Jones, In re

• Decision Date: 10 January 1966
• Docket Number: No. 47788,47788
• Citation: Jones, In re, 431 S.W.2d 809 (Mo. 1966)
• Parties: In re F. Leland JONES.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 809

431 S.W.2d 809

In re F. Leland JONES.

No. 47788.

Supreme Court of Missouri, En Banc.

Jan. 10, 1966.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 14, 1966.

Certiorari Denied Oct. 10, 1966. Sec. 87 S.Ct. 126.

Guilfoil, Caruthers, Symington, Montrey & Petzall, Rexford H. Caruthers, St. Louis, for F. Leland Jones.

William H. Billings, Flake L. McHaney, Kennett, for Missouri Bar Advisory Committee.

DONNELLY, Judge.

This is a disciplinary proceeding against F. Leland Jones, a member of the Bar of Missouri.

On July 22, 1959, the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar filed an Information in this Court in substance charging that F. Leland Jones, during the period of February, 1956, to and including June 1, 1958, employed, utilized, benefited from and accepted the services of one Walter G. Candy of Cincinnati, Ohio, a layman, to seek out, influence and solicit persons with claims for personal injuries or wrongful death under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the purpose of securing such persons as clients, and that Jones did directly and indirectly pay and reward Candy for doing so, all in violation of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri; that Jones, in order to circumvent the Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, with respect to the solicitation of claims by Candy, did willfully, wrongfully and unprofessionally 'set up, operate and take part' in a deliberate plan, scheme and subterfuge in that Candy solicited said claims purportedly as an investigator and, by agreement with Jones, had the person whose claim was solicited write a letter requesting an interview with Jones for the purpose of employing Jones in a professional capacity concerning such person's claim, when in fact said 'investigative plan' and said 'letter' constituted a willful and deliberate facade to conceal the true facts, i.e., that Candy was soliciting, chasing and running claims for Jones, in the event a Bar investigation ensued.

It was charged that sometime during the year 1956 Candy solicited and procured for Jones the claims and lawsuits of George Shuler, M. L. Crutchfield, Jack Hubbard, George Morgan Spears, Paul D. Pratt, Lee Addison, Carlos B. Redden, and the heirs of Donald G. Bruce; and that Jones thereby violated Rules 4.27 and 4.28, V.A.M.R. of the Missouri Supreme Court in that he (1) solicited law business by personal communication or interviews and (2) employed a lay agent and runner for like purposes.

F. Leland Jones, for his answer to the charges, admitted that during the last eight months of 1956 Candy recommended to Shuler, Crutchfield, Hubbard, Spears, Pratt, Addison, Redden and the Bruce heirs that they consult Jones with respect to professional employment, and that said persons did consult him and thereafter employed him and his law firm to represent them concerning their respective claims, but Jones denied that such recommendations and employment constituted or resulted from a deliberate plan, scheme and subterfuge by which he employed, utilized, benefited from and accepted the services of a layman in soliciting personal injury claims and by which he paid and rewarded said layman in violation of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri. Jones further affirmatively stated that prior to and during the period of time when Candy recommended personal injury clients, Jones and his partners had the good faith belief that such recommendations were not in violation of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Missouri, and stated facts evidencing such alleged good faith. Jones further averred that, although Candy recommended to the clients mentioned above that each consult Jones and his firm regarding professional employment, Candy did not do so as an agent and runner for Jones and his firm.

This Court, on January 11, 1960, appointed Ronald L. Somerville, of the Livingston County Bar, as Special Commissioner to take testimony, make findings and conclusions and report to this Court. A total of fifty days of hearings were conducted resulting in more than 4,000 pages of transcript and countless exhibits.

The Commissioner, in his report, treats Candy as follows:

'The Commissioner is quite candid and forthright in stating that the overall personality and character of Walter G. Candy was quite distasteful and repelling. It is inconceivable that any person with human instincts would react otherwise. The aforementioned, in conjunction with numerous contradictions, self-admitted lies and perjury contained in Walter G. Candy's testimony at the outset of the hearing, since Walter G. Candy was the first witness produced, placed the hearing before the Commissioner, Intially, as well as the overall record in the case, in a difficult and adverse posture. Moreover, the aforementioned undoubtedly placed extremely heavy burdens upon both Informants and Respondent concerning the orderly presentation of their respective positions in said cause. The Commissioner wishes to emphatically and clearly state that he does not, directly or indirectly, level any criticism towards either Informants or Respondent in respect to the matters just mentioned. However, the Commissioner feels that in ultimate fairness to all concerned in these proceedings that the court should be aware of the extraordinary burden that all connected with this matter labored under. Regardless of Walter G. Candy's character and personality, his obvious determination to seek revenge against F. Leland Jones, and his complete and utter disregard and disrespect for the solemnity of the sworn oath, he was the individual whom F. Leland Jones was associated with during the period of time involved in the proceedings and he was, and is, therefore inextricably involved in the ultimate determination and disposition of the charges pending herein although, for reasons hereinafter assigned, his (Candy's) testimony is not considered in determining the charges.'

The Commissioner, who was present at the hearings, and observed the witnesses, concluded that Candy's testimony was unworthy of belief. We agree. Since Candy's testimony is relied on for proof of the charge of 'a deliberate plan, scheme and subterfuge,' we hold for Jones on this segment of the case. The question concerning solicitation is another matter. All parties agree with the Commissioner's findings of basic fact. We borrow freely from his report in this regard.

F. Leland Jones was 38 years of age at the time he testified before the Commissioner; he was born in St. Louis, Missouri, on June 2, 1924. He attended the University of Denver, Denver, Colorado, on a scholastic scholarship, graduating from said institution in 1946. While attending the University of Denver he was initiated into the honorary scholastic fraternity of Phi Beta Kappa. After completing his undergraduate work at the University of Denver he attended Harvard Law School on a scholastic scholarship, graduating from said latter institution in 1949. In December of 1949, he was admitted to practice law in the State of Missouri.

Thereafter, he worked as an adjuster and for several law firms in St. Louis until the partnership of Gross, Jones and Blumenfeld was formed in St. Louis in 1955. At the hearings a Federal Judge, four Missouri Circuit Judges and eight lawyers and doctors testified to his good character, good judgment and above-average intelligence. At the hearings, Jones was cooperative and respectful and in all instances made his records and files available.

The initial contact between Jones and Candy occurred on October 27, 1955, in the Civil Courts Building in St. Louis, where Candy approached Jones about representing an injured friend. Nothing came of this conversation. Then, in January, 1956, Candy appeared in Jones' office in St. Louis to make inquiry as to whether the firm would employ Candy on a per diem basis to investigate railroad cases. Jones advised Candy that the firm would not employ Candy as an investigator with respect to any cases in which Candy recommended injured employees to the firm, since to do so might be looked upon as a payment to Candy for such recommendation. After several telephone calls, Jones and Candy met for a conference in Cincinnati, Ohio, on January 28, 1956. At this conference Candy explained to Jones that he had an investigation contract form which he was going to execute with injured employees; that this contract form was in the nature of a contingent fee contract whereby Candy would investigate cases and then make the investigation file available. Candy inquired of Jones whether Jones would be interested in being recommended by Candy to injured employees from whom Candy obtained contingent fee contracts. Jones advised Candy that he at no time saw anybody unless he was first contacted by such person. Jones understood that under Candy's proposed mode of operation, he, Candy, was going to solicit injured people either by making direct contact with them or as a result of advertising Candy contemplated doing. Jones further knew that in the event he decideed 'to do business' with Candy that he, among others, would be recommended as an attorney by Candy to innured people with whom Candy had investigation contracts. At the conclusion of the conference, Jones advised Candy that he would discuss Candy's proposal with his partners.

Upon Jones' return to St. Louis from Cincinnati, his conference with Candy was the subject of a discussion or series of discussions with the other partners in the firm. The partners analyzed Candy's proposal, principally as to the point they were interested in, namely, if they were recommended by Candy to any of the persons with whom he had contingent fee investigation contracts, whether it would be proper for them to talk to such injured people. They analyzed the matter of whether or not it would be proper for Candy to recommend a lawyer to injured people with whom he had a contingent fee investigation contract. In this latter respect, the firm drew certain analogies:

(1) An analogy was drawn with respect...