Jonas v. Isuzu Motors Ltd.

Decision Date11 July 2002
Docket NumberNo. 5:00-CV-344-4 (WDO).,5:00-CV-344-4 (WDO).
Citation210 F.Supp.2d 1373
PartiesRegan H. JONAS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISUZU MOTORS LIMITED, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

W. Carl Reynolds, Macon, GA, Charles A. Lanford, Jr., Macon, GA, Kice H. Stone, Macon, GA, for plaintiff.

Andrew T. Bayman, Robert B. Friedman, King & Spalding, Atlanta, GA, for defendants.

ORDER

OWENS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs brought suit alleging strict liability, breach of warranty and negligence claims related to an accident involving a 1993 Isuzu Rodeo Diversity jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and Georgia law is the applicable substantive law of the case. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the punitive damages issue. Plaintiffs do not oppose summary judgment on the issue of punitive damages but do oppose summary judgment on all other claims. After carefully considering the entire record and the applicable law, the Court enters the following Order on the remaining claims.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following are the undisputed, material facts. On July 10, 1998 at approximately 3:15 p.m., Ollivant Jonas, Jr. was driving his family's 1993 Isuzu Rodeo on Highway 22 in Baldwin County, Georgia. At the time, Ollivant Jr. was 15 years old and was driving with a learner's permit. The other individuals in the Rodeo were Ollivant Jr.'s father, Ollivant Sr., Rita Jonas, Ollivant Jr.'s mother and Regan Jonas, Ollivant Jr.'s sister. The evidence shows Ollivant Jr. fell asleep at the wheel, drifted into oncoming traffic and lost control of the vehicle after it had already crossed over onto the shoulder on the opposite side of the road.1 Once the vehicle was on the opposite shoulder, it rolled over 4¼ times.2 Ollivant Jr. and Rita were thrown from the vehicle. Tragically, Ollivant Sr., Rita and Ollivant Jr. died in this accident.

The Plaintiffs are Regan Jonas, individually and as next of kin of Ollivant Jr., and Charles Lanford, as administrator of the estate of Ollivant Jr.3 The Defendants are various Isuzu entities. Plaintiffs contend the 1993 Isuzu Rodeo design was dangerously defective in that it had a high propensity to roll over and that this allegedly defective design caused the accident. Plaintiffs contend Defendants are liable based on theories of strict liability, negligence and breach of the warranty of merchantability. Defendants contend the evidence does not show the accident was proximately caused by any defect in the design of the Rodeo but was caused by the driver falling asleep at the wheel and losing control of the vehicle.

II. Summary Judgment Standard

In Celotex v. Catrett the Supreme Court explained the evidentiary standards parties must meet in order to succeed on or withstand a summary judgment motion. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (negligence, breach of warranty and strict liability claims based on plaintiff's exposure to products containing asbestos). "Under Rule 56(c), summary judgment is proper `if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and ... the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'" Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. "In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment ... against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."

"Rule 56(e) ... requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the `depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. The burden on the movant may then be discharged "by `showing' — that is, pointing out to the district court — that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Id. "Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed `to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.'" Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 1; 99 F.R.D. 465, 467 (1984)). Finally, summary judgment is appropriate where the causal connection between a defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury is too remote for the law to permit a recovery. See Tucker Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Balogh, 228 Ga.App. 482, 491 S.E.2d 915 (1997).

III. Substantive Claims
A. Strict Liability
In Georgia

The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.

O.C.G.A. § 51-1-11 (2001) (strict liability statute).4 "Under Georgia law, a product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling. If injury results from abnormal handling, the manufacturer is not liable." Argo v. Perfection Prods. Co., 730 F.Supp. 1109 (N.D.Ga.1989), aff'd, 935 F.2d 1295 (11th Cir.1991) (summary judgment to defendant where workers injured when propane gas heater exploded but safety valve was disabled and was not defective when manufactured) (citations omitted).

Manufacturers are liable only for foreseeable misuses of property. "Under Georgia law, `foreseeability means that which it is objectively reasonable to expect, not merely what might occur.'" Id. at 1117 (citing Greenway v. Peabody International Corp., 163 Ga.App. 698, 294 S.E.2d 541 (1982)). "No matter how negligent a party may be, if [their] act stands in no causal relation to the injury it is not actionable." Finney v. Machiz, 218 Ga.App. 771, 463 S.E.2d 60, 61 (1995) (vehicle's sudden collision with another vehicle was the proximate cause of the accident). "Strict liability is imposed for injuries which are the proximate result of product defects, not for the manufacture of defective products. Unless the manufacturer's defective product can be shown to be the proximate cause of the injuries, there can be no recovery." Talley v. City Tank Corporation, 158 Ga.App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 (1981).

One of the principal cases applying these standards under Georgia law is Banks v. ICI Americas, Inc., 264 Ga. 732, 450 S.E.2d 671 (1994) (risk-utility analysis is the appropriate standard for products liability cases). In Banks, the parents of a nine-year-old child who had died after eating rat poison brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of the poison. The Georgia Supreme Court held that "in design defect cases ... the court is called upon to supply the standard for defectiveness: the term `defect' in design defect cases is an expression of the legal conclusion to be reached, rather than a test for reaching that conclusion." Id. at 673 (citations omitted). This determination must incorporate a "balancing test whereby the risks inherent in a product design are weighed against the utility or benefit derived from the product." Id. The court noted that "although the benefits of safer products are certainly desirable, there is a point at which they are outweighed by the cost of attaining them." Id. at 674. "[I]t is only at their most extreme that design defect cases reflect the position that a product is simply so dangerous that it should not have been made available at all," therefore "the reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs and adopting the safest one if it is feasible is considered the `heart' of design defect cases." Id. "[L]iability for defective design attaches only when the plaintiff proves that the seller ... failed to adopt a reasonable, safer design that would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product." Id. at n. 4 (citation omitted). Finally, "under Georgia law a manufacturer is not an insurer that its product is, from a design viewpoint, incapable of producing injury." Id. at 675. See also Doyle v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelellschaft, 114 F.3d 1134 (11th Cir.1997) ("compliance with federal standards or regulations will not bar manufacturer liability for design defect"); Timmons v. Ford Motor Company, 982 F.Supp. 1475 (S.D.Ga.1997) (summary judgment granted for sport utility manufacturer where design was not proximate cause of crash where driver was driving 100 miles per hour) (citing Banks).

In the case at bar, the critical question is whether a design defect in the 1993 Isuzu Rodeo was the proximate cause of the roll-over accident. This question depends on whether the vehicle began to roll over while it was on the road — indicating a possible defect in the vehicle — or whether it began to roll over off the road — indicating driver error and negligence.5

Lt. Deason, the investigating officer, testified that the marks left by the Rodeo indicated the roll over began off the road because all of the marks were on the grass on the shoulder of the road. Lt. Deason drew a diagram of this on the police report. The police report is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8) because it was prepared from the officer's own personal observation of the scene.6

One of the eyewitnesses, Mr. Ezell Adams, was asked specifically about where the roll-over began and testified that the vehicle began to roll over off the road. Mr. Adams was in the best position of anyone to testify about the circumstances of the accident because his was the oncoming vehicle the Rodeo...

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    ...defective product can be shown to be the proximate cause of the injuries, there can be no recovery." Jonas v. Isuzu Motors Ltd., 210 F.Supp.2d 1373, 1377 (M.D.Ga.2002) (quoting Talley v. City Tank Corp., 158 Ga.App. 130, 279 S.E.2d 264, 269 The element of causation is also required in negli......
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