Jon v. Thaler
| Decision Date | 23 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | ACTION NO. H-10-3344 |
| Parties | ROY JON, TDCJ-CID NO. 626840, Petitioner, v. RICK THALER, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Texas |
Roy Jon, an inmate of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody (Docket Entry No. 1) challenging three prison disciplinary rulings against him. The respondent has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment with Brief in Support (Docket Entry No. 18) supported by TDCJ-CID records. After reviewing the pleadings and the records, the court has determined that the motion should be granted and this action should be dismissed.
Jon is serving a twenty-five-year sentence for delivery of a controlled substance, cocaine. State v. Jon, No. 241-0565-03 (114th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex., Aug. 20, 1992).(Respondent's Exhibit A, Docket Entry No. 18-1 at 2) A procedural history concerning appeal and post-conviction proceedings of a felony offense is not relevant because Jon does not attack the validity of his state court conviction. Instead, Jon's petition concerns three prison administrative disciplinary proceedings.
In the first proceeding (TDCJ-CID Disciplinary Case No. 20090312514), Jon was charged with and found guilty of refusing to work and was assessed the following punishments: (1) thirty days of commissary restriction, (2) thirty days of cell restriction, (3) a reduction in classification from Line Class 1 (LI) to Line Class 2 (L2), and (4) forfeiture of thirty days' good-time credit. (Respondent's Exhibit B, Docket Entry No. 18-2 at 3) Jon filed Step 1 and Step 2 Grievances, both of which were denied. (Respondent's Exhibit C, Docket Entry No. 18-3) The TDCJ-CID administration's response to the Step 2 Grievance was issued on September 18, 2009. Id.
In the second proceeding (TDCJ-CID Disciplinary Case No. 20100012220), Jon was charged with and found guilty of refusing or failing to obey orders and was assessed the following punishments: (1) thirty days of commissary restriction, (2) thirty days of cell restriction, and (3) forfeiture of thirty days' good-time credit. (Respondent's Exhibit D, Docket Entry No. 18-4) Jon's Step 1 and Step 2 Grievances were both denied. (Respondent's Exhibit E, Docket Entry No. 18-5) The response to the Step 2 Grievance was issued on December 2, 2009. Id.
In the third proceeding (TDCJ-CID Disciplinary Case No. 20100089247), Jon was again charged with and found guilty of refusing or failing to obey orders and was assessed the following punishments: (1) thirty days of commissary restriction, (2) thirty days of cell restriction, (3) thirty days of phone restriction, (4) reduction in classification from L2 to L3, and (5) forfeiture of sixty days' good-time credit. (Respondent's Exhibit F, Docket Entry No. 18-6) Jon's Step 1 and Step 2 Grievances were both denied. (Respondent's Exhibit G, Docket Entry No. 18-5) The response to the Step 2 Grievance was issued on February 1, 2010. Id.
Jon filed his federal habeas petition on August 20, 2010. See Starns v. Andrews, 524 F.3d 612, 616 (5th Cir. 2008). He asserts that his due process rights were violated because the TDCJ-CID officials failed to comply with TDCJ-CID regulations. (Docket Entry No. 1 at 10) Jon alleges the following deficiencies in his disciplinary proceedings:
Jon also contends that TDCJ-CID officials abused their authority by retaliating against him in violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id.
The respondent argues in his Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 18) that Jon's challenge regarding the loss of privileges, imposition of restrictions, and classification demotion in each case are not actionable under federal habeas law. The respondent also argues that Jon was afforded the constitutional rights to which he was entitled as a prisoner during the disciplinary proceedings and that his good-time credits were forfeited in compliance with the Due Process Clause. The respondent also asserts that the records indicate that there was sufficient evidence to support the disciplinary officer's findings of guilt in each case.
In response to Jon's complaint that he was denied effective counsel, the respondent points out that Jon does not have a constitutional right to appointed counsel. Moreover, the disciplinary cases were not complex, and generally they only involved a credibility dispute between Jon's testimony and that of the charging officer. Finally, the respondent argues that Jon failed to exhaust all of his claims before filing his federalhabeas petition, and that the unexhausted claims are subject to dismissal because Jon is now procedurally barred from presenting them.
Summary Judgment standards established under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply in habeas corpus cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Clark v. Johnson, 202 F.3d 760, 764 (5th Cir. 2000); McBride v. Sharpe, 25 F.3d 962, 969 (11th Cir. 1994). A summary judgment shall be issued if the pleadings and evidence "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Hall v. Thomas, 190 F.3d 693, 695 (5th Cir. 1999). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court construes factual controversies in the light most favorable to the non-movant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists. Lynch Properties, Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, 140 F.3d 622, 625 (5th Cir. 1998). The burden is on the movant to convince the court that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to the claims asserted by the non-movant, but the movant is not required to negate elements of the non-movant's case. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553 (1986).
The non-moving party may not rest solely on its pleadings. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 656 (5th Cir. 1992). For issues onwhich the non-movant will bear the burden of proof at trial, he must produce summary judgment evidence and designate specific facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Wallace v. Texas Tech. Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5th Cir. 1996). The non-movant "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986). To meet its burden, the non-moving party must present "significant probative" evidence indicating that there is a triable issue of fact. Conkling v. Turner, 18 F.3d 1285, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994). If the evidence rebutting the summary judgment motion is only colorable or not significantly probative, summary judgment should be granted. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986). A habeas petitioner cannot rely on "bald assertions on a critical issue in his pro se petition . . . mere conclusory allegations do not raise a constitutional issue in a habeas proceeding." Ross v. Estelle, 694 F.2d 1008, 1011-12 (5th Cir. 1983).
A petitioner's habeas challenge to a disciplinary hearing is not actionable in federal court if the outcome of the administrative proceeding does not adversely affect his release date. See Sandin v. Conner, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 2297 (1995); Luken v.Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995). A prisoner does not have many of the rights and privileges that a free citizen enjoys. Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765, 767 (5th Cir. 1997). In some instances, the state may create liberty interests that are protected by the Due Process Clause. Id. However, a prison inmate may only seek relief from disciplinary actions that impose "atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life." Sandin, at 2300.
Four of the five punishments issued in Jon's three disciplinary hearings (commissary restriction, cell restriction, phone restriction, and reduction in classification) did not impose an "atypical and significant" hardship on Jon. Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 958 (5th Cir. 2000); Madison, 104 F.3d at 768 ( ). Nor did they have a direct effect on his release date. See Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 1997); Luken v. Scott, 71 F.3d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1995); Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992). Only Jon's losses of good-time credits are subject to review in this federal habeas action. Houser v. Dretke, 395 F.3d 560 (5th Cir. 2004); Murphy v. Collins, 26 F.3d 541, 543 n.5 (5th Cir. 1994).
A petitioner is required to exhaust available state procedures before he may pursue habeas relief in federal court. See Wion v. Quarterman, 567 F.3d 146, 148 (5th Cir. 2009), citing Orman v. Cain...
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