Jonathan R. v. Justice

Decision Date20 July 2022
Docket Number21-1868
Citation41 F.4th 316
Parties JONATHAN R., minor, BY Next Friend, Sarah DIXON; Anastasia M., minor, by Next Friend, Cheryl Ord; Serena S., minor, by Next Friend, Sarah Dixon; Theo S., minor, by Next Friend, L. Scott Briscoe; Garrett M., minor, by Next Friend, L. Scott Briscoe; Gretchen C., minor, by Next Friend, Cathy L. Greiner; Dennis R., minor, by Next Friend, Debbie Stone; Chris K., Calvin K., and Carolina K., minors, by Next Friend, Katherine Huffman; Karter W., minor, by Next Friend, L. Scott Briscoe; Ace L., minor, by Next Friend, Isabelle Santillion; and individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. Jim JUSTICE, in his official capacity as the Governor of West Virginia; Bill Crouch, in his official capacity as the Cabinet Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources ; Jeremiah Samples, in his official capacity as the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Resources; Linda Watts, in her official capacity as the Commissioner of the Bureau for Children and Families; West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, Defendants - Appellees. Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs; National Association of Counsel for Children; Children's Advocacy Institute; Advokids; Youth Law Center; National Center for Youth Law; Mountain State Justice; National Center on Adoption and Permanency; Child and Disability Non-governmental Organizations, Amici Supporting Appellants.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

ARGUED: Marcia Robinson Lowry, A BETTER CHILDHOOD, New York, New York, for Appellants. Philip Peisch, BROWN & PEISCH PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Richard W. Walters, J. Alexander Meade, SHAFFER & SHAFFER, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellants. Steven R. Compton, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF WEST VIRGINIA, Charleston, West Virginia; Caroline M. Brown, Julia M. Siegenberg, Kendra Doty, BROWN & PEISCH PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. Tobias S. Loss-Eaton, Mark P. Guerrera, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, Washington, D.C., for Amici Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, National Association of Counsel for Children, Children's Advocacy Institute, Advokids, Youth Law Center, National Center for Youth Law, Mountain State Justice, and the National Center for Adoption and Permanency. Jonathan M. Smith, Kaitlin Banner, Marja Plater, WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Washington Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs. Amy C. Harfield, Children's Advocacy Institute, UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO SCHOOL OF LAW, San Diego, California, for Amicus Children's Advocacy Institute. Lydia C. Milnes, MOUNTAIN STATE JUSTICE, INC., Morgantown, West Virginia, for Amicus Mountain State Justice. J. Michael Showalter, James D. Cromley, SCHIFF HARDIN LLP, Chicago, Illinois, for Amici Child and Disability Non-Governmental Organizations.

Before HARRIS and RUSHING, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in which Judge Harris joined. Judge Rushing wrote a separate opinion dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment.

FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge:

This case brought on behalf of thousands of West Virginia's foster children challenges the State's administration of child welfare services. Plaintiffs describe an ineptly structured program, beleaguered city employees trying their best to provide necessities while plagued with unmanageable caseloads, staff shortages, and budgetary constraints, and the resultant tragedies for West Virginia's children relegated to entire childhoods in foster-care drift. But this appeal is not about any of that. Invoking Younger v. Harris , 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the court below abstained from hearing the case in deference to parallel state-court proceedings. Because West Virginia courts retain jurisdiction over foster children until they leave state custody, the court reasoned, any federal intervention into that process would undermine our fundamental notions of comity and federalism and reflect negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitutional principles.

We reverse. In this case, principles of federalism not only do not preclude federal intervention, they compel it. Plaintiffs bring federal claims, and federal courts "are obliged to decide" them in all but "exceptional" circumstances. Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs , 571 U.S. 69, 72, 73, 134 S.Ct. 584, 187 L.Ed.2d 505 (2013) (citation omitted). And this case presents none of those circumstances.

But our decision is based on more than mere syllogism. Younger 's narrow scope safeguards Plaintiffs' rights, bestowed on them by Congress in the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, to present their claims to a federal tribunal. 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Plaintiffs allege that a federal class action is the most—if not the only—effective way to achieve the kind of systemic relief they seek. And history builds out those allegations. For years, West Virginia's response to any foster-care orders entered as part of the individual state hearings seems to have been to shuffle its money and staff around until the orders run out, entrenching rather than excising structural failures. See In re Carlita B. , 185 W.Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365, 375 (1991) (lamenting, as far back as 1991, the foster children "left to languish in a limbo-like state during a time most crucial to their human development"); State v. Michael M. , 202 W.Va. 350, 504 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1998) (reiterating the court's "frustration over any unwarranted delays caused by the" State (emphasis omitted)); In re Brandon H.S. , 218 W.Va. 724, 629 S.E.2d 783, 786, 789–90 (2006) (still deploring the State's inability to "solv[e] the staffing crisis"). Forcing Plaintiffs to once more litigate their claims piecemeal would get federalism exactly backwards.

I.
A.

West Virginia entrusts to its Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR or the Department) the care of all children in the custody of the State. W. Va. Code Ann. § 49-4-113(a)(b). Roughly 90% of those children come to the Department by way of traditional abuse-and-neglect proceedings following parental maltreatment. J.A. 210–11, 13. But 10% are adjudicated into its custody through juvenile delinquency and status-offense hearings, the state courts possessing authority to place children in the Department's care when they require a middle ground between in-home supervision and full-fledged imprisonment. See W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 49-4-706(a)(3), 49-4-708(a)(4).

But regardless of how a child becomes a ward of the Department, the State bears the same responsibility to "determine the safety of the child, the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, the extent of compliance with the case plan, and the extent of progress which has been made toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement in foster care." Id. § 49-4-110(a); see also id. §§ 49-4-406(a), (b), (d)(2)(4), 49-4-712(a), 49-4-714(f). That is, as far as the State is concerned, all children within the Department's guardianship are "foster children" and the Department must mete out appropriate care to them all. See Resp. Br. 4 & n.1 (citing DHHR, Foster Care Policy (Aug. 2021), https://dhhr.wv.gov/bcf/policy/Documents/Foster%20Care%20Policy%20August%202021%20%281%29.pdf).

But the buck does not stop with the Department; state circuit courts conduct "quarterly status reviews" to ensure the Department places children "in the least restrictive setting available" and generally acts in their "best interests."

W. Va. Code Ann. §§ 49-4-110(a), 49-4-404(a), 49-4-604(a)(2), 49-4-714(b). Broadly speaking, the courts "examine the proposed case plan," "determine if the department has made reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency plan," approve out-of-state placements, and review "[t]he appropriateness of the current educational setting" and any "[s]ervices required to meet the child's needs." Id. §§ 49-4-108, 49-4-408(b), 49-4-608(b), (d)(e).

To sum up, the Department maintains responsibility for planning and delivering the care, the circuit courts for supervising it.

However effective this arrangement appears on paper, Plaintiffs assert the Department has made a mockery of it in practice. Rather than take children away from abuse and neglect, Plaintiffs charge, the Department only compounds it. It houses children in inadequate and outright dangerous environments, deprives them of badly-needed social and mental-health services, and, when all else fails—which it often does in West Virginia—simply institutionalizes the children for years, segregating them from the outside world at the time socialization matters most.

Take just two of the named Plaintiffs. Jonathan, fifteen at the time of filing, had suffered repeated physical, sexual, and emotional abuse at the hands of his biological parents. When he became suicidal and aggressive, they voluntarily gave him up for adoption. And though the Department was aware of the circumstances, it did nothing to vet their decision—or the adoptive parents who soon committed Jonathan to a psychiatric hospital. When Jonathan returned from the hospital, so did the abuse, prompting several calls from mandatory school reporters. Still, the Department did not intervene. Only when Jonathan was locked away in the psychiatric hospital for the second time—now, on his adoptive parents' accusations that he had sexual contact with another child—did the Department step in. But it made no effort to place Jonathan in a foster home, simply parking him at an out-of-state facility in Georgia. After Georgia came Nashville and its mandatory treatment for adjudicated juvenile sex offenders, never mind that no one had investigated the adoptive...

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