Jones v. Alvarez
| Decision Date | 02 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:19CV930 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
| Parties | ZARED KINAH JONES, Plaintiff, v. S.A. ALVAREZ, J.M. CHAVEZ, K.R. JOHNSON, F.T. WRIGHT, CITY OF GREENSBORO, WAYNE SCOTT, S.K. FLOWERS, SGT. S.K. WRIGHT, A.G. LEWIS, D.C. FLEMING, D.M. HARMON, J.T. HARRILL, and M.J. MOLSON, Defendants. |
Presently before this court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Defendants S.A. Alvarez, J.M. Chavez, K.R. Johnson, F.T. Wright, Wayne Scott, S.K. Flowers, and the City of Greensboro. (Doc. 22.) Also before the court is a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed by Defendants A.G. Lewis, D.C. Fleming, D.M. Harmon, J.T. Harrell and M.J. Molson. (Doc. 37.) On September 18, 2020, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Respond, (Doc. 44), seeking additional time to respond to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (Doc. 37). This final Motion to Dismiss was filed in February, 2020, (id.), more than six months prior to Plaintiff's most recent Motion for Extension of Time. Thus, Plaintiff's Motion for Extension of Time is untimely. Moreover, Plaintiff has already responded to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss by filing a Response. (Doc. 43). For these reasons, this motion will be denied.
On a motion to dismiss, a court must "accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint . . . ." Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020). The facts, taken in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and as alleged in the Amended Complaint are as follows.
Plaintiff alleges that he and three companions arrived in downtown Greensboro around 10:30 p.m. on September 9, 2016.1 (Amended Compl. 2 At various timesafter arrival, Plaintiff alleges three unconstitutional interactions with law enforcement.
The first interaction occurred on South Elm Street in downtown Greensboro. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 16) at 7.) Plaintiff alleges that he was surrounded by Officers Alvarez, Chavez, Johnson, F.T. Wright, Flowers, S.K. Wright3, Lewis, Fleming, Harmon, Harrill, and Molson of the Street Team Bike Squad. (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that these officers unlawfully restrained his movement and he was detained and unlawfully interrogated. (Id.) Plaintiff contends he was required to answer questions. (Id.) After a prolonged period of time, Plaintiff alleges he was then granted permission to leave. (Id.) Plaintiff generally refers to violations of his 14th and 5th Amendment rights. (See id. at 5.) However, this first law enforcement interaction is more appropriately construed as a claim ofunconstitutional detention in violation of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizure.4
After being allowed to leave, Plaintiff alleges the second unconstitutional interaction occurred when these same officers conducted "unwarranted surveillance" by following Plaintiff for several blocks on North Elm Street, up until he arrived at his destination on West McGee Street. (Id.)
The third interaction occurred after Plaintiff arrived at his destination on North Elm Street, the "Boiler Room" establishment. Plaintiff alleges he was assaulted by two unknown assailants at the Boiler Room. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges two separate unconstitutional actions by law enforcement during this interaction at the Boiler Room.
First, Plaintiff contends he sought assistance from the officers and was then improperly detained. Plaintiff alleges that he approached Alvarez and asked for help; at which point he was told to "Go Away You Dont [sic] Belong Down Here." (Id.)Plaintiff then approached Johnson and asked for help, though Johnson initially refused assistance. However, Johnson then "agreed to adhere to established policy and began an investigation establishing [Plaintiff's] role as a victim/complaining witness." (Id. at 10.) Johnson then allegedly walked away with Plaintiff's driver's license and refused to return it. Plaintiff contends he was detained by Johnson's act of retaining Plaintiff's driver's license. (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges Johnson detained him by show of authority. (Id.)
Second, Plaintiff contends he was unconstitutionally arrested at the Boiler Room by Flowers and Alvarez. Plaintiff alleges that Flowers approached the door of the Boiler Room, where a civilian "concoct[ed] or other wise [sic] manufactur[ed] false evidence." (Id.) Flowers then ordered Plaintiff to leave. (Id.) Plaintiff appears to contend that he could not leave as directed because Johnson still had Plaintiff's license. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Flowers then committed assault and battery "by touching and handling [Plaintiff's] body while placing [him] under arrest with out [sic] Valid [sic] warrant or probable cause." (Id. at 11.) Plaintiff alleges that Alvarez then obtained a "false warrant" by falsely alleging that Plaintiff had remained after having been notified not to enter or remain upon the premises. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges "OfficersAlvarez, D.M. Harmon, F.T. Wright, and J.M. Chavez conspired to and did fabricate false charges," (id.), and Alvarez and Flowers conspired to unlawfully arrest Plaintiff. (Id.)5
This court construes Plaintiff's claim as to this third interaction to allege unconstitutional detention with respect to Johnson, followed by an unconstitutional detention and arrest by other officers - all in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff asserts these constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Am. Compl. (Doc. 16) at 4-5.)
Plaintiff, Zared Kinah Jones, proceeding pro se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff filed his original complaint on September 10, 2019. (Doc. 2.) Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, (Doc. 16), on December 9, 2019, and named as Defendants the following: the City of Greensboro ("the City"); Wayne Scott, as the Chief of Police; and GreensboroPolice officers S.A. Alvarez, J.M. Chavez, K.R. Johnson6, F.T. Wright, S.K. Flowers, A.G. Lewis, D.C. Fleming, D.M. Harmon, J.T. Harrill, and M.J. Molson. Defendants Alvarez, Chavez, City of Greensboro, Flowers, Johnson, Scott, and Wright filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 22.) Defendants Fleming, Harmon, Harrill, Lewis, and Molson also filed a motion to dismiss. (Doc. 37.) Plaintiff has filed a number of additional documents, including a response, (Doc. 39); an affidavit, (Doc. 40); a second response, (Doc. 43); and a third response with accompanying brief, (Docs. 45, 46).
Defendants move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Doc. 22 at 1; Doc. 37 at 1.) "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In other words, the plaintiff must plead facts that "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant isliable" and must demonstrate "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57).
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, this court must accept the complaint's factual allegations as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Despite this deferential standard, a court will not accept mere legal conclusions as true, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, [will] not suffice." Id.
Pro se plaintiffs are subject to a relaxed pleading standard. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (); see also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). However, these plaintiffs must still plead facts that fairly put the defendant on notice of the nature of the claims and "contain more than labels and conclusions." Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Defendants Alvarez, Chavez, Johnson, Wright, Scott, Flowers, and the City of Greensboro filed their motion seeking dismissal of all claims. (Doc. 22.) Defendants Lewis, Fleming, Harmon, Harrill, and Molson filed a separate motion to dismiss, (Doc. 37), which incorporates and joins in the arguments raisedby the other Defendants. (See Doc. 38 at 4.) Defendants Lewis, Fleming, Harmon, and Harrill also raise a separate statute of limitations argument. (See id.) This court will first address the arguments that are applicable to all Defendants. The court will then turn to the separate statute of limitations issue.
To prevail on a § 1983 claim, Plaintiff must show that he was deprived of a federal statutory or constitutional right and that deprivation "was committed under color of state law." Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50, (1999). Assuming Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, municipal liability will attach only if the deprivation is also caused by "an official policy or custom." Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir. 1999).
Because section 1983 was not designed to impose municipal liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the "official policy" requirement was "intended to distinguish acts of the municipality from acts of employees of the municipality, and thereby make clear that municipal liability is limited to action for which the municipality is actually responsible." Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 479, 106 S. Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986).
Riddick v. Sch. Bd. of City of Portsmouth, 238 F.3d 518, 523 (4th Cir. 2000). As another district court in this circuit persuasively explains:
a municipality is not liable simply because a plaintiff "is able to identify conduct attributable to the municipality." Riddick, 238...
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