Jones v. American Caramel Co.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1909
• Docket Number: 141
• Citation: 74 A. 613,225 Pa. 644
• Parties: Jones v. American Caramel Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

74 A. 613

225 Pa. 644

Jones v. American Caramel Company, Appellant

No. 141

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

October 11, 1909

Argued May 18, 1909

Appeal, No. 141, Jan. T., 1909, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. York Co., Oct. T. 1907, No. 17, on verdict for plaintiffs in case of James R. Jones and Wilson H. Jones, by the said James R. Jones, his father and next friend, v American Caramel Company. Affirmed.

Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before BITTENGER P.J.

The facts relating to the accident are set forth in the opinion of the Supreme Court.

The court charged in part as follows:

[Now, the jury will inquire who is telling the truth in reference to that matter; whether the boy was mistaken as to the order he received, and did he act on the mistaken idea. He says the superintendent or foreman is mistaken as to what he said to this plaintiff; that it is not probable that he would tell him to do this work in that way, without telling him that it was dangerous back of the table. You will consider whether it is natural and probable that he told him to stand in front of the table, without telling him that there was danger from this fan, and that therefore he should stand in front. Would it be natural for him, or in anywise probable, for this foreman, knowing the danger of going behind that table, and having seen other boys stand there, to tell the plaintiff to stand in front of the table, without further stating that that was the only safe place to stand? These are matters to reason about. The jury are like all other reasonable beings, or it is supposed that they are or you would not have been selected by both parties to try this case. It becomes, therefore, your duty to ascertain as to which order was given; and you will inquire about these things, and reason these things out.]

[The law is to warn young people. If they come to a shop, and have not had any experience, they must be warned of danger about machinery. This especially if they have had no experience about machinery. But if they are over fourteen years of age, they are presumed to know the danger of machinery; or, if they had been working at anything like that before, it is not necessary to explain to them that the machine is dangerous at which they are working. They are presumed to have eyes and experience; and it is not necessary to warn them. This, I repeat, if they have been working at such place before, and knew how to operate the machine. But if they are put to work in a dangerous neighborhood, or where there are other dangerous machines, or they are liable to fall into danger from those machines which are around the place where they are working, and are not properly guarded, and they have had no experience, why then it is necessary for the employer to explain to him or them that there is danger in that locality where they are required to work; and, not only to give the proper warning of danger, but also to show them how to manage the machine that they are not accustomed to work. This is an obligation on the part of the employers; and they are bound to give them sufficient information to enable them to escape danger. This is decidendly so when they are inexperienced, and have not been engaged at work on such machines before, or in the neighborhood of such machines.]

[The testimony on the part of the plaintiff shows that this young man was injured there for want of a sufficient guard around this fan, and for want of sufficient instruction; that he was not instructed, or that he was not even told, where to stand; that he had no information given to him by the foreman, or by anyone else, of the dangerous character of this fan; that he did not know of its dangerous character, and that he should not put his hand up near that fan; and that without any knowledge of the fan he put his hand up to save his hat, and the injury resulted as described.] [The plaintiff alleges as I said before, that this fan was maintained in a dangerous condition; that it did not have a guard upon it as required by the act of assembly; in other words, a proper guard. In the year 1905 the legislature, I suppose upon a demand of people to require protection in so far as the workmen were concerned, passed a law regulating the running of machine shops, with a good many sections in the act; and there are a good many provisions in it also. Section 11 of the act, p. 354 of the Pamphlet Laws of 1905, is as follows, after previous sections providing a great many other things: That "the owner or person in charge of an establishment where machinery is used shall provide belt shifters or other mechanical contrivances for the purpose of throwing on or off belts or pulleys. Whenever practicable, all machinery shall be provided with loose pulleys. All vats, pans, saws, planers, cogs, gearing, belting, shafting, set-screws, grind stones, emery-wheels, fly wheels, and machinery of every description shall be properly guarded."

This act of assembly requires "whenever practicable;" and the court instructs you that machinery of this character, uncovered, shall be properly guarded; and we instruct you in this case, if you shall find that this fan was not properly guarded, that then there is evidence before the jury of negligence on the part of this defendant. This is a positive act of assembly. It is mandatory; and everybody engaged in this kind of business, using machinery, is compelled to comply with its requirements. If it is practicable to have a proper guard to this fan, it would seem to the court -- but that is for the jury to decide -- if it was practicable to have a proper guard, they were bound to have it. There is nothing that would excuse them; it was negligence for them not to have it. The jury will say whether, from the weight of all the evidence in the case, there was a proper guard to this fan; -- a guard that would prevent injury to this plaintiff, or anyone who had occasion to be there on proper business.

The defense say that they have properly guarded this fan by placing this heating table in front of it, by placing obstacles at one end of the table, and by the inconvenient method that exists at the other end of the table of getting behind the table, because of pipes and other obstructions. Now, was that a proper guard; that is, all the guard that is proven? Or, I should say, was it proven that there was no guard over this fan that extended into the room? Was this table and the surrounding objects, which were proved here by the witnesses as being there, a sufficient guard to this fan? That is a matter for the jury to determine from the weight of the evidence. It would seem to the court to be a sufficient guard to protect anybody from danger, with the space that has been proved as existing around this table; but that is a question for the jury to determine; and it is for them to determine whether it was properly guarded. If it was properly guarded, why then there was no negligence in maintaining this fan without any other guard. If it was not properly guarded, the jury can find the defendant negligent in running its works without complying with the act of assembly. As we have already said, the act of assembly is mandatory, and made for the good purpose of properly guarding all dangerous machinery. [14]

Verdict and judgment for James R. Jones for $800 and for Wilson H. Jones for $7,500.

Errors assigned were (11-14) above instructions, quoting them.

Charles A. Hawkins and Henry C. Niles, of Niles and Neff, for appellant. -- Not knowing of a danger will not excuse if it is such that it should have been known by the exercise of the senses: Stackhouse v. Vendig, 166 Pa. 582; Barnes v. Sowden, 119 Pa. 53; Robb v Connellsville, 137 Pa. 42; Dehnhardt v. Phila., 15 W.N.C. 214; Phila. v. Smith, 23 W.N.C. 242; Shallcross v. Phila., 187 Pa. 143; Lumis v. Traction Co., 181 Pa. 268; Beer v. Clarion Twp...