Jones v. Apfel

• Decision Date: 20 September 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98 CIV. 3389(WHP).,98 CIV. 3389(WHP).
• Citation: 66 F.Supp.2d 518
• Parties: Ruth C. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

66 F.Supp.2d 518

Ruth C. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Kenneth S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.

No. 98 CIV. 3389(WHP).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

September 20, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Ian F. Feldman, Legal Aid Society, Bronx, NY, for Plaintiff.

Susan Baird, Assistant U.S. Attorney, New York, NY, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAULEY, District Judge.

The plaintiff, Ruth Jones ("Jones") brings this action against the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") pursuant to § 205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking review of a final decision denying her disability benefits. This matter was referred to a magistrate judge. Both parties moved for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The magistrate judge recommended that the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted to the extent of remanding the action to the Commissioner to further develop the record, and that the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings be denied. Neither party filed objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation ("Report").

After a de novo review, this Court agrees that the ALJ failed to adequately develop the record in reaching his determination of Jones' residual functional capacity, and thus adopts the magistrate judge's report.

BACKGROUND

Prior Proceedings

On March 8, 1994, Jones applied for Social Security Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") benefits on the basis of psychiatric problems, diabetes and joint pain. (R. 41-44.)¹ That application was denied on August 17, 1994. Jones' request for reconsideration on the basis of physical and mental disability was subsequently denied on May 24, 1995. (R. 77-80.) On February 12, 1996, Jones appeared pro se at a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). On June 20, 1996, the ALJ found that Jones was not disabled under the Social Security Act because she retained the residual functional capacity to return to her previous work, or to engage in other work which exists in the national economy. (R. 9-16.) On February 5, 1998, the Appeals Council denied Jones' request for a review of the ALJ's decision, rendering the ALJ's decision final. (R. 4.) On March 25, 1998, Jones, represented by the Legal Aid Society, commenced this action under Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act.

Testimony at the Hearing

Jones was born on March 1, 1945. At the time of the hearing, she had achieved an eleventh grade education. She was taking Impurity 100 Insulin for her diabetes, and Duptap (phonetic) for her nerves. At the time of the hearing, Jones was living with her cousin, Cora Tapp, for a few months. (R. 23, 27, 31, 33.) Jones testified that she experienced daily episodes of weakness, falling, painful arthritis, sudden blackouts, unexplained weight loss, and blurry vision. (R. 27-30.) Jones testified that she had been treated for her diabetes during 1994 and 1995 by Dr. Coven at the Soundview Health Clinic, but that she was presently looking for another physician. (R. 31, 35.) She testified that she was treated for her arthritis by Dr. Coven as well, but had stopped treatment since she left the Soundview Health Clinic. (R. 29.) She also stated that she was being treated for "her nerves" by a psychiatrist at Bronx Mental Health Services. (R. 30.) The record reveals that Jones started receiving treatment from the psychiatrist in February 1996. (R. 23.) Jones also stated that she had last worked as a home attendant for an elderly woman in 1983. (R. 26.) This job involved bathing the woman, as well as shopping and cooking for her. It also involved lifting the elderly woman whom Jones described as "very heavy." (R. 27.)

Jones' cousin, Cora Tapp, ("Tapp") with whom she lived, also testified at the hearing. She stated that Jones had lost considerable weight, and that she needed help with routine daily activities, such as grocery shopping, and running errands. (R. 33.) She also corroborated Jones' testimony regarding her sudden blackouts, adding that it would be necessary to place a piece of candy under Jones' tongue to revive her during a those times. (R. 35.)

Documentary Evidence

In reaching his decision, the ALJ relied on four patient notes signed by Dr. A. Egbunike from Bronx Lebanon Family Practice Center ("Bronx Lebanon"), and an x-ray report by Dr. J.C. Tourlitsas, also from Bronx Lebanon. The first patient note, dated February 24, 1994, indicated that Jones had a history of depression for the past four years, and recommended iron sulphate for her anemia. (R. 125.) The second patient note, dated March 1, 1994, diagnosed her with "uncontrolled" diabetes and reflected that she was being treated for depression with Hydroxyzine. The x-ray report, dated March 2, 1994, indicated that Jones suffered from hypertension and diabetes. (R. 129.) However, her heart, lung and pleuro-diaphragm were normal. (R. 129.) The third patient note, dated March 29, 1994, stated that while Jones' hypertension was under control, her diabetes remained uncontrolled. (R. 124) The fourth patient note, dated April 27, 1994, stated that Jones' diabetes appeared to be controlled, that her hypertension was well-controlled, and that she was still seeing a psychiatrist and being treated with Hydroxyzine. The note also recommended that Jones continue to take iron sulphate for her anemia. (R. 123.)

The ALJ also reviewed three consultative physical examination reports, conducted on behalf of the Commission, dated March 4, 1994, July 1, 1994 and April 18, 1995, and three consultative psychiatric examination reports, dated March 8, 1994, July 1, 1994 and April 18, 1995. In addition, the ALJ considered two residual functional capacity assessments, dated August 24, 1994 and May 10, 1995.

The ALJ's Decision

At the conclusion of the hearing, the ALJ asked Jones to obtain three medical reports: a physical report from Dr. Coven of the Soundview Health Clinic, where Jones had been treated during 1994 and 1995; a physical report from Dr. Walsh of Bronx Lebanon, and a mental report from the Bronx Mental Health Services. (R. 36-38.) The ALJ specifically stated that Dr. Coven from Soundview Health Clinic would be considered Jones' treating physician. (R. 25.) He also acknowledged both Dr. Walsh and the unidentified psychiatrist examined Jones only once, and thus, might not "be in a position to give a report if they've only seen [Jones] once or twice." (R. 25.)

The ALJ encouraged Jones' cousin to help her get the reports, and instructed Jones that if he did not hear from her in thirty days, he would "consider the record closed." (R. 38.) At the expiration of the thirty days, the ALJ wrote to Jones, stating that if he did not hear from her within ten days, he would "issue a decision." (R. 160.)

On June 20, 1996, the ALJ issued a decision denying Jones' SSI benefits, based on a finding that she was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. 9-16.) Despite the absence of any records from Jones' treating physician, Dr. Coven, the ALJ found that "the record contained ample medical evidence and that a decision could be made as to whether the plaintiff was disabled." (R. 12.) He also found that Jones retained the residual functional capacity to return to her past work as a home attendant, or other work which exists in the national economy. (R. 16.) In reaching his decision, the ALJ relied on the patient notes from Bronx Lebanon, to show that Jones' diabetes, hypertension and anemia were controllable as long as she adhered to her prescribed medication. The ALJ also relied on the consultative examinations to support his finding as to Jones' residual functional capacity.

Medical Evidence Submitted to the Appeals Council

On August 15, 1996, Dr. Walsh submitted a report, dated August 14, 1996, to the Appeals Council. (R. 161-68.) The report stated that a physical examination of Jones conducted on August 9, 1996, was normal, except for an enlarged liver and anemia. (R. 163.) Dr. Walsh found that Jones could stand, walk, lift and carry, despite her impairments. He also found that she could occasionally carry up to 20 pounds a day and that she could sit for eight hours a day; and for three hours without interruption. (R. 167.) Dr. Walsh also found that Jones could occasionally climb, kneel, crouch, stoop, balance and crawl, and that her impairments did not prevent her from reaching, handling, speaking, feeling, pushing, pulling or hearing. (R. 167.) The only environmental limitation on working noted by Dr. Walsh, was the minimization of temperature extremes. (R. 168.)

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

This Court conducts a de novo review of the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court may consider only the factual allegations in the complaint and answer. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). A party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings only if it establishes that no material facts remain to be resolved, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Carballo v. Apfel, 34 F.Supp.2d 208, 213 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citing Juster Assocs. v. Rutland, 901 F.2d 266. 269 (2d Cir.1990)).

The Social Security Act provides that the "findings of the Commissioner as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir.1996); Reynoso v. Apfel, 1998 WL 61002, at *6, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1549, at *17 (S.D.N.Y.1998). "Substantial evidence" in this context is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938)); see also Diaz v. Shalala, 59...