Jones, In re

Decision Date12 June 1962
Docket NumberCr. 6965
Citation57 Cal.2d 860,22 Cal.Rptr. 478,372 P.2d 310
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
Parties, 372 P.2d 310 In re Marvin D. JONES on Habeas Corpus.

Joseph A. DeCristoforo, Sacramento, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for petitioner.

Stanley Mosk, Atty. Gen., Doris H. Maier, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Edsel W. Haws, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

PETERS, Justice.

The petitioner, Marvin D. Jones, seeks habeas corpus on the ground that on two occasions certain named custodial officials at Folsom State Prison, where Jones was incarcerated 1 inflicted cruel and inhuman punishment upon him. The petition, filed in propria persona in August of 1961, alleges that in October 1960 an Islam scrapbook was confiscated from him by Lt. Campoy, who then, together with Lts. Piper, Johnson and Vance, proceeded to beat and kick petitioner in the face, stomach and groin. The petition also alleges, that in January 1961 petitioner was beaten and knocked unconscious by Sgt. Valley and Lt. Piper, and Officers Williams and Lonzo. In the course of this beating, he alleges that his right eye was knocked out of its socket. It is alleged that these acts of brutality were directed against him solely because he is a member of the Black Muslim religious group. It is also alleged that his right of access to this court was interfered with.

In so far as this petition charges the infliction of cruel and inhuman punishment or interference with the right of access to the courts, it states a good cause for relief by way of habeas corpus. These points have been fully discussed in the case of In re Riddle, Cal., 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304. What was there said on these points need not be here repeated.

It is also true that the allegations of racial and religious discrimination state a good cause for relief by way of habeas corpus. 2 A person is not deprived of all of his constitutional rights by reason of his incarceration for a felony. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall 'deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' (Emphasis added.) A convicted felon, although civilly dead (see Pen.Code, § 2600-2604) in nevertheless a 'person' entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. (McCollum v. Mayfield, D.C., 130 F.Supp. 112, 115-117; Gordon v. Garrson, D.C., 77 F.Supp. 477, 479.) There are many cases upholding the right of such persons to equal protection (Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 71 S.Ct. 262, 95 L.Ed. 215; Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 62 S.Ct. 1068, 86 L.Ed. 1453) and to due process (Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 61 S.Ct. 640, 85 L.Ed. 1034; United States v. Jones, 5 Cir., 207 F.2d 785; Harper v. Wall, D.C., 85 F.Supp. 783). Freedom from religious discrimination, either in a state prison (Pierce v. La Vallee, 2 Cir., 293 F.2d 233; Note (1962) 75 Harv.L.Rev. 837) or in a federal penitentiary (Sewell v. Pegelow, 4 Cir., 291 F.2d 196) has also been protected by the federal courts. Reasonable regulation of these rights, however, is permitted (In re Ferguson, supra, 55 Cal.2d 663, 12 Cal.Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417; People v. Ray, 181 Cal.App.2d 64, 69, 5 Cal.Rptr. 113; Davis v. Superior Court, 175 Cal.App.2d 8, 20, 345 P.2d 513; Akamine v. Murphy, 108 Cal.App.2d 294, 238 P.2d 606; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; see 2 Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States (2d ed. 1958) pp. 1184-1187; see also People ex parte Wright v. Wilkins, 26 Misc.2d 1090, 210 N.Y.S.2d 309; McBride v. McCorkle, (44 N.J.Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881).

For these reasons, the petition properly alleged grounds for the issuance of an order to show cause. Such an order was issued, and counsel appointed for petitioner.

The return to the order to show cause contradicted the petition in many material respects. In denied that any force was used by respondent on petitioner in October of 1960. It conceded that some force was used on petitioner on January 24, 1961, but alleged that only that amount of force was used as was necessary to enforce compliance with proper prison regulations. It also denied the allegations of racial and religious discrimination and denied that there had been any improper interference with petitioner's right of access to the courts.

Because of these conflicts, the Honorable J. T. B. Warne was appointed as a referee of this court. After a full hearing (the hearing lasted nine days, during which a transcript of over 800 pages was compiled) the referee found

'1. * * * that force was used against petitioner by certain prison authorities or personnel on October 14, 1960, and also on January 24, 1961.

'2. * * * that petitioner's belligerent conduct toward the correctional officers and his refusal to obey prison rules and regulations reasonably occasioned the use of force in each instance; that the degree of force used and the circumstances concerning each instance are not as alleged by the petitioner but that with the exception of respondent's denial of the use of any force pertaining to the October 14, 1960 instance the facts and circumstances are as set forth in their return to the order to show cause in this proceeding. Concerning the October incident I find that some force was used in moving petitioner to the restricted area but it is not true as alleged by petitioner that at that time he was beaten, kicked and otherwise physically abused.

'3. * * * that the force which was used upon petitioner was reasonably necessary to compel him to comply with prison rules and regulations in each instance, notwithstanding the fact that on or about January 24, 1961 petitioner sustained an injury to his right eye, commonly termed a 'black eye' which caused a swelling of the area to the extent that the eye was closed from the ecchymosis. The injury occurred while petitioner was being escorted from the prison hospital to the Adjustment Center. During that period of time petitioner was in a fighting mood, yelling, kicking and swinging his fists at the correctional officer, and it was necessary to use 'come-along holds' as a means of taking him to the Adjustment Center. Under the circumstances it is my finding and conclusion that no more than reasonable force was used in order to compel compliance with prison rules and regulations, and the commands of the Correctional Officers involved. I further find that petitioner sustained no permanent injury to either eye and that both eyes are normal.

'4. * * * that no slanderous epithets were directed at petitioner on any of the occasions alleged in his petition, or at any other time, by any of the prison authorities or personnel.

'5. * * * that no attempt was made on June 16, 1961, as alleged by petitioner, or at any other time, by any of the prison authorities or personnel to intimidate petitioner because of material contained in any document addressed by petitioner to any court.'

As pointed out in In re Riddle, supra, Cal., 22 Cal.Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304 these findings, even though supported by the evidence, and entitled to great weight, are not binding on this court. This court is required to pass on the weight of the evidence.

Jones testified that in October 1960 Lt. Campoy and others searched his cell and confiscated a Muslim scrapbook. He was then taken to a cell in the restricted area, the 'dungeon' in prisoner parlance, and was beaten with baseball bats and kicked by Lts. Campoy, Johnson, Piper, and Officers Williams, Campoy and Lonzo. He was then left naked in the cell for three days and nights.

Jones also testified that about January 23rd, four guards, armed with clubs, took him to another cell and jabbed him with the clubs on the way. The next day Jones went to the hospital for a reason not connected with this case. As he left the hospital several officers pulled and dragged him through Building Two down a flight of stairs and into the mess hall. While in the mess hall he was struck several times. He was then carried to the Adjustment Center. There he tried to fend off a blow from Lonzo, and was jumped upon by six officers who proceeded to beat and kick him in the face, stomach and groin. During this beating his right eye was knocked out of its socket. The next day he went to the hospital and was required to stay there for two weeks.

Jones further testified that he tried to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in February of 1961, but that the officials refused to mail it to the court. He submitted another (the instant petition) in March of 1961 but it was not mailed until June 1961.

Jones stated that he has been frequently threatened by Lonzo, Williams and Piper concerning his naming them in this petition. He claims that he has been frequently insulted both because he is a Negro and also because he is a Black Muslim.

He also testified that he was offered a parole in January 1962 by Clinton Duffy and C. J. Fitzharris, members of the Adult Authority, if he would drop the instant proceedings.

Some of the facts in reference to the January incident were corroborated by several inmates. Several substantiated Jones' testimony as to the circumstances under which he was then removed from his cell, and the fact that the guards were armed with clubs, and that they 'poked' Jones with them. Several said that they heard the guards use abusive language toward Jones and ridicule him for being a Black Muslim. Several testified that they heard Lonzo threaten Jones for naming him in the instant petition, while others testified that they were warned not to testify for Jones and threatened with reprisals if they did so. One testified that he saw Jones being dragged through the mess hall on the day in question; that Jones was bloody and had his eye kicked out; that he saw the officers kicking Jones. Several other witnesses testified that they also observed such...

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  • Cleaver, In re
    • United States
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    • 27 Septiembre 1968
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