Jones Truck Lines, Inc. v. Republic Tobacco, Inc., Adv. No. 93 A 00910.
| Decision Date | 02 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | Adv. No. 93 A 00910. |
| Citation | 178 BR 999 |
| Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Northern District of Illinois |
| Parties | JONES TRUCK LINES, INC., Debtor-in-Possession, Plaintiff, v. REPUBLIC TOBACCO, INC., n/k/a DRL Enterprises, Inc., Defendant. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Timothy F. Eddy, Lawrence M. Liebman, Eddy & Liebman, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff.
Christine L. Olson, Sarah Cook, McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Farrug, Chicago, IL, for defendant.
This matter comes before the Court on cross motions for summary judgment. Jones Truck Lines, Inc. ("Plaintiff" or "Jones"), seeks to recover purported freight undercharges relating to transportation services provided for Republic Tobacco, Inc., n/k/a DRL Enterprises, Inc., ("Defendant" or "Republic"), between October 1988 and January 1989, under the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917. In support of its motion for summary judgment, Defendant relies on section 2(a)1 of the Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 ("NRA"), Pub.L. No. 103-180, 107 Stat. 2044 (1993), which exempts small businesses from liability for freight undercharge claims. 49 U.S.C.A. 10701(f)(9). In response, Plaintiff argues that the NRA does not apply to bankrupt motor carriers, and even if the NRA does so apply, it is inapplicable in this case because the Plaintiff's claims and bankruptcy filing arose prior to the enactment of the NRA. Having considered the arguments, pleadings and exhibits, the Court finds that the NRA does apply to Plaintiff's claims and, therefore, Jones is precluded from recovering the freight undercharges from Republic pursuant to the small business exception of NRA § 2(a). As set forth in the Court's order, summary judgment is granted in favor of Republic.
Jones formerly was a licensed motor common carrier under the Interstate Commerce Act ("ICA"), 49 U.S.C. § 10102(4). Jones is no longer transporting property. Republic is a wholesale distributor of tobacco and tobacco products who engaged Jones to transport goods to various consignees from October 1988 through January 1989. Jones filed a petition for Chapter 11 relief on July 9, 1991, in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Arkansas, Fayetteville Division, Case No. 91-15475-M. On June 22, 1993, Jones filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Case No. 93 C 3724. The case was referred to this Court in accordance with Northern District of Illinois General Rule 2.33(A) on July 16, 1993. Relying on the ICA, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917, Plaintiff sought to recover purported freight undercharges relating to the transportation services provided for Republic. In response, Defendant filed a motion for stay of the proceedings and referral to the Interstate Commerce Commission ("ICC") to determine the reasonableness of Plaintiff's shipping rates. In its motion for stay of proceedings, Defendant argued that: (1) the original freight charges paid by Republic were in accordance with Jones' lawfully filed tariff rates; and (2) the undiscounted class rates sought by Jones were unreasonable. Jones subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that under the "filed rates doctrine" of the ICA, common carriers are required to charge and collect only those rates that are set forth in tariffs on file with the ICC. Accordingly, Jones argues that because the tariff rates paid by Republic for services rendered were less than the class rate tariffs filed by Jones, Jones is entitled to recover these "undercharges" in accordance with the ICA, 49 U.S.C. § 10761(a). Jones seeks $6,186.96 in tariff undercharges from Republic plus prejudgment interest and costs.
On January 26, 1994, this Court entered an Order granting the Defendant's motion to stay the action pending a determination by the ICC regarding the reasonableness of Plaintiff's filed tariff rates. The ICC subsequently established a procedural schedule in the proceeding to determine rate reasonableness. Republic Tobacco n/k/a DRL Enterprises, Inc.—Petition for Declaratory Order — Certain Rates and Practices of Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 1994 WL 172332 . Republic then filed a motion for summary judgment with this Court on July 21, 1994, requesting that the ICC stay its proceeding pending dismissal of the adversary proceeding in this Court, which the ICC granted. See Republic Tobacco n/k/a DRL Enterprises, Inc.—Petition for Declaratory Order—Certain Rates and Practices of Jones Truck Lines, Inc., 1994 WL 457121 (I.C.C. August 25, 1994). In response, Jones filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.
In the motion for summary judgment currently before the Court, Republic asserts that the Negotiated Rates Act of 1993 amends the filed rate doctrine and provides for various forms of relief for shippers who have been subjected to freight undercharge claims. Specifically, Republic relies on section 2(a) of the NRA, 49 U.S.C. § 10701(f)(9), which exempts small businesses from liability for tariff undercharges.
Jones, on the other hand, insists that the NRA does not apply to bankrupt motor carriers because it deprives the bankruptcy estate of an interest in property in violation of Bankruptcy Code § 541. 11 U.S.C. § 541. Alternatively, Jones claims that even if the NRA does apply in bankruptcy cases, it does not apply in this particular case because Jones' claims arose before enactment of the NRA.
This matter was initially assigned to the Honorable George W. Lindberg. On June 23, 1993, Judge Lindberg transferred the case and ordered the Clerk of the District Court to transmit the entire court file to the Clerk of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois. This Court's jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1334 and General Rule 2.33(A) of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
Rule 56(c), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, applicable to adversary proceedings within bankruptcy cases by Rule 7056 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions of file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Carroll v. AcmeCleveland Corp., 955 F.2d 1107, 1114 (7th Cir.1992).
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that no genuine issue of material fact exists. See Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056, incorporating Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Donald v. Polk County, 836 F.2d 376, 378-79 (7th Cir.1988). A material fact is one that "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2501, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The moving party has the burden to show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256, 106 S.Ct. at 2514; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Matter of Chicago, Missouri & Western Ry. Co., 156 B.R. 567 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1993). This burden is met when the record, as a whole, does not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. "If the evidence is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11 (citations omitted); see also Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 822 F.2d 656, 659 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 977, 108 S.Ct. 488, 98 L.Ed.2d 486 (1987).
Once the movant makes a prima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the respondent must show that there is a genuine issue and may not rest on mere allegations or denials in its pleadings. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2552; Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. at 1356. All reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the underlying facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587-88, 106 S.Ct. at 1356; Karazanos v. Navistar Int'l. Transp. Corp., 948 F.2d 332, 335 (7th Cir.1991).
When both parties seek summary judgment, that does not by itself indicate that there are no genuine issues of material fact. The Court must rule on each motion separately, utilizing applicable standards to determine whether summary judgment would be appropriate. ITT Indus. Credit Co. v. D.S. America, Inc., 674 F.Supp. 1330, 1331 (N.D.Ill.1987); In re Woodstock Associates I, Inc., 120 B.R. 436, 442 (Bankr.N.D.Ill. 1990). The Court may deny both motions if both parties fail to meet their burden. Wolf v. Maryland Casualty Co., 617 F.Supp. 456, 458 (S.D.Ill.1985).
The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 10101-11917, requires motor common carriers to publish their rates in tariffs filed with the ICC, 49 U.S.C. § 10762, and prohibits both carriers and shippers from deviating from those rates, 49 U.S.C. § 10761. Failure to charge or pay the filed rate may result in civil or criminal sanctions. Security Services, Inc. v. Kmart Corporation, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 114 S.Ct. 1702, 1706, 128 L.Ed.2d 433 (1994); see 49 U.S.C. §§ 11902-11904. The purpose behind the ICA is "to ensure that rates are both reasonable and nondiscriminatory." Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497...
To continue reading
Request your trial