Jolley v. Vinton
| Decision Date | 11 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | AC 41989 |
| Citation | 229 A.3d 1198,196 Conn.App. 379 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | Carlton JOLLEY v. Captain VINTON et al. |
Carlton Jolley, self-represented, the appellant (plaintiff), filed a brief.
Janelle R. Medeiros, assistant attorney general, and William Tong, attorney general, filed a brief for the appellee (named defendant).
Lavine, Devlin and Bear, Js.
The self-represented plaintiff, Carlton Jolley, appeals from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant, Captain Brian Vinton, a former administrative captain at the Enfield Correctional Institution (Enfield), in this action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 alleging that the defendant retaliated against the plaintiff for providing legal advice to his fellow inmates while incarcerated at Enfield. Because we conclude that the trial court's finding that the plaintiff failed to prove a causal connection between his conduct and the alleged retaliation was not clearly erroneous, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts, as found by the trial court or as undisputed in the record, and procedural history are relevant. The plaintiff alleged that, at various times while incarcerated, he provided legal assistance to his fellow inmates. He further alleged that he primarily assisted with postconviction motions and petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In 2011, the defendant was an administrative captain at Enfield, where the plaintiff was then incarcerated. In that role, the defendant was responsible for investigating gang activity and security issues that threatened the safety of inmates or staff.
At some point prior to March 28, 2011, the defendant became aware that the plaintiff was providing legal assistance and had a reputation as a "jailhouse lawyer." Concerned that the plaintiff might have been using his legal work to smuggle contraband, the defendant alerted the warden to the plaintiff's activities and, together, they determined that the plaintiff's cell should be searched. On March 28, 2011, correction officers carried out a search of the plaintiff's cell and confiscated forty-one free postage legal mail envelopes, sixty-two plain white envelopes, seven homemade cassette tapes, four reams of typing paper, and twenty-six manila envelopes. A correction officer determined that all of the items seized were contraband and the plaintiff pleaded guilty to possessing contraband. Around this time, five large legal storage boxes were also seized from the plaintiff's cell. Inmates were limited to only two boxes in their cells. The plaintiff was instructed to examine the boxes to determine whether any of the contents pertained to active cases. The plaintiff was permitted to retain any of the contents regarding active cases with the caveat that if the contents exceeded two boxes, the excess would be stored elsewhere. All of the boxes not pertaining to active cases would be sent to the plaintiff's home address. Ultimately, three of the boxes were sent to the plaintiff's home.
In the spring of 2011, the plaintiff was working in the recreational office of Enfield's gym. Later that year, the defendant learned that the plaintiff was working multiple shifts per day in that position, which was unusual. The defendant was concerned that the plaintiff may have been using the multiple shifts either to have illicit contact with other inmates or to establish inappropriate relationships with the staff. Subsequently, on December 16, 2011, the plaintiff was removed from his job, as were three other inmates due to the length of time they had held those positions. The plaintiff was allowed to apply for another job after his removal and was later assigned to work as a janitor.
On July 29, 2011, the self-represented plaintiff commenced the present action against the defendant and Attorney General George Jepsen. The plaintiff sought monetary damages pursuant to § 1983 for alleged violations of his rights under the first, eighth, and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution. The trial court initially dismissed this action on grounds of statutory and sovereign immunity. See Jolley v. Vinton , 171 Conn. App. 567, 567, 157 A.3d 755 (2017). On appeal, this court affirmed the dismissal in regard to Attorney General Jepsen but reversed the dismissal as to the defendant. Id., at 567–68, 157 A.3d 755. After the case was remanded, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint on December 7, 2017, clarifying his claims against the defendant. In the amended complaint, the plaintiff alleged that he suffered retaliation for the exercise of his first amendment rights. Specifically, he claimed that the defendant ordered (1) the search of the plaintiff's cell, (2) the seizure of numerous items from the plaintiff's cell, and (3) the removal of the plaintiff from his job, in retaliation for the plaintiff's provision of legal advice to fellow inmates.
The trial court, Noble, J. , conducted a two day trial on July 10 and July 11, 2018. The court heard testimony from both the plaintiff and the defendant. In particular, the defendant testified that the alleged retaliatory actions were prompted by concerns for safety and security. According to the defendant, when inmates assist one another in legal matters, there is a potential for bribery or extortion to occur by using the personal information gathered while providing legal advice. In addition, the defendant testified that inmates often use legal work to disguise contraband. Moreover, the defendant testified that the items seized from the plaintiff's cell each posed potential dangers, as they could be used for bartering, concealing weapons and other contraband, or—in the case of the reams of paper—even used as a weapon. Likewise, in regard to the legal storage boxes, the defendant testified that those boxes pose a fire hazard and may be used to conceal contraband; hence, the inmates were prohibited from having more than two boxes in their cells. Lastly, the defendant recalled that he had the plaintiff removed from his job in accordance with an institutional policy of not allowing inmates to work in the same job for a long period of time. This policy, according to the defendant, arose from concerns that extended periods of work enhanced the risk that the supervising staff would become too comfortable and complacent with the inmates, which, in turn, could result in bribery, threats, or the smuggling of contraband. Further, the defendant testified that the plaintiff's removal from his job was not a disciplinary measure, and, therefore, the plaintiff was allowed to seek another job as soon as he was removed.
On July 11, 2018, the court issued its decision from the bench, rendering judgment in favor of the defendant. Specifically, the court found that the plaintiff had failed to prove that (1) he was engaged in an activity protected by the first amendment, (2) he was denied access to the courts in a specific, pending, personal action, and (3) there was any causal connection between his alleged protected conduct and the alleged retaliatory acts. This appeal followed.
Before turning to the claims on appeal, we set forth the applicable law governing first amendment retaliation claims and our scope and standard of review. "A first amendment retaliation claim under § 1983 requires that a prisoner establish three elements: (1) that the speech or conduct at issue was protected, (2) that the defendant took adverse action against the plaintiff, and (3) that there was a causal connection between the protected speech and the adverse action." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Townsend v. Hardy , 173 Conn. App. 779, 785–86, 164 A.3d 824, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 909, 170 A.3d 679 (2017). Failing to establish any of the three elements is fatal to a first amendment retaliation claim. See, e.g., id., at 787, 164 A.3d 824 (); Higginbotham v. Sylvester , 741 Fed. Appx. 28, 31–32 (2d Cir. 2018) (...
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