Jolley v. Clay

Decision Date03 May 1982
Docket NumberNo. 13433,13433
PartiesLee JOLLEY and Marijane Jolley, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. J. R. CLAY, individually and as Personal Representative of the Estate of Dahlia Clay, deceased, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtIdaho Supreme Court

William A. Parsons of Parsons, Smith & Stone, Burley, for defendant-appellant.

Herman E. Bedke, Burley, for plaintiffs-respondents. BISTLINE, Justice.

I.

The pleadings of the parties to this action were superseded by a Pre-Trial Conference Order. The agreed facts included that Marijane Jolley, one of the plaintiffs, and J. R. Clay, the defendant, are the sole surviving children of Dahlia Clay, who at the time of her death owned the 20 acre parcel which was the subject of this law suit, and that J. R. Clay was the personal representative of Dahlia Clay's estate. 1 Plaintiffs' contentions were that they had entered into an oral contract with Dahlia Clay for the purchase of the 20 acre parcel for $10,000, and that they had paid thereon $5,500 and tendered to J. R. the $4,500 balance. Plaintiffs further contended that they had taken possession of the parcel pursuant to the oral agreement and made substantial improvements. J. R.'s contention, as pertinent to this appeal, was that the oral contract was invalid, "not having been reduced to writing pursuant to the requirements of Idaho Code § 9-503." Placed in issue, as recited in the pre-trial order, was the existence of the claimed oral contract, the partial payment of the purchase price, the taking of possession and the making of permanent and valuable improvements. The question placed before the trial court was whether equity and justice required the conveyance of the property to plaintiffs upon their paying the balance of $4,500, and whether the failure to reduce the contract to writing was a bar to plaintiffs' action.

In a one day trial the plaintiffs and two other witnesses testified. J. R. did not personally appear at the trial, and although subpoenaed by the plaintiffs during the noon recess, he had not yet appeared when plaintiffs rested their case. Upon plaintiffs' resting, J. R.'s counsel moved for an involuntary dismissal, which the court took under advisement and later denied. J. R.'s counsel stood on the motion, advising the court that he would not put on any case if the motion were denied. In entering his written order denying the motion for involuntary dismissal, the trial court allowed both parties time in which to argue the merits by way of memoranda and, in keeping with this Court's suggestion in Compton v. Gilmore, 98 Idaho 190, 560 P.2d 861 (1977), requested proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law from both parties, which request the parties complied with. Thereafter the district court prepared and entered its own Findings and Conclusions, which were favorable to the plaintiffs. As pertinent to the issues now presented to us those Findings are as follows:

"5. That in January, 1964, pursuant to an oral agreement or contract, Dahlia Clay sold the property in question to her daughter and son-in-law, Marijane Jolley and Lee Jolley, husband and wife, for the sum of $10,000.

"6. That the terms of such agreement are as follows: Pursuant to oral agreement Dahlia Clay sold the real property in question to her daughter and son-in-law, Marijane Jolley and Lee Jolley, husband and wife, for the sum of $10,000, payable without interest on an installment sale contract giving the purchasers immediate possession and with the purchasers paying the taxes, with payments to be made periodically, but with no exact payment schedule.

"7. That the $10,000.00 for the property was a fair price for the sale of the real property above described.

"8. That pursuant to the oral agreement, Marijane and Lee Jolley made the following payments to Dahlia Clay:

                April 4, 1965, paid by check  $  500.00
                July 29, 1965, paid by check     500.00
                December 30, 1966, paid by
                check                          1,000.00
                May 16, 1968, paid by check      450.00
                A check on the proceeds of
                the sale of a sleigh which
                the Jolleys had purchased
                was endorsed directly over
                to Dahlia Clay                 1,000.00
                Lee Jolley sold a horse
                named Bar Muff and this
                check was endorsed over to
                Dahlia Clay                      900.00
                Cash given to Dahlia Clay
                at various times               1,150.00
                                              ---------
                TOTAL:                        $5,500.00
                

"9. That prior to the conveyance of all the property from J. R. Clay to Dahlia Clay, the plaintiffs were in possession thereof as tenants, and after the major portion of the farm property was sold to Gaylord Phillips by Dahlia Clay and, pursuant to the above oral agreement, Marijane and Lee Jolley took possession of such property as owners and retained such possession continually for approximately 15 years and are still in possession of the premises in question.

"10. That Marijane and Lee Jolley, during this 15-year period, made the following valuable improvements on the property in reliance on the oral contract or agreement with Dahlia Clay: surveyed and fenced the land in conjunction with Gaylord Phillips; filed for and received a permit to drill a well on the premises; drilled a well and installed a pump; remodeled the barn from a milking parlor to a horse barn and built corrals to accommodate horses; put a new roof on the house; carpeted the house throughout; and remodeled the kitchen and bathroom.

"11. That the approximate value of these improvements was $10,000.00.

"12. That in further reliance on the oral agreement, the Jolleys paid the ad valorem taxes of Cassia County from 1964 to 1975 and tendered payment to Cassia County since the death of Dahlia Clay.

"13. That Dahlia Clay died on September 9, 1976, in Cassia County, Idaho, and at the time of her death she had not conveyed the real property in question to the Jolleys.

"14. That J. R. Clay was appointed personal representative of the Estate of Dahlia Clay. He refused to accept the tender of the balance of the purchase price of $4,500.00, and although demanded by the plaintiffs, refused to convey the real property to them as per the oral contract between Dahlia Clay and the Jolleys."

The Court's Conclusions of Law were:

"1. That the defendant is precluded from now interposing the statute of frauds as a defense, the defendant having allowed plaintiffs to rely on the oral sale to their detriment for some 15 years.

"2. That the occupancy of the land in question, the improvements by the plaintiffs, the payments to Dahlia Clay, the obtaining of a well permit, the obtaining of fire insurance, and the payment of taxes on the real property are all consistent with ownership of the land in question and in reliance on the oral contract of sale between the plaintiffs and Dahlia Clay.

"3. That the plaintiffs have met their burden of proof in proving that an oral contract existed between them and Dahlia Clay and in proving the material terms of such contract. That the proof has shown that the plaintiffs and Dahlia Clay understood the terms of their contract and that their minds met with respect thereto. That such parol contract has been proved sufficiently definite, certain, and complete in its material terms by the plaintiffs. That the Doctrine of Part Performance is applicable herein. This Court will thus exercise its equity jurisdiction by specifically decreeing specific performance of this oral contract.

"4. That the estate of Dahlia Clay, in fairness and in equity, will be required to specifically perform the contract to sell the land in question by accepting from the plaintiffs the unpaid balance of $4,500.00 and by then executing and delivering to the plaintiffs a deed on the real property in question conveying the same to the plaintiffs in fee simple." 2 Pertinent to our understanding of the theories of the parties, and consistent with J. R.'s non-appearance at trial against the estate of which he was personal representative and sole devisee as well, it is seen from his proposed findings and conclusions that he simply did not believe that Marijane and her husband could make out a case on the facts and the law. J. R. proposed a finding that Marijane and Lee's occupancy was that of tenants when they took possession in 1960; that Dahlia "may have had an intent to sell" the parcel in question, but that that intent was not reduced to writing, and that the conversations which formed the basis for the alleged contract were insufficient "to show an oral contract, complete, definite, and certain in all material terms." Another proposed finding was that the improvements made by Marijane and Lee were for their benefit or in the nature of good husbandry, and "not in reliance on any contract."

J. R.'s proposed conclusions were to the effect that the evidence did not establish an oral agreement, and for that reason the doctrine of part performance was not applicable. These contentions are continued on appeal, as is a contention made at trial that the testimony of the two independent witnesses, Mr. Phillips and Mrs. Bailey, violated the hearsay rule and was inadmissible. We turn to this contention at the outset, as J. R. is correct in labeling that testimony as essential to plaintiffs' case.

II.

Mr. Phillips and Mrs. Bailey testified as to what Dahlia Clay had said to them concerning the sale and purchase of the 20 acre parcel. J. R. argues that this testimony was the only proof that there was a sale and that it was for the price of $10,000. He urges upon us that absent such evidence, no case for specific performance was proven.

Mr. Phillips had purchased a ranch from Dahlia Clay in 1963, which property appears to have at one time encompassed the subject 20 acres. He was asked to state what was said at that time, and J. R.'s counsel interposed that:

"We object, Your Honor, on the basis that the conversation's hearsay and to any terms and conditions of the purchase that Mr. Phillips entered...

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