Joly v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Rutland

• Decision Date: 07 October 1947
• Citation: 55 A.2d 181,115 Vt. 174
• Parties: ROSE A. JOLY v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF RUTLAND
• Court: Vermont Supreme Court

55 A.2d 181

115 Vt. 174

ROSE A. JOLY v. COCA-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF RUTLAND

Supreme Court of Vermont

October 7, 1947

May Term, 1947.

Negligence.

1. Whether the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies to a particular case depends, to a great extent, upon the particular facts disclosed by the evidence in such case.

2. Where a plaintiff, a short time after receiving delivery of a bottle of Coca-Cola from the defendant and with no intervening change, suffered injuries due to explosion of the bottle, she was entitled to the benefit of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, it appearing that the only possible causes of the explosion were a defective bottle or undue pressure within the bottle and that the defendant had had exclusive control of the bottle and of the ingredients up to the time of delivery.

3. In determining whether the res ipsa loquitur doctrine shall apply to a given case regard must be had to management and control of the instrumentality, not at the time of the accident, but at the time of the occurrence of the negligence which led to the accident.

4. To justify reversal on the ground of improperly receiving evidence it must appear that the excepting party was injured thereby.

5. Where the trial court ordered a remittitur from $2,000.00 to $1,500.00, the defendants could not complain of error in such order as they were benefitted rather than injured thereby.

ACTION OF TORT. Trial by jury, Rutland County Court, March Term 1946, Hughes, J., presiding. Judgment for the plaintiff.

Judgment affirmed.

Clayton H. Kinney for the defendant.

Asa S. Bloomer for the plaintiff.

Present MOULTON, C. J., SHERBURNE, BUTTLES, STURTEVANT and JEFFORDS JJ.

OPINION

STURTEVANT

This is an action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, Rose A. Joly, as a result of being struck in the face by part of a Coca-Cola bottle which burst shortly after she had placed it in the refrigerator at the store where she was employed. The defendants pleaded the general issue and trial was by jury. The plaintiff had a verdict and judgment below and the case is here on exceptions by the defendants.

We first consider exceptions saved by defendants to the refusal of the court to grant their motion for a directed verdict made at the close of all the evidence. Briefly stated, this motion was on the grounds that there was no evidence in the case that the defendants were guilty of any negligence that was a proximate cause of the accident which resulted in injury to the plaintiff; and also that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, upon which the plaintiff relies, has no application to this case and that this appears from undisputed facts shown by the evidence.

Viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the jury could reasonably find the following facts from the evidence. At all times here material, the defendants operated a bottling plant in the City of Rutland where Coca-Cola, a well-known carbonated soft drink, was bottled and prepared for sale and distribution to the general public. On July 7, 1944, the plaintiff was in the employ of her uncle, Napoleon Joly, who operated a store at the corner of Harrison and Library Avenues in Rutland city. On that day Joly, the store owner, purchased two cases of Coca-Cola from the defendants. There were 24 bottles in each case and the cases contained a separate compartment for each bottle. This Coca-Cola was delivered at the store at about four o'clock p. m., by an employee of the defendants, carried from the truck into the store by him and left on the floor near the refrigerator. The plaintiff paid him for the goods and he left the store immediately. The day was cloudy and the temperature ranged from a high of 88 degrees to a low of 57 degrees. About ten minutes after the Coca-Cola had been delivered, the plaintiff started to place it in the refrigerator. She picked up one of the cases and placed it on the floor nearer to the refrigerator preparatory to transferring the bottles into the cooler. Taking the first bottle in her right hand she placed it on the bottom of the refrigerator near the door and was in the act of transferring a second bottle with her left hand when the first bottle exploded in such a manner that a part of that bottle struck her, cutting the side of her face. No one came into the store between the time of the delivery of the bottles and the time of the accident. She did not strike the bottle against anything or do anything to cause it to break. The laceration which plaintiff received on the side of her face was about two inches in length and left a permanent scar. As a result of her injury she lost about 2 1/2 hours from her work and her medical and hospital expenses for treatment did not exceed $ 25.00. After the explosion, the cap was found to be in place on the top of the bottle at the bottom of and inside the refrigerator. One of defendants' expert witnesses testified in cross examination that, assuming the plaintiff's testimony to be true, the cause of the explosion was either that the bottle was weak or abnormal or the internal pressure was too great. "It would have to be one or the other." This testimony was not disputed.

The defendants introduced evidence tending to show that due care was used by them in the selection and inspection of bottles used as well as in all other matters concerning the preparation of the bottles and their contents for delivery to the general public. A normal bottle of Coca-Cola manufactured by them has an internal pressure of from 52 1/2 pounds to 55 pounds per square inch. The pieces of the bottle were introduced in evidence by the plaintiff. One of the defendants' expert witnesses testified that the appearance of the top part of the bottle indicated to him that the bottle received a blow from some hard object just below the cap and it was his opinion that this blow cracked or weakened the bottle so that the internal pressure caused it to explode immediately upon receipt of such blow.

The plaintiff introduced no specific evidence tending to show that the defendants were negligent in the preparation and delivery of the bottle in question but rested her case on the showing that the explosion occurred under the circumstances as hereinbefore stated. That is, she relied upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to take her case to the jury. The defendants contend that this doctrine has no application here because it appears without question that at the time of the accident the bottle which exploded was in the control and possession of the plaintiff and that the defendants then had no control or management of it.

Speaking of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, this Court has stated the following: "Without attempting to formulate a rule embracing every case to which the maxim is to be applied, we think it clear, from the authorities cited, that when the defendant owes a duty to the plaintiff to use a certain degree of care in respect to the thing causing the accident, to prevent the occurence of such accident, and the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if those who have the management use proper care, it affords evidence, in the absence of evidence showing that it happened without the fault of the defendant, that the accident arose from the lack of requisite care. In such case, the occurrence itself, unexplained, shows prima facie a shortage of legal duty on the part of the defendant.

"This doctrine does not dispense with the rule that the party who alleges negligence must prove it, but, on the contrary, it only determines the mode of proving it, or what shall be prima facie evidence of negligence in a certain class of cases." Houston v. Brush & Curtis, 66 Vt. 331, 346, 29 A. 380, 384. Also see Desmarchier v. Frost, 91 Vt. 138, 144, 99 A. 782; Humphrey v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 100 Vt. 414, 423, 424, 139 A. 440, 56 ALR 1011.

"The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the plaintiff. " 38 Am Jur p. 995, § 299. Also see 45 CJ p. 1205, § 773, b.

In support of their contention that the res ipsa doctrine does not apply to the facts shown by the evidence in this case, the defendants have cited several A. L. R. annotations, viz., 4 ALR 1095; 8 ALR 500; 39 ALR 1006; 56 ALR 593 and LRA 1916 E, 1078. The defendants also cite several specific cases in their brief which will hereinafter be mentioned. As to the many cases included in this general citation, it is sufficient to state that an examination of all of them discloses that many do not apply here because the facts upon which they are turned do not square with the facts in the case at bar. While some of them support the defendants' contention, there are several others that support the plaintiff's claim. Because of conflicts in conclusions reached in these cases, no rule of general application can be deduced from them. Whether the maxim applies to a particular case depends, to a great extent, upon the particular facts disclosed by the evidence in such case. This is true because "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur... is not a rigid or arbitrary formula, but a rule that adjusts itself to circumstances". 45 CJ p. 1200, § 771 c; Goldman & Freiman Bottling Co. v. Sindell, 140 Md. 488, 117 A. 866 at 871.

When the facts in this case are considered in the light of the nature, purpose and foundation of the res ipsa doctrine reason and justice appear to dictate that this plaintiff should be entitled to the benefits of the maxim. This is so because the defendants, by methods known best to them,...