a claim of discriminatory discharge, a claim of constructive discharge for a separation from employment occurring after the alleged discriminatory acts cannot serve to extend the period of limitations for discriminatory acts committed before the termination. Because Jacobson v. Parda Fed. Credit Union, 457 Mich. 318, 577 N.W.2d 881 (1998), held that allegations of constructive discharge could operate to extend the applicable period of limitations for discriminatory acts falling outside the period of limitations, and is inconsistent with Magee, supra, it is overruled.
Here, plaintiff does not assert a claim of discriminatory discharge. All the discriminatory acts or misrepresentations alleged in plaintiff's complaint took place before November 30, 1998. Therefore, plaintiff's November 30, 2001, complaint was not timely filed under the applicable three-year statute of limitations, MCL 600.5805.2 Accordingly, we hold that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in denying defendants' motion for summary disposition. We reverse and remand to the Wayne Circuit Court for entry of an order of summary disposition in defendants' favor.
Plaintiff worked for the city of Taylor as a data processing manager. Plaintiff testified by deposition that beginning in 1997, she was subjected to continual sexist remarks and derogatory treatment because of her age by defendant Frank Bacha, the former executive director of the Department of Public Works in the city of Taylor.
On August 31, 1998, the city hired a much younger man, Randy Wittner, as the new director of information systems. Plaintiff testified that many of her prior job duties were shifted to Wittner, and that she suffered a $15,000 reduction in income because she no longer received overtime pay.3
In late September 1998, Bacha went on leave, and then formally left his position on October 8, 1998. Bacha was apparently the subject of sexual harassment complaints from other women, and it was arranged for him to leave his job with the city of Taylor. After Bacha went on leave, plaintiff never saw him again.
Plaintiff testified that she became uncertain about her status at work in the fall of 1998. She attempted to meet with defendant Gregory Pitoniak, mayor of the city of Taylor, about her concerns, but he avoided meeting with her. Plaintiff repeatedly requested an "at will termination" by the city, which would have allowed her to receive 30 weeks' severance pay, but she testified that Pitoniak refused to discuss her requests.
Plaintiff went on vacation on November 24, 1998. While on vacation she decided that she could no longer work for the city. Plaintiff sent in her resignation on November 30, 1998, to be effective December 1, 1998. In her letter of resignation, plaintiff again requested that she be given severance pay.
On November 30, 2001, plaintiff filed a complaint against Pitoniak and Bacha.4 Plaintiff claimed quid pro quo sex discrimination, hostile work environment sex discrimination, age discrimination, breach of contract, and misrepresentation.
Defendants filed a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), asserting that plaintiff's suit was barred by the three-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5805(9). At the February 21, 2003, hearing on the motion for summary disposition, plaintiff conceded that all her claims, including her claims for breach of contract and misrepresentation, were governed by the three-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5805(9).
The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary disposition, concluding that plaintiff had three years from the last day that she worked, which was sometime between November 30, 1998, and December 3, 1998, to file suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order denying defendants' motion for summary disposition, finding that plaintiff's last day of work was November 30, 1998.5
Defendants then filed an application for leave to appeal in this Court. We ordered oral argument on the application, instructing the parties to address the following questions:
The parties shall submit supplemental briefs ... addressing: (1) what actions, if any, were taken by the two defendants after October 8, 1998, that contributed to a discriminatory hostile work environment, so as to support a December 1, 1998, date of injury; (2) whether a December 1, 1998, accrual date for injury to plaintiff is sustainable for defendant Frank Bacha, where he left his employment with the city of Taylor on October 8, 1998; and (3) the impact, if any, of this Court's decision in Magee v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 472 Mich. 108, 693 N.W.2d 166 (2005).[6]
This Court reviews de novo rulings on summary disposition motions, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.7 In the absence of disputed facts, whether a cause of action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo.8
All of plaintiff's claims against the defendants are subject to the three-year period of limitations in MCL 600.5805(9).9 The questions presented are on what dates did plaintiff's claims accrue, and when did the period of limitations begin to run.
The statute of limitations at issue, MCL 600.5805, provides that plaintiff's claims must be brought within three years of the date the claims accrued:
(1) A person shall not bring or maintain an action to recover damages for injuries to persons or property unless, after the claim first accrued to the plaintiff or to someone through whom the plaintiff claims, the action is commenced within the periods of time prescribed by this section.
* * *
(9) The period of limitations is 3 years after the time of the death or injury for all other actions to recover damages for the death of a person, or for injury to a person or property.
Furthermore, accrual under the three-year statute of limitations is measured by "the time the wrong upon which the claim is based was done regardless of the time when damage results."10
Thus, plaintiff's claims are barred by the statute of limitations unless they were brought within three years of the date the claims accrued, which is the date of the alleged wrongdoing.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals both relied on Jacobson, supra, and Collins v. Comerica Bank, 468 Mich. 628, 664 N.W.2d 713 (2003), to hold that the period of limitations began to run on plaintiff's last day of work. Both courts found that plaintiff's last day of work was not before November 30, 1998, and thus plaintiff's suit was timely filed within the three-year period of limitations.
The lower courts' reliance on Collins was erroneous. First, as we noted in Magee, supra, Collins involved a claim of discriminatory discharge motivated by race and gender animus, not a constructive discharge based on earlier discriminatory acts, as is the claim here.11 In Collins, after the plaintiff's employment was terminated by her employer, the plaintiff brought a claim of discriminatory discharge under the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq. There, this Court recognized that "a claim for discriminatory discharge cannot arise until a claimant has been discharged."12
But here plaintiff does not assert a claim of discriminatory discharge. Rather, plaintiff's Civil Rights Act claims and her breach of contract and misrepresentation claim are based on alleged discriminatory conduct that occurred before she resigned her position. Thus, unlike the situation in Collins, the adverse employment action alleged in this case did not coincide with the date of the termination of plaintiff's employment. Collins is inapposite.
This Court recently recognized in Magee, supra, the distinction between a constructive and a discriminatory discharge. When the plaintiff does not make a claim of discriminatory termination, the court must examine whether the discriminatory conduct occurred within the three years that preceded the filing of the complaint. In Magee, the plaintiff went on medical leave on September 12, 1998, and resigned on February 2, 1999. She never returned to work from her medical leave. On February 1, 2002, the plaintiff filed a civil rights claim against the defendant, alleging an assortment of age, sex, and hostile work environment claims. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition on the ground that the statute of limitations barred the plaintiff's claims, because the plaintiff alleged no discriminatory activity after September 12, 1998. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court by relying on Collins. It held that the plaintiff's suit was timely because she filed suit within three years of her resignation.
This Court reversed the Court of Appeals and distinguished Collins on the basis that the plaintiff in Magee did not allege a discriminatory discharge. Since she was not discriminatorily discharged by the defendant, and she could not allege any acts of discrimination within three...
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