Jones' Estate, Matter of, 9668
| Decision Date | 14 February 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 9668,9668 |
| Citation | 288 N.W.2d 758 |
| Parties | In The Matter of the ESTATE of R. H. JONES, also known as Robert H. Jones or Robert Jones, Deceased. Judy I. JONES, Personal Representative of the Estate of Robert T. Jones, also known as Robert T. E. Jones, Deceased, Petitioner and Appellant below, Appellee, v. Irene H. JONES, Personal Representative of the Estate of R. H. Jones, Deceased, and Irene H. Jones, personally, Respondent and Appellee below, Appellant, and Rosemary Hodges, Karen Brookhart, Jeanne Faiman, and Jule NeVille, Respondentsand Appellees below. Civ. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Freed, Dynes, Malloy & Reichert, Dickinson, for petitioner and appellant below, appellee; argued by George T. Dynes, Dickinson.
Orrin B. Lovell, Beach and Zuger & Bucklin, Bismarck, for respondent and appellee below, appellant; argued by Leonard H. Bucklin, Bismarck, and Harold H. Halstead, Mercer Island, Wash.
This case began as an action in the Golden Valley County Court by Judy Jones as personal representative of the estate of her late husband, Timer Jones, to rescind a waiver and assignment Timer signed in connection with the probate of the estate of Bob Jones, Timer's father.Timer's mother, Irene Jones, personal representative of Bob Jones' estate, was named a defendant in the action.The county court held it had no jurisdiction to set aside a contract agreement, and that the waiver and assignment was still in full force and effect.Judy Jones appealed this decision to the district court and requested a trial de novo.The district court held that it had jurisdiction to grant the relief requested, and rescinded the waiver and assignment.This appeal by Irene Jones followed.We hold that the district court, on appeal from the decision of the county court, had no jurisdiction to rescind the waiver and assignment.The judgment is therefore reversed.
After the county court decided that it had no subject-matter jurisdiction to grant a rescission of Timer Jones' waiver and assignment, the matter was appealed to the district court and a trial de novo was requested and granted.Irene Jones moved that the court dismiss the appeal on the ground that where the county court has no jurisdiction of the subject matter, the district court acquires none upon appeal.
At this same time, Judy Jones, after perfecting the appeal to district court, commenced an original action in district court, in effect raising the same issues that she raised in the appeal.Judy requested that the two cases be consolidated to avoid the possibility that the district court, in the appeal from county court, might not have jurisdiction to grant the relief requested.District JudgeMuggli dismissed this original action without prejudice.Thereafter, Judy commenced a second original action, and again requested that the original district court action be consolidated with the appeal from the county court.Judy also filed a demand for change of judge, and District Judge Hodny was assigned to hear this original district court action.
Judge Hodny suspended this second action until the appeal from the county court was completed.He stated in a letter to the attorneys:
Judge Muggli ruled that the district court, on appeal from county court, had jurisdiction to determine the issues Judy Jones raised.The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied.The case was heard on the merits and judgment was rendered in favor of Judy Jones, rescinding the waiver and assignment executed by Timer Jones.Irene Jones appeals from this decision.
Irene Jones, at all times and in all contexts, objected to the jurisdiction of the district court on appeal from the county court to grant the rescission, urging that because the county court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief, the district court acquired none on the appeal.
We must determine then:
(1) Did the county court have subject-matter jurisdiction to grant a rescission of Timer Jones' waiver and assignment?, and
(2) If not, did the district court have jurisdiction to do so on appeal from the county court?
Judy Jones contends that with the passage of the Uniform Probate Code in North Dakota (Chapter 257, S.L. 1973), the jurisdiction of the county court in probate matters has been broadened.Therefore, Judy reasons that prior case law holding that the probate court could not hear an action to cancel a document, such as the assignment in this case, 1 and that the probate court has no equity jurisdiction, 2 is no longer controlling.
Although North Dakota's Uniform Probate Code, codified inChapter 30.1, NDCC, has added certain language pertaining to the probate court's subject-matter jurisdiction, 3 this additional language was not intended to broaden the probate court's power to include equity jurisdiction or subject-matter jurisdiction over contracts.
When our Legislature adopted the North Dakota version of the Uniform Probate Code, it omitted §§ 1-308and1-309 of the Uniform Code.Section 1-308 provided for a direct appeal from the probate court to the supreme court, and assumed that the probate court would be a court of general jurisdiction.Instead, North Dakota's version leaves intact the prior procedure requiring that appeals from probate court be taken to district court.Section 30.1-02-02, NDCC.Matter of Estate of Bieber, 256 N.W.2d 879(N.D.1977).Section 1-309 provided that the legal qualifications of a probate judge would have to be that of a judge of a court of general jurisdiction.North Dakota has no requirement that county court judges be "learned in the law."
By specifically omitting these sections, and by retaining the provision that the District court has equity jurisdiction (1...
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