Jones-Cruz v. Rivera
| Decision Date | 14 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19 Civ. 6910 (PGG) |
| Parties | DEBRA JONES-CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. VICTOR RIVERA, individually and in his capacity as VP Local 1199 SEIU; LOCAL 1199 SEIU; and BROOKDALE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Debra Jones-Cruz is a physician assistant at Defendant Brookdale University Hospital Medical Center (the "Hospital"), where she is a member of Defendant Local 1199 SEIU (the "Union"). In this action, Plaintiff alleges that the Union and its vice president, Victor Rivera (together, the "Union Defendants"), and the Hospital, discriminated against her on the basis of her race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981; the New York State Human Rights Law (the "NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(c); and the New York City Human Rights Law (the "NYCHRL"), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-107(1)(c). Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Rivera tortiously interfered with her employment contract. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 7)) Jurisdiction is premised on federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (Id. ¶1)
The Union Defendants and the Hospital have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. Nos. 40, 34) For the reasons stated below, Defendants' motions to dismiss will be granted.
For the past ten years, Plaintiff has worked as a physician assistant in the Hospital's Department of Neurology. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 7) ¶¶ 5-6, 10) Plaintiff is responsible for "administering drugs on stroke patients, responding to stroke codes, neuro assessments, and attending to neurological emergencies." (Id. ¶ 11) Three other physician assistants work in the Neurology Department. All of the physician assistants report to the Supervising Neurologist and all work at both the Hospital and two adjacent nursing homes. (Id. ¶¶ 12-14) Plaintiff is Black; two of the other physician assistants are White; and one of the physician assistants is Indian. (Id. ¶ 15)
Plaintiff and her physician assistant colleagues are represented by the Union. (Id. ¶ 8)
Plaintiff's allegations regarding discriminatory treatment arise from the four physician assistants' work schedules. According to Plaintiff, the night shift is preferable: "the number of emergencies and [stroke] code[s] are not as high and the modalities of the job do not involve[] as much stress compared to the [day] shift." (Id. ¶ 34) The "[n]ight shift also pays more" than the day shift. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that - due to Defendant Rivera's intervention - only White physician assistants are assigned to night shifts, while "minority Physician Assistants" such as Plaintiff "have all now been confined to the day shift." (Id. ¶¶ 34-36, 38)
When the Hospital first hired Plaintiff, she worked three days a week, twelve hours a day, and one weekend day once a month. There was no night shift. (Id. ¶¶ 16-18)
At some point not specified in the Complaint, New York State began requiring stroke centers such as that operated at the Hospital to offer 24-hour service for stroke victims. Accordingly, the Neurology Department adjusted work schedules to provide for physicianassistant coverage 24 hours a day, seven days a week. (Id. ¶¶ 19-20) The Chair of the Neurology Department asked Plaintiff to create a work schedule "to incorporate day and night shifts to meet departmental clinical needs." (Id. ¶ 23) In October 2018, Plaintiff was chosen - "based on her seniority and experience" - to manage the work schedule for the Neurology Department physician assistants. (Id. ¶ 25)
According to Plaintiff, by February 2019, the two White physician assistants became "antagonistic" and "defian[t]" towards Plaintiff in connection with their work schedules, leading to "internal disagreement" in the department. The Neurology Department administrator then assumed control over the physician assistants' work schedules. (Id. ¶¶ 26-27) Among other changes, the department administrator scheduled all physician assistants to work every other weekend. (Id. ¶28)
In April 2019, all of the Neurology Department physician assistants met with the Hospital's management to discuss a new scheduling system. The Hospital and the physician assistants agreed that "the physician assistants would self-schedule" in order of seniority, and would rotate overseeing the master work schedule on a monthly basis. (Id. ¶¶ 29-31, 39)
The Complaint alleges that after this agreement was reached, one of the White physician assistants asked Defendant Rivera to intervene with the Hospital's management to help the White physician assistants obtain a more favorable work schedule.1 (Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 35) Rivera is White Hispanic, and is vice president of the Union. (Id. ¶¶ 7, 32) Rivera used his position in the Union to obtain a meeting with the Chair of the Neurology Department and William Bilfuco - part of the Hospital's management - to address the physician assistants' workschedule. (Id. ¶¶ 33-37) Although the Chair of the Neurology Department "requested . . . for Plaintiff to work nights," and Bilfuco "indicated he would follow seniority rule and give Plaintiff preference to select [her] schedule as required by policy," Rivera nonetheless changed the work schedule to benefit White physician assistants and disadvantage non-White physician assistants, "who have all now been confined to the day shift." (Id. ¶¶ 36-38)
In addition to "favoring and allowing the schedule preferences of White Physician Assistants," Rivera "spoke to Plaintiff in a condescending and insulting manner . . . when he was challenged on his pro[-]White policy," and "isolated" her with his "challenges and antagonistic attitude." (Id. ¶¶ 41-43) As a result, Plaintiff suffered "physical stress, heart palpitations, emotional distress and dizziness whenever she went to work." (Id. ¶ 44)
In response to Rivera's scheduling change, Hospital "staff draft[ed] a petition to condemn [his] bigoted interference in the scheduling process for [p]hysician [a]ssistants in the Neurology Department." (Id. ¶ 45) The Complaint alleges that Hospital management told Plaintiff that "Rivera . . . insisted on changing the schedules" to benefit "his preferred constituency, the White Physician Assistants," and that management acquiesced when Rivera injected race into the scheduling process. (Id. ¶¶ 46-49)
The Complaint was filed on July 24, 2019,2 and alleges that all Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of her race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, the NYSHRL, and the NYCHRL. (Id. ¶¶ 51-58) The Complaint further alleges that Defendant Rivera committed tortious interference with contract. (Id. ¶¶ 59-60)
The Union Defendants and the Hospital have moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. Nos. 34, 40)
"To survive a motion to dismiss [pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)], a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "In considering a motion to dismiss[,] . . . the court is to accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint," Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 237 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Dougherty v. Town of N. Hempstead Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 282 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 2002)), and must "draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Id. (citing Fernandez v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 2006)).
A complaint is inadequately pled "if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement,'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557), and does not provide factual allegations sufficient "to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
"[A] plaintiff alleging employment discrimination or retaliation is not required to plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case," however. Krasner v. HSH Nordbank AG, 680 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (). Instead, as the Swierkiewicz Court explained, the "ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of a complaint" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)'s notice pleading standard apply. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.
Under this standard, a plaintiff is required only to set forth a "short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a), with sufficient factual "heft 'to sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in Twombly) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative level," id. at 555, and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face." Id. at 570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
"Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.'" Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). And where "the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, the[ ] complaint must be dismissed." Id. at 570.
"In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a district court may consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the...
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