Jones Cnty. v. Estate of Bright
| Decision Date | 17 November 2022 |
| Docket Number | 2021-IA-00631-SCT |
| Parties | JONES COUNTY, CITY OF ELLISVILLE, AND LAUDERDALE COUNTY v. ESTATE OF JADA BRIGHT AND ON BEHALF OF THE WRONGFUL DEATH BENEFICIARIES OF JADA BRIGHT |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi |
MARY LEE HOLMES
MARCUS ALAN McLELLAND
BEFORE KING, P.J., COLEMAN AND BEAM, JJ.
¶1. After being arrested twice in a two-day span, once in Lauderdale County and once in Jones County, for being suspected of driving under the influence and public intoxication, Shelley Rose allegedly drove a rental van the wrong way down Interstate 59 in Pearl River County. A motor vehicle collision ensued, killing Jada Bright. On January 30, 2020, Plaintiff Estate of Jada Bright (Bright) filed a wrongful death suit in Pearl River County Circuit Court against Defendants Estate of Shelley E. Rose; EAN Holdings, LLC; Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC; Elco Administrative Services Company; Enterprise Holdings, Inc.; National Car Rental System, Inc.; Lauderdale County; Jones County; City of Ellisville; Beech's Towing &Recovery LLC; ABC 1-5; and John Does 1-5, and asserted that venue was proper per Mississippi Code Section 11-11-3 (Rev. 2019) because the claim arose out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred in Pearl River County.
¶2. Defendants Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville, filed motions to change venue, alleging that they had not been sued in the proper venue, based on the specific venue statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2019), of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. The circuit court directed the parties to supplement their briefing on the change of venue issue, and the motions were ultimately denied. Aggrieved, Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville petitioned for an interlocutory appeal arguing that venue in the Circuit Court of Pearl River County was improper and that the case should be transferred either to Jones County or Lauderdale County.
¶3. We reverse the circuit court's judgment denying the change of venue motions, and we remand the case with instructions to transfer venue either to Jones County or Lauderdale County.
¶4. On November 19, 2018, Shelley Rose rented a Dodge Caravan from EAN Holdings, LLC; Enterprise Leasing Company-South Central, LLC; Elco Administrative Services Company; Enterprise Holdings, Inc; and/or National Car Rental System, Inc. The next day, deputies with the Lauderdale County Sheriff's Department responded to a call at TravelCenters of America Truck Stop in Meridian, Mississippi, concerning a suspected impaired driver in a vehicle matching the description of the rental car Rose had rented. Witnesses claimed they had been run off the road by the driver of the car and that the car hit a pole in the parking lot of the truck stop. Deputies reached the driver of the car and found her exhibiting signs of intoxication. Rose was taken to the Lauderdale County Detention Center, was booked around 4:24 p.m., and was charged with DUI 4 and later released from custody around 10:23 p.m. of the same day.
¶5. On November 21, 2018, Ellisville Police Department received a report of a suspicious woman attempting to break into vehicles at a local gas station. Captain Wayne McLemore responded to the call and found an intoxicated Rose. She was charged with public intoxication and transported to the Jones County jail at around 9:48 a.m. Rose remained in jail until 11:00 p.m., when she was transported to the Ellisville Police Department and released on bond. Ellisville police drove Rose to a towing service, where she arranged to retrieve her rental vehicle just as she had done after her arrest in Lauderdale County
¶6. The next morning, November 22, 2018, while driving the rented Dodge Caravan in Pearl River County, Rose, while impaired, traveled north in the southbound lane of I-59 and collided head-on with a vehicle driven by Jada Bright, who died at the scene of the accident.
¶7. "The determination for proper venue is governed by statute." Miss. Crime Lab. v. Douglas, 70 So.3d 196, 202 (¶ 16) (Miss. 2011); see also Park on Lakeland Drive, Inc. v. Spence, 941 So.2d 203, 206 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2006) . The application of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and its venue statute is a question of law, to which the Mississippi Supreme Court applies de novo review. Miss. Dep't of Hum. Servs. v. S.C., 119 So.3d 1011, 1013 (Miss. 2013); City of Jackson v. Harris, 44 So.3d 927, 931 (Miss. 2010). Indeed, it is well established that "statutory interpretation is a matter of law which this Court reviews de novo." Adams v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp.-DeSoto, Inc., 965 So.2d 652, 655 (Miss. 2007) (citing Franklin Collection Serv., Inc. v. Kyle, 955 So.2d 284, 287 (Miss. 2007)).
¶8. The Estate of Jada Bright has asserted monetary damages claims against Jones County, Lauderdale County, and the City of Ellisville. The claims are exclusively governed by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, Mississippi Code Sections 11-46-1 to -23 (Rev. 2019). Mississippi Code Section 11-46-7(1) provides:
(2) The remedy provided by this chapter against a governmental entity or its employee is exclusive of any other civil action or civil proceeding by reason of the same subject matter against the governmental entity or its employee or the estate of the employee for the act or omission which gave rise to the claim or suit; and any claim made or suit filed against a governmental entity or its employee to recover damages for any injury for which immunity has been waived under this chapter shall be brought only under the provisions of this chapter, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-7(1) (Rev. 2019).
¶9. The tort claims act is to "be interpreted as expressly written or by necessary implication in order to carry out the Legislature's intent to strictly limit the State's waiver of state sovereign immunity." Knight v. Miss. Transp. Comm'n, 10 So.3d 962, 967 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009), overruled on other grounds by Little v. Miss. Dep't of Transp., 129 So.3d 132 (Miss. 2014). All parties agree that the Mississippi Tort Claims Act controls here.
¶10. The specific venue provision of the tort claims act states:
(2) The venue for any suit filed under the provisions of this chapter against the state or its employees shall be in the county in which the act, omission or event on which the liability phase of the action is based, occurred or took place. The venue for all other suits filed under the provisions of this chapter shall be in the county or judicial district thereof in which the principal offices of the governing body of the political subdivision are located. The venue specified in this subsection shall control in all actions filed against governmental entities, notwithstanding that other defendants which are not governmental entities may be joined in the suit, and notwithstanding the provisions of any other venue statute that otherwise would apply.
Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-46-13(2) (Rev. 2019) (emphasis added).
¶11. "[T]his venue is controlling over all other venue statutes and defendants in the suit." S.C., 119 So.3d at 1013 (¶ 7). The Court's role "is not to decide what a statute should provide, but to determine what it does provide." Lawson v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 75 So.3d 1024, 1027 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2011). The Court examines the statute and linguistic choices as a whole, not looking to the words in isolation. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 340 (2000); In re Settoon Towing, L.L.C., 859 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2017). "If the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the Court applies the plain meaning of the statute and refrains from using principles of statutory construction." Lawson, 75 So.3d at 1027. On the other hand, if a statute is ambiguous or silent, statutory interpretation is warranted. Miss. Methodist Hosp. & Rehab. Ctr., Inc. v. Miss. Div. of Medicaid, 21 So.3d 600, 607 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2009).
¶12. "When shall is used in a statute, the word 'shall' is mandatory and the word 'may' is discretionary." King v. Miss. Dep't of Child Prot. Servs. (In re Int. of E.K.), 249 So.3d 377, 383 (¶ 21) (Miss. 2019) (citing In re Int. of D.D.B. v. Jackson Cnty. Youth Ct., 816 So.2d 380, 382 (¶ 7) (Miss. 2002)). "When an action is filed laying venue in the wrong county, the action shall not be dismissed, but the court, on timely motion, shall transfer the action to the court in which it might properly have been filed and the case shall proceed as though originally filed therein." Miss. R. Civ. P. 82(d). Here, the circuit court could have applied the more specific venue statute of the Mississippi Tort Claims Act and transferred venue to a proper county while not extinguishing the wrongful death claim.
¶13. Instead, the circuit court declined to apply the specific venue statute found in Section 11-46-13(2) and rather declined to apply any venue statute and determined that because Mississippi's wrongful death statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-7-13, requires but one...
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