Jones v. Baltimore Transit Co.

• Decision Date: 11 December 1956
• Docket Number: No. 55,55
• Citation: Jones v. Baltimore Transit Co., 211 Md. 423, 127 A.2d 649 (Md. 1956)
• Parties: Perry JONES v. The BALTIMORE TRANSIT COMPANY, a body corporate.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 423

211 Md. 423

127 A.2d 649

Perry JONES v. The BALTIMORE TRANSIT COMPANY, a body corporate.

No. 55.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 11, 1956.

Amos I. Meyers and Robert S. Rody, Baltimore, for appellant.

Benjamin C. Howard, Baltimore (Patrick A. O'Doherty, Baltimore, on the brief), for appellee.

Before BRUNE, C. J, and COLLINS, HENDERSON, HAMMOND and PRESCOTT, JJ.

HAMMOND, Judge.

A passenger on a bus, thrown and injured by its sudden stop, sued its owner for damages. At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case, the court directed a verdict for the defendant and the appeal is from the judgment that followed.

Mrs. Perry Jones, the plaintiff below and appellant here, left her place of employment and boarded a bus that ran north on St. Paul Street, intending to get off at Preston Street. She was standing between the fare box and the front door, facing front, as the bus approached Preston Street. She was asked exactly what took place and her answer was: 'Well, the speed was very fast. It was a little too fast to be going there. On the corner, you know, where the passengers is supposed to get off, a car pulled in front of it, and he was going to fast that he had to throw on the brakes and avoid a more serious accident * * *.' She then testified that she fell across the fare box and that two other ladies waiting to get off, also fell, one of them across her. She then testified further as follows: 'Well, it wasn't quite ready to shop then but, you see, he was going so fast he, you know, when this car pulled in front of him and he had to throw on the brakes real--real--fast, you know, real quick, and that's when we all went down, and then he stopped.' After she gave this testimony, the witness was withdrawn and the doctor testified as to the injuries. Appellant's counsel next called to the stand Mrs. Ethel Kelly, one of the passengers who fell at the same time as appellant. She testified that as the bus was going north on St. Paul Street after leaving Biddle Street, she got up to get off at Preston Street, the next stop, and that she was 'standing at the front door like that (indicating) holding to the rail waiting to get off at Preston Street, and the bus was going very, very fast, and I could see up half-way of the block that there was a car standing there on the right-hand side of St. Paul Street in the bus stop, and the bus did not stop--or, did not slow down its speed. It was going very, very fast, and it just stopped suddenly, and threw us over, and we were screaming and yelling.' The testimony of appellant and Mrs. Kelly, quoted above, was all the testimony as to liability.

Appellant contends that the court erred in directing a verdict. She argues that her own evidence, that showed that the accident was caused by the negligence of the automobile which cut in front of the bus, may be disregarded and that the jury was entitled to find that the driver of the bus was negligent from the testimony as to the fast speed of the bus and its sudden stop--a stop so sudden as to cause three passengers to be thrown to the floor. We think the contentions are untenable.

The plaintiff in a suit based on negligence bears the burden of showing that it was the negligence of the defendant without disclosing the intervention of any independent factor that caused the harm complained of. In this context, an intervening cause means not a concurrent and contributing cause but a superseding cause, which itself is the natural and logical cause of the harm. Even if the plaintiff shows that the defendant was negligent, it is not enough; it must be shown that this negligence was the direct and proximate cause of the injury. Restatement, Torts, Secs. 440, 441, 447; Parsons v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 181 Md. 502, 505, 30 A.2d 788.

These general principles have been applied by this Court in cases analogous to the case before us. In Klan v. Security Motors, 164 Md. 198, 164 A. 235, the appellee was the owner of a taxicab in which the appellant, while a passenger, was injured as a result of a collision between the cab and an automobile. The appellee successfully contended that there was no direct proof of negligence against it but that there had been shown that the collision causing the injuries was produced by an independent, intervening cause as to which there was evidence of negligence. The Court applied the rule which is often applied in cases where res ipsa loquitur is relied on unsuccessfully, that "If, by the evidence of the plaintiff, it was disclosed that the injury complained of might have been caused either by the defendant's negligence or by the act of another for which the defendant was not responsible, then the doctrine (res ipsa loquitur) would not apply." The Court concluded 'For the reason that the plaintiff has, himself, offered evidence of an intervening, independent, and efficient agency as one of the causes of the collision resulting in his injuries, it was incumbent on him to prove the defendant negligent to sustain his right to recover, and, in the absence of evidence to prove such negligence, the trial court properly instructed the jury for the defendant.' In Monumental Motor Tours v. Becker, 165 Md. 32, 166 A. 434, the suit was by a passenger on a bus that was struck by a taxicab at an intersection as it was proceeding east on Fayette Street. The driver of the taxicab, called as a witness for the plaintiff, testified that he 'tried to stop his car before crossing Fayette street, but was unable to do so because the brakes were 'faulty,' although they had been working properly until that time * * *.' It was argued that negligence could be inferred from the excessive speed of the bus which had been testified to. The Court said that the fact that the plaintiff was a passenger did not prevent the application of the rule that the negligence, of which the plaintiff complains, must be the proximate cause of the injury for which he sues. It pointed out the effort by the taxi driver to stop his cab before he entered the intersection and his failure to do so, because of the defect in its brakes, and concluded: 'While relying upon the protection which the traffic sign was intended to afford for his right of way, the bus driver had no reason to anticipate and guard against such contingencies as those to which the accident in this case must be attributed, and to which the speed of the bus had no relation.' The Court cited Klan v. Security Motors, supra, and said: 'The principle of the decision in the cited case applies with special force to the facts now presented' and held that there should have been a directed verdict for the defendant. In Hickory Transfer Co. v. Nezbed, 202 Md. 253, 263, 96 A.2d 241, 245, the Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply because it appeared from the evidence produced by the plaintiffs, or in their behalf, that causes for which the defendants were in no way responsible produced the injuries for which the damages were sought. The Court said: 'In this case the plaintiffs themselves proved the details of the happening, foregoing reliance on res ipsa loquitur; and, having undertaken to prove the details, they failed to show negligence on the part of the defendants. Indeed, they explained away the possible inference of negligence. Paradoxically, ...