Jones-Gentry v. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab.

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: BOULWARE EURIE, J.
• Docket Number: C095008
• Decision Date: 02 April 2024
• Parties: DANETTE JONES-GENTRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

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DANETTE JONES-GENTRY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION et al., Defendants and Respondents.

C095008

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Lassen

April 2, 2024

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

C095008 (Super. Ct. No. 62519)

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

Danette Jones-Gentry was hired by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) to serve a one-year probationary period as a teacher in one of their facilities. Jones-Gentry was rejected during that probationary period and she elected to challenge her rejection via an administrative proceeding before the State Personnel Board (Board). In that proceeding, Jones-Gentry argued the reasons for the rejection were not supported by substantial evidence and were made in "bad faith," as evidenced by respondents' failure to respond to her complaint of disability discrimination. The Board rejected Jones-Gentry's appeal, finding that her rejection was in fact supported by substantial evidence and was not motivated by bad faith or based on any discriminatory motive. Jones-Gentry did not seek judicial review of the Board's ruling in superior court. Instead, she filed a civil action against CDCR and two of her former supervisors (collectively, respondents) asserting six causes of action under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA; Gov. Code, § 12900 et seq.)^[1]including disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodations. The trial court granted respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings, concluding collateral estoppel bars Jones-Gentry's FEHA action because of the preclusive effect of the Board's unchallenged prior ruling. Jones-Gentry appeals the trial court's ruling, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

When reviewing an order granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings, we accept as true all material allegations in the complaint. (National Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc. v. State of California (2018) 5 Cal.5th 428, 432.)

In July 2016, Jones-Gentry began working for CDCR as a teacher for prison inmates. While walking to a prison classroom in November 2016, she tore a meniscus in her knee. When she tried to return to work in early December 2016 with a doctor's work restriction that she limit walking, CDCR told her it would not accommodate her. In a late December 2016 letter, CDCR told her there were no reasonable accommodations for her and that she could return to work without work restrictions or "provide a clear doctor's note requesting accommodations."

Later, Jones-Gentry claimed her supervisors made her work life "miserable." One supervisor yelled at her, prohibited her from using shorter walking routes on prison grounds that other employees were allowed to use, moved her workstation without explanation, and did not provide her with necessary equipment and supplies. Another supervisor told her she was" 'a very expensive employee,'" that he" 'would write . . . [her] up'" if they were in the private sector, and wrote false performance reviews stating she often left work early. Jones-Gentry filed grievances with her union complaining about her supervisors' conduct, but "[n]othing ever came of it."

In July 2017, CDCR gave Jones-Gentry a "Notice of Rejection" during her one-year probationary period, the grounds for which included (1) being late for work, leaving work early, or being absent from work 55 times; (2) bringing an unauthorized cell phone into her classroom; (3) using her state-issued "personal alarm" whistle to get the attention of an inmate, prompting custody staff to respond to her classroom; and (4) dozens of data entry errors. The prison warden refused to investigate her complaints "regarding disability discrimination and [the] accuracy of her performance evaluations."

Jones-Gentry challenged her rejection before the Board. CDCR argued Jones-Gentry failed to meet her burden of proof to show either (1) a lack of substantial evidence supporting the reasons it rejected her or (2) that the rejection was based on fraud or bad faith. In December 2017, an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the rejection in a written decision that included factual findings.

The ALJ determined the rejection was supported by substantial evidence and was not motivated by bad faith. Regarding the second determination, the ALJ explained that Jones-Gentry "argue[d] that [CDCR] engaged in bad faith because it failed to respond to the disability discrimination complaint she raised" in response to the notice of rejection. The argument was "specious," the ALJ explained, in part because Jones-Gentry "submitted no evidence to establish that she ever filed a discrimination complaint" with CDCR.

In a February 2018 resolution and order, the Board adopted the ALJ's decision. Jones-Gentry did not seek judicial review of the Board's order by means of a mandate action in superior court. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5.) Instead, she filed a lawsuit against CDCR and her supervisors in July 2019 raising six causes of action under the FEHA: (1) disability discrimination, (2) failure to provide reasonable accommodation, (3) failure to engage in a good faith interactive process; (4) harassment/hostile work environment, (5) failure to prevent harassment/hostile work environment, and (6) retaliation. All causes of action were against CDCR and the harassment/hostile work environment cause of action was also against Jones-Gentry's supervisors.

Ultimately, the trial court granted respondents' motion for judgment on the pleadings, ruling principles of collateral estoppel barred Jones-Gentry's FEHA action because she (1) elected to challenge her rejection with the Board, (2) "was afforded the opportunity to prove her case and raise all of her claims of bad faith and discrimination," and (3) "failed to prove her case or have the adverse determination set aside." Citing Murray v. Alaska Airlines, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 860 (Murray), the trial court emphasized the importance of Jones-Gentry having the opportunity to litigate her discrimination claims with the Board.

The trial court denied leave to amend and dismissed Jones-Gentry's action with prejudice. Jones-Gentry filed a timely notice of appeal in September 2021. Her opening brief was filed in February 2023, this case was fully briefed on December 12, 2023, and the matter was argued on March 19, 2024.

DISCUSSION I

Principles of Collateral Estoppel and Judicial Exhaustion Bar the FEHA Action

A. Collateral Estoppel and Judicial Exhaustion

Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion is a "distinct aspect of res judicata," a doctrine that"' "gives conclusive effect to a former judgment in subsequent litigation between the same parties involving the same cause of action. . . . Collateral estoppel . . . involves a second action between the same parties on a different cause of action. The first action . . . operates as an estoppel or conclusive adjudication as to such issues in the second action which were actually litigated and determined in the first action." '" (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 864, 866-867, italics added.)

"But the rule goes further. If the matter was within the scope of the action, related to the subject-matter and relevant to the issues, so that it could have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on it despite the fact that it was not in fact expressly pleaded or otherwise urged." (Interinsurance Exchange of the Auto. Club v. Superior Court (1989) 209 Cal.App.3d 177, 182, italics omitted.)

" 'Judicial exhaustion'" is a "corollary" of the collateral estoppel doctrine, whereby final decisions of administrative agencies acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity have preclusive effect. (Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 867.) Judicial exhaustion" 'may arise when a party initiates and takes to decision an administrative process-whether or not the party was required, as a matter of administrative exhaustion, to even begin the administrative process in the first place. Once a decision has been issued . . . respect for the administrative decisionmaking process requires that the prospective plaintiff . . . exhaust[] any available judicial avenues for reversal of adverse findings. (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 69-72 [(Johnson)].) Failure to do so will result in any quasi-judicial administrative findings achieving binding, preclusive effect and may bar further relief on the same claims.'" (Murray, at p. 867; Johnson, at pp. 69-70 ["unless a party to a quasi-judicial proceeding challenges the agency's adverse findings made in that proceeding, by means of a mandate action in superior court, those findings are binding in later civil action"].)

In Johnson, our Supreme Court ruled a public employee who challenged a dismissal on discrimination grounds through administrative civil service remedies, received an adverse finding, and failed to have the finding set aside through judicial review procedures, was bound by the adverse finding in a later civil action raising discrimination claims under the FEHA. (Johnson, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 65-67, 72, 76; see Murray, supra, 50 Cal.4th at pp. 876-877.)" 'The failure of a litigant to introduce relevant available evidence on an issue does not necessarily defeat a plea of collateral estoppel,'" because the important thing is that a party has" 'the opportunity and incentive to present'" the relevant evidence in the prior proceeding. (Murray, at p. 871.)

Consider our Supreme Court's discussion in Murray regarding Takahashi v. Board of Education (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 1464. There, "a public school teacher claiming she was wrongfully terminated for incompetency was found collaterally estopped from pursuing her civil and constitutional claims in court because she had failed to raise those claims...