Jonak v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co.
Decision Date | 04 January 1985 |
Docket Number | No. CV84-L-523.,CV84-L-523. |
Citation | 629 F. Supp. 90 |
Parties | Isadore JONAK and Marilyn Jonak, Plaintiffs, v. JOHN HANCOCK MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., Roger E. Johnon, and Daryl L. Nielsen, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Isadore Jonak and Marilyn Jonak, pro se.
John P. Heil of Baird, Holm, McEachen, Pedersen, Hamann & Strasheim, Omaha, Neb., for defendants.
Two motions to dismiss have been filed on behalf of the defendants, filings 8 and 9, on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and a motion for summary judgment, filing 14. The plaintiffs have filed a motion for summary or default judgment, filing 11. Although I recently have had occasion to consider the sufficiency of several complaints remarkably similar to the one here and have dismissed a similar complaint by these plaintiffs against different defendants, Jonak v. Sherman County Bank, CV84-L-522 (memorandum and order, January 3, 1985), I must address the present complaint on its own merits.
The focus of the complaint is a set of loans and security agreements between the plaintiffs and the defendant insurance company in 1974, 1978, and 1982. In addition to a variety of allegations about why the transactions are invalid or rescindable, the plaintiffs allege a threatened "nonjudicial foreclosure sale" without a hearing.
In ruling on a motion to dismiss, whether on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or for failure to state a cause of action, the allegations of the complaint must be construed favorably to the pleader, and the complaint should not be dismissed on the latter ground unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1686, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The burden of demonstrating the existence of federal jurisdiction is on the pleader. Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 33 (3d Cir.1980). However, when a statute provides the basis for both the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court and the plaintiff's substantive claim for relief, the claim may be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction—rather than for failure to state a claim—only when the allegations of the complaint are frivolous. Black v. Payne, 591 F.2d 83, 86 (9th Cir.1979). In regard to their motion for summary judgment, the defendants bear the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. All doubts are to be resolved against the moving party, and the non-moving party is to receive the benefit of all favorable inferences that reasonably may be drawn from the evidence. Walling v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir. 1943); Ramsouer v. Midland Valley R. Co., 135 F.2d 101, 106 (8th Cir.1943).
The plaintiffs purport to bring this action as a class action, claiming that they represent a class of farmers and farming corporations who have borrowed money from the defendants for the purpose of purchasing land and farm equipment and other agricultural and non-agricultural purposes. However, the complaint does not adequately allege the prerequisites to use of the class action required by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For instance, there is no allegation that the class of farmers borrowing from the defendants "is so numerous that joinder of all member is impracticable." Also, I cannot find that the plaintiffs, acting pro se, can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class, particularly in light of the manner in which the complaint was drafted. Therefore, I shall treat the complaint as affecting only the interests of the named parties.
In light of the facts pleaded, many of the cited grounds for relief are utterly lacking in merit, as I have said repeatedly in similar cases. Among the statutes upon which the plaintiffs rely are:
Many of these provisions have absolutely nothing to do with the facts alleged. Others provide rules of law which would be helpful to the plaintiffs' claims, except for the fact that their applicability is limited by express provisions or by context to subjects totally unrelated to the facts alleged in the complaint. In addition, the allegations concerning aspects of contract law, equity, and various other matters involving state statutory or case law are matters which state a claim, if at all, under state law, not federal law. As such, this court lacks jurisdiction over those claims absent diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. However, the complaint defeats diversity jurisdiction by alleging that the plaintiffs and at least one of the defendants are Nebraska residents. Nondiversity between any one plaintiff and any one defendant defeats diversity jurisdiction despite the diverse citizenships of other parties. Pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim requires the existence of a related federal claim.
The remaining federal statutes upon which the plaintiffs rely also are inapplicable, but I shall discuss them more fully.
Federal courts are willing to grant to farmers whatever relief the law allows. For example, several courts have enjoined the Secretary of Agriculture from foreclosing farm loans extended by the Farmers Home Administration because the Secretary had failed to develop a policy for deferring principal and interest payments or foregoing foreclosure, as required by 7 U.S.C. § 1981a. E.g., Allison v. Block, 723 F.2d 631 (8th Cir.1983); Coleman v. Block, 580 F.Supp. 194 (D.N.D.1984). However, § 1981a is expressly limited to loans "made, insured, or held by the Secretary under this chapter 7 U.S.C. Ch. 50, or under the provisions of any other law administered by the Farmers Home Administration." Nothing in the complaint or the attached exhibits indicates any material connection between the loans from the insurance company and any of the FmHA loan programs covered by § 1981a.
The plaintiffs allege that the defendants are subject to the rules and regulations established under the Farm Credit Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 2001 et seq., and, in particular, 12 C.F.R. § 614.4510(d). However, the...
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