Jonathan M., In re

• Decision Date: 31 March 1981
• Docket Number: Cr. 37018
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re JONATHAN M., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. The PEOPLE, Petitioner and Respondent, v. JONATHAN M., a minor, Appellant.

Page 833

172 Cal.Rptr. 833

117 Cal.App.3d 530

In re JONATHAN M., A Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

The PEOPLE, Petitioner and Respondent, v. JONATHAN M., a minor, Appellant.

Cr. 37018.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

March 31, 1981.

Hearing Denied May 27, 1981.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, and Diane M. L. Tan, Deputy State Public Defender, for appellant.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard J. Schwab and Anthony D. Blankley, Deputy Attys. Gen., for petitioner and respondent.

LILLIE, Associate Justice.

The minor appeals from disposition order entered on order sustaining petition charging unlawful driving and taking a motor vehicle. (§ 10851, Veh. Code.)

On the night of November 2 Mrs. Lopez' locked 1963 Chevrolet was stolen from its parking place; two days later it was returned to her with a damaged left windwing and a different ignition key.

At 3:30 a. m. on November 3 Officers Anderson and Henson riding in a patrol car observed a car containing five young people, 15 or 16 years old, stopped at a red light; driving in the opposite direction, they pulled up alongside of the vehicle and looked in; Officer Anderson observed the driver and seated next to him the minor and in the rear seat a girl and two males; the driver's windwing of the vehicle was damaged; Officer Henson directed the spotlight into the vehicle, and the minor ducked down in the front seat and put his arm up over his head bringing his jacket with it trying to shield himself from the view of the officers; the light changed and the driver made a hard right turn and accelerated driving away at a high rate of speed; they turned around and pursued the vehicle; as they drove around a brick building, they saw all of the occupants jump out of the car while it was still in motion and run in all directions leaving the car to continue down the street unoccupied with the engine still running; the vehicle hit the curb and Officer Anderson jumped in, brought it to a stop and parked it; he tried to pull out the ignition key but could not and left the vehicle with the key still in it to pursue its occupants; he started a small foot search but found no one.

In the patrol car he and Officer Henson circled the block and saw a male standing on the corner; they stopped to talk to him and recognized him as the minor who had been seated in the front passenger seat of the car; in casual conversation the minor told them he was waiting for a friend; they did not arrest him at the time but drove away keeping him under observation in the rear view mirror to determine if his friend was one of the others in the car; they watched the minor walk up the alley toward the abandoned car; when they approached it they saw the minor, and while they could not be sure "whether he was leaning in the car, or what," they did see him standing next to the open driver's window with his right side to the car. Officer Anderson exited the patrol car to conduct an investigation; the minor was not free to leave; as he started to ask the minor preliminary questions such as his name and where he was going, he looked into the car and saw the ignition key was missing; he searched the minor's pockets for the key and found it in his right jacket pocket; the minor was arrested. After being advised of and having waived his Miranda rights the minor told Officer Anderson that he was not driving the car but that the key was his, he knows it is wrong to steal and he had been recently arrested in Gardena for joyriding.

In his defense the minor testified he was waiting at a bus stop after visiting a friend and observed the car with its occupants and the police direct a spotlight inside and pursue the car; the police circled the block, stopped and talked to him; he told them he had just come from a friend's house; then he became curious and walked to the abandoned car but took nothing from it; on his return to the bus stop he was stopped by the officers; Officer Anderson said nothing, went to the abandoned car, returned, handcuffed him, searched every pocket and came up with a key which was planted in his pocket; Officer Henson struck him numerous times with his flashlight. He denied giving any statement to anyone about driving or riding in the car but admitted he had been arrested for joyriding in Gardena; he never rode in the abandoned car.

The minor moved to suppress the key on the ground of unlawful search. The court denied the motion citing the testimony of Officer Anderson. Appellant challenges the legality of the search of his pockets on the ground it was not a pat-down search for weapons but an exploratory search and conducted prior to an arrest for which there was no probable cause. We conclude on the foregoing evidence viewed in a light most favorable to the court's order denying motion to suppress the key (In re Roderick P., 7 Cal.3d 801, 809, 103 Cal.Rptr. 425, 500 P.2d 1) that before the search of the minor's pockets the officer had probable cause to arrest him and although the search preceded the arrest it was substantially contemporaneous therewith and incident to a lawful arrest.

First, Officer Anderson had reasonable cause to believe a crime had been committed, i. e., the vehicle had been stolen. He first saw the car full of teenagers stopped for a red light at 3:30 a. m.; the windwing had been broken, a common means of entry to a locked vehicle; when the light changed the driver accelerated and sped away from the police car; he pursued the vehicle and observed the occupants abandon the car by jumping out of it while it was still moving and fleeing in all directions; obviously the ignition key did not belong to the vehicle because he could not easily remove it at the time he parked it.

Second, at the time Officer Anderson approached the minor who was standing against the driver's open window of the vehicle, and questioned him he properly detained him. The record reflects the existence at that time of suspicious and articulable facts which reasonably caused Officer Anderson to believe that some activity out of the ordinary had taken place, it was related to crime and the minor was connected with it (People v. Bower, 24 Cal.3d 638, 644, 156 Cal.Rptr. 856, 597 P.2d 115); and that Officer Anderson personally entertained such suspicions and these were subjectively reasonable. (In re Tony C., 21 Cal.3d 888, 893, fn.2, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) The minor had been seated with the driver in the front seat of the car; he had tried to duck down and shield himself from view of the officers when the spotlight was directed to the interior of the vehicle; he abandoned the car while it was still in motion and fled from the scene; he hung around in the area until he thought the officers had gone then returned to the abandoned car; he was seen leaning into the open driver's window or standing by it. The legality of the detention is manifest.

Third, when Officer Anderson observed that the ignition key which he left in the vehicle had been removed, he had reasonable cause to believe that the minor had committed an offense. " 'Cause for arrest exists when the facts known to the arresting officer "would lead a man of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that the person is guilty of a crime. " (Citations.)' " (People v. DeVaughn, 18 Cal.3d 889, 895, 135 Cal.Rptr. 786, 558 P.2d 872.) Each case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. (People v....