Jones v. Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
| Decision Date | 04 September 1990 |
| Docket Number | 89-8921,Nos. 89-8464,s. 89-8464 |
| Citation | 917 F.2d 1528 |
| Parties | Albert JONES, Plaintiff-Counter-Defendant-Appellant, v. The AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, Defendant-Counter-Claimant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
David E. Tuszynski, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff, counter-defendant, appellant.
William Lewis Spearman, Douglas W. Smith, Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Atlanta, Ga., and W. Ray Persons, Arrington & Hollowell, Atlanta, Ga., for defendant, counter-claimant, appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.
Before EDMONDSON and BIRCH, Circuit Judges, and RE *, Chief Judge.
In this diversity case involving the interpretation of the Georgia Motor Vehicle Accident Reparations Act, O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-1 et seq. (the Georgia No-Fault Act), plaintiff Albert Jones (Jones) appeals three separate orders by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. The first order granted defendant, The Automobile Insurance Company's (Insurance Company) motion in limine to exclude evidence concerning Insurance Company's relationship with other of its insureds not involved in this action, and agreed with Insurance Company's interpretation of O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) as a ceiling on recoverable insurance benefits. 698 F.Supp. 226. The second order granted Insurance Company's motions to deposit $700 with the court to settle the case and to dismiss the action in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 725 F.Supp. 528. The third order denied Jones' request for relief from the second order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
In its first order, the trial court properly interpreted O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) and properly excluded the evidence of other insureds of Insurance Company. In granting Insurance Company's motion to dismiss, the district court considered matters outside of the pleadings, thereby converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, complete with all of the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Because the district court did not comply with the ten-day notice requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), we reverse the grant of summary judgment and the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On April 24, 1986, Jones was stopped at a red light in his pick-up truck when it was struck from behind by another automobile. Jones was injured in the collision. At the time of the accident, Jones had a personal injury protection (PIP) insurance policy issued by Insurance Company. This insurance policy provided for basic "no fault" insurance benefits, consisting of a maximum of $2,500 in medical expense benefits and an aggregate maximum of $5,000 in benefits.
After his accident, Jones filed a claim with Insurance Company for payment of medical expenses and for payment of loss of earnings benefits. Insurance Company reimbursed Jones the $1,704 he had paid in medical expenses. This action concerns the amount of loss of earnings benefits to which Jones is entitled under his PIP policy.
Jones claims that as a result of his accident he was unable to work between April 25, 1986 and July 29, 1986. According to Jones' interpretation of his PIP policy and of O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B), Insurance Company must pay him 85% of the wages lost during his period of disability, at a rate of $200 per week, such payments to stop only when Jones has recovered 85% of his lost wages or when the $5,000 limitation on aggregate benefits has been reached. Insurance Company paid Jones $200 per week from April 25, 1986 until July 4, 1986, when Insurance Company claims Jones was able to return to work. Insurance Company disagrees with Jones' interpretation of O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B), contending that the statute requires Insurance Company to pay an insured loss of earnings benefits only during the insured's period of disability. Jones is also seeking statutory penalties and punitive damages from Insurance Company for its alleged bad faith in failing to pay Jones' claim for lost wages within the time provided by O.C.G.A. Secs. 33-34-6(b) and 33-34-6(c).
On November 25, 1987, Jones began this suit against Insurance Company in the state courts of Georgia. His complaint set forth claims for insurance benefits, statutory penalties and punitive damages under the Georgia No-Fault Act. Insurance Company removed this suit to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia and responded to Jones' claims. Pre-trial proceedings began.
Insurance Company filed three motions on July 12, 1988. The first was a motion in limine in which Insurance Company sought an order prohibiting Jones from tendering any evidence concerning Insurance Company's relationship with other of its insureds not involved in this action. The second motion, styled "Motion in Limine, or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment," requested that the court construe O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) as limiting the payment of loss of earnings benefits to the term of disability, and to the lesser of $200 per week or 85% of lost wages. Insurance Company's third motion, also entitled "Motion in Limine, or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment," requested that the court find unconstitutional O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-6(c), the section of the Georgia No-Fault Act pursuant to which Jones seeks punitive damages. On July 18, 1988 the district court mailed to Jones a "Notice to Respond to Summary Judgment Motion" pursuant to an April 14, 1987 "standing order" of the district court, thereby complying with the notice requirement of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 56). Jones filed his response to Insurance Company's motions in limine and for summary judgment on July 29, 1988. In an order dated November 2, 1988, the district court ruled on Insurance Company's three motions.
The order granted Insurance Company's first motion in limine to exclude evidence of transactions between Insurance Company and others insured by Insurance Company who are not involved in this action. The district court also granted Insurance Company's second motion, its "Motion in Limine or, in the Alternative for Summary Judgment", finding that O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-4(a)(2)(B) requires the insurer to pay injured insureds the lesser of $200 per week or 85% of their lost wages, only throughout the period of their disability or until the $5,000 aggregate benefits maximum is reached. The district court also found O.C.G.A. Sec. 33-34-6(c) to be constitutional, thereby denying Insurance Company's third motion. 1
On November 15, 1988, the district judge met with counsel for Jones and Insurance Company. The judge suggested that after the court's November 2, 1988 order, no issues remained to be resolved. Insurance Company expressed its willingness to pay Jones $700 ($200 per week for the three and one-half weeks of disputed disability) to conclude the action. At the end of the conference, Insurance Company was to file a motion to pay $700 into the registry of the court and to dismiss Jones' complaint. That motion was filed on February 2, 1989. Attached to that motion, entitled "Motion to Deposit Money with Court, to Dismiss Complaint and for Other Relief," was an affidavit in support of the motion. On February 21, 1989, Jones filed a response to Insurance Company's motion to dismiss, claiming that the district court's November 2, 1988 order did not dispose of all of the issues in the case. There still existed, claimed Jones, the issue of whether Insurance Company had acted in good faith in failing to pay Jones in the timely manner required by the Georgia No-Fault Act. The resolution of this issue would determine whether Jones was entitled to statutory penalties and/or punitive damages. In two separate orders, dated May 30, 1989 and June 5, 1989, the district court granted Insurance Company's motion to dismiss and to deposit money with the court. Judgment was entered for Jones in the amount of $700 on June 7, 1989. On June 12, 1989, Jones appealed from the district court's order dismissing the case.
On August 30, 1989, Jones filed with the district court a "Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment" pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (Rule 60(b)). This Rule 60(b) motion was based on documents Jones received from Insurance Company in late July, 1989. In his motion for relief, Jones claimed that these documents constituted newly discovered evidence which could not reasonably have been discovered earlier. Jones also claimed that the district court converted Insurance Company's February 2, 1989 motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment without affording Jones the notice and opportunity to be heard required by Rule 56. On September 14, 1989, Insurance Company filed an "Opposition to Jones' Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment." On September 20, 1989, we granted Jones' motion for stay pending the district court's determination of Jones' Rule 60(b) motion. The district court denied Jones' Rule 60(b) motion on October 30, 1989, indicating that Jones' newly discovered evidence would not affect its prior order and judgment. Jones appealed from the district court's denial of his Rule 60(b) motion on November 3, 1989. This latter appeal was consolidated with Jones' appeal of the district court's May 30 and June 5, 1989 orders for review by this court.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (Rule 12(b)) provides:
If on a motion ... to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be...
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